How the Army Runs Primer

I. Army Force Management:

1. The Army Force Management process provides prudent adjustments to the existing force, while balancing force structure requirements (manpower and equipment) within available and planned resources (people, equipment, time, and dollars). Force structure adjustments are based on guidance, constraints, and previous leadership decisions.

We start this process with an existing force structure within the Army. That is, we are modifying existing force structure, not developing a force from scratch.

2. The role of the Army is to conduct prompt and sustained combat on land. To accomplish the mission of deterring conflict and winning wars, the Army must continuously change in order to provide the most combat effective force, within available resources, for joint and expeditionary roles.

3. Successfully integrating changes in doctrine, organizations, and materiel into the Army, requires synchronizing multiple echelons of command and diverse management structures and systems. To manage force structure changes, the Army Force Management Model is the process the Army has adapted to graphically depict how it will manage force structure changes.

4. Figure 1 summarizes the major functions and processes of Force Management depicted in a logical sequence for illustration and ease of explanation only.

II. General:

1. The Army Force Management Model reflects a “System of Systems” approach. Each process provides an essential force management function. The model shows how these functions relate to each other, and to the major Department of Defense (DoD) management processes.

2. This diagram depicts a fairly linear model, in a sequential manner. These processes occur simultaneously, in parallel, in compressed format or in reverse, depending on urgency, risk and senior leader guidance. Eventually all of the steps take place to produce a fully trained, equipped and resourced operating force at the right place and time, with the required capabilities.

3. In the Army Force Management process, strategic and senior leadership guide the processes for determining warfighting requirements. The resulting product of force development provides the basis for the force integrating function of acquiring and distributing materiel, as well as acquiring, training and distributing personnel in the Army.
DETERMINE STRATEGIC and OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

1. **DETERMINE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.** This is where the PURPLE (DoD) and GREEN (Army) interface. OSD starts the process with the receipt of national security directives, initiating the interrelated OSD planning systems displayed in figure 2.


3. The Defense Planning Process establishes the bridge from OSD and JS guidance to the Army’s PPBE process. The Army’s planning and programming processes develop Army force structure, designed to meet the guidance and the needs of the Combatant Commanders.

4. The **key output**, which initiates the Army Planning System, is the programming guidance that is currently provided by the SECDEF in the DPG and QDR.

   The Army translates the OSD guidance into Army guidance (the Army Plan), and Army senior leader directives, guidance or decisions.

DEVELOP CAPABILITIES

1. The receipt of OSD and Senior Army Leader guidance initiates the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process. JCIDS identifies capabilities needed to accomplish the strategic and operational requirements. The capabilities are investigated within the **DOMAINS** of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities, commonly referred to as the domains of DOTMLPF (figure 3).

2. Each **domain** is an area providing focus for action officers to investigate solutions, products, and services to meet the required capabilities delineated in DoD directives.

3. JCIDS develops an integrated set of Army DOTMLPF requirements that support national strategies and guidance, and operational needs of the combatant commanders. This process assesses future Joint and Army warfighting functional needs and solutions.

   The analysis process is composed of a structured, four-phased methodology that defines capability gaps, capability needs, and approaches to provide those capabilities within a
specified functional or operational area. The analyses initiate the development of integrated, joint capabilities investigating solutions within Army domains of DOTMLPF.

4. JCIDS examines where we are, where we want to be, what risks we may face and what it might cost.

5. TRADOC’s Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) submits DOTMLPF solution sets for ARSTAF validation and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) approval via the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) validation and approval process.

6. The key output is the recommendation of a solution set within the domain of DOTMLPF to the ARSTAF.

MATERIEL ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PROCESS

NOTE: Non-materiel solutions are analyzed first. Non-materiel solutions are normally quicker to implement and cost less.

1. If the DOTMLPF solution to the capability gap or shortcoming is determined to be within the materiel domain, hardware is developed to meet the requirement. Materiel solutions are developed within the Defense Acquisition Management System (figure 4).

2. The Acquisition process consists of a series of sequential management decisions, made within DoD, the Army Secretariat (ARSEC) or the ARSTAF, as the development of a materiel system progresses from a stated materiel requirement to the fielding of an operational and supportable system, in Accordance with DoD INSTRUCTIONS 5000.1 and 5000.2.

3. Figure 4 reflects the Acquisition process, the milestones and the decision points as the development of the hardware system moves through the process.

4. The key output of this sub-process is the Basis of Issue Plan feeder data (BOIPFD) and a fully operational, affordable and sustainable system. The BOIPFD is the primary input to the BOIP, a requirements document, developed in the next phase by the United States Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA). The BOIP is discussed in the Develop Organization Models phase.

DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS

1. If the DOTMLPF solution developed in the “Develop Capabilities” section is an Organizational Solution, we move to the DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS PHASE. In this phase (figure 5), we address new organizations and modifications to existing organizations. The Design Organizations phase analyzes the proposed organization for doctrinal correctness. The Design Organizations phase provides a forum for the entire Army, to review the issue and links the Capabilities, Materiel, Training, and Document Developers together.
2. Proposed organizational solutions to meet desired capability require the development of a Unit Reference Sheet (URS). The URS contains sufficient data about a unit’s personnel and equipment to support Army force design initiatives.

3. The next step is the Force Design Update (FDU) process.
   a. Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Force Design Directorate (FDD), at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, shepherds the FDU process for the Army.
   b. The Army takes a good idea from a variety of sources; staffs them through the proponent centers and schools, forward to FDD to ensure the proposed organizational solution is **doctrinally correct**. The Commanding General (CG) of TRADOC recommendation is forwarded to the CSA/VCSA for decision and implementation instructions.

4. The **key output** is an approved design and implementation instructions from the CSA or VCSA.

**DEVELOP ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS**

1. We start this phase with two potential inputs: a Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) for a new piece of equipment **OR** an FDU decision for an organizational change.


3. USAFMSA, United States Medical Command (MEDCOM) and United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) develop TOEs and BOIPs codifying the input from the FDU process or the Materiel Acquisition Management Process (BOIP feeder data) at **Figure 6**.

4. USAFMSA, USASOC and MEDCOM apply **rules, standards, and guidance** to the doctrinally correct design to produce a new organizational model – called the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for operating forces. Other changes may just modify an existing TOE; or require a change of a Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) for equipment that also can result in changes to a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for generating forces (made at unit level).

5. The TOEs and BOIPS are **KEY OUTPUT** documents from this process.

**DETERMINE AUTHORIZATIONS**

1. After HQDA approves the TOE/TDA/BOIP, the desired “unit type” competes in the resourcing phase for authorizations within the Army’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Process (PPBE). The **DETERMINE AUTHORIZATIONS** phase provides the proper mix of organizations, resulting in a balanced and affordable force structure, which supports the Joint and Army Guidance (figure 7). The guidance includes the Directed Force.
Currently, the force projected for a 450K end strength level is 52 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs); 28 AC BCTs and 24 RC BCTs.

2. **ARMY GUIDANCE:**
   a. The Army Plan (TAP) is the principal guidance provided from the Secretary of the Army (SA) and CSA to the Army for development of the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission. The TAP articulates the transition of DoD guidance to all Services into Army-specific planning. The TAP provides guidance on Strategy, Threat Data, Resource Priorities and Force Structure Guidance.
   b. The SA, CSA, VCSA, G-3/5/7 and G-8, provide the directives and guidance to the ARSEC, ARSTAF and commands in form, substance, direction and process to accomplish the missions through the Army Planning System and develop force structure to meet OSD guidance.

3. **Figure 7** represents the flow of the PPBE process. The Total Army Analysis (TAA) process is what moves the PPBE process from Planning to Programming, providing the **POM FORCE** as input to the G-8, Program Analysis and Evaluation Division (PA&E).

4. The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process called TAA. *The TAA process is currently under review*. Based on the guidance and inputs, the Army modifies our current force through TAA. TAA determines the force structure needed to support the “directed force”. The TAA process modifies the current force, identifies the total requirements (Operating and Generating Force) and ultimately resources the future force. This sub-process determines the correct mix of organizations required and resourced to meet the guidance, within resource constraints.

5. The purpose of TAA is to develop requirements and authorizations defining the force structure the Army must build, raise, provision, sustain, maintain, train and resource.

6. During the Resourcing phase (determining authorizations), the requirements compete for resourcing (authorized number of units, by type), based on Army leadership directives, written guidance, risk analysis and inputs from the Combatant Commanders. Each component, command and branch is competing for the limited resources.

7. The **KEY OUTPUTS** from the PPBE/TAA processes are:
   a. POM Force. The resulting force structure is forwarded to the Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army (SLDA) for approval. The approved POM force is forwarded to the OSD with a recommendation for approval. The POM force contains the type organization, the FY, COMPO and the action (activation, inactivation, conversion, or reorganization).
   b. Army Structure Memorandum (ARSTRUC). The ARSTRUC provides the ARSEC, ARSTAF, commands and Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) the results of the TAA process.
   c. The Army’s POM submission to OSD from the Army’s PPBE process.
DOCUMENT ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS

1. After approval of the resourced force structure by Army leadership, the United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) manages the process of documenting the decision(s) (figure 8).

2. USAFMSA develops the authorization documents through the Force Management System (FMS) Web. This process results in the generation of organizational authorizations documented as modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) or tables of distribution and allowance (TDA).

3. The programmed and budgeted force is documented ensuring the organizations may place demands on the functional systems (manning, equipping, resourcing, stationing, etc).

4. Finally, the Structure and Composition System (SACS) computes the personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations based on integrating the input from BOIPs, TOEs, SAMAS, through FMS to compute personnel (PERSACS) and equipment (LOGSACS) requirements and authorizations for the next ten years.

4. **Key Outputs**: SAMAS database, FMS Documents (MTOE/TDA) and SACS.

ACQUIRE, TRAIN and DISTRIBUTE PERSONNEL

1. Having developed the Authorization Document, we can now address the issues of: **ACQUIRE, TRAIN, and DISTRIBUTE** in terms of personnel.

2. Based on the results of PERSACS, more specifically PMAD (Personnel Management Authorization Document), the Human Resources Command (HRC) can compare the personnel authorizations, based on MTOEs and TDAs, to the current and projected inventory of Soldiers by grade, skill and MOS.

3. The various personnel processes predict the recruiting, retention and training needs of the Army over the POM years.

4. The Human Resources Command distributes personnel in accordance with the MTOE and TDA authorization, Army priorities and inventory available.

5. **Figure 9** highlights several interconnected activities.

6. The **Key Output** is the assignment of an individual by grade, skill and MOS to a valid authorization.
ACQUIRE and DISTRIBUTE EQUIPMENT

1. We now address the materiel we can DISTRIBUTE and what we must ACQUIRE in terms of equipment.

2. Based on the results of LOGSACS, the DCS, G-8, DCS, G-4 and Army Materiel Command (AMC), compare the equipment authorizations to the current inventory of equipment by Line Item Number (LIN), Equipment Readiness Code (ERC) and quantity (figure 10).

3. Our logisticians acquire and allocate equipment based on:
   a. The total REQUIREMENTS and total AUTHORIZATIONS.
   b. Equipment quantities on hand.
   c. Army PRIORITIES.

4. The Key Output for this process is a distribution plan.

PROVIDE COMBAT READY UNITS

1. At this point - MANPOWER and EQUIPMENT have been acquired, personnel trained and both have been distributed to the Army to provide combat ready units to the Combatant Commanders.

2. The Combatant Commander and the Services were provided the same direction and guidance (DPG) at the same time (“Purple - Green” interface) (Figure 2).

3. Two issues the Army must address during this period of Transformation are STATIONING and READINESS (Figure 11).
   a. STATIONING.
      1) The Army will eventually field 52 BCTs: 28 AC BCTs and 24 ARNG BCTs. The stationing of each brigade is critical within existing facilities.
      2) Base Re-alignment and Closure (BRAC).
      3) Each of these stationing issues brings FACILITY issues to the table for UNITS – such as motor pools, billets and ranges; and FACILITIES for FAMILIES.
   b. READINESS.
      1) The Army must provide to the combatant commanders the force structure required to meet the tasks the President and the Secretary of Defense have articulated.
      2) The Army is evaluated on our ability to “Provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies.”

4. The Key Output is the evaluation of how well the Army provided combat ready organizations to the Combatant Commanders.
SUMMARY

1. Although the Army Force Management Model depicts a **fairly linear model**, in a **sequential** manner, managing change may mandate that any one or several of these processes occur **simultaneously**, in **parallel**, in **compressed** format or in reverse depending on **urgency**, **risk** and senior leader **guidance**.

2. It is important to note that eventually all of the processes and systems must be addressed to field, maintain, sustain and resource the current and future Army force structure.

3. What is not depicted in the Army Force Management Model are all of the potential coordination lines between systems, processes or blocks. Alternative paths, not reflected in the model, may be needed to verify impacts of decisions, re-evaluation when a solution is rejected based on a change in strategy, threat, leadership decisions, resourcing or identification of a new capability required based on identification of a new or different capabilities gap.

4. When a solution has been determined, resourced, funded and documented, the solution becomes the major input to other processes such as the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model, Force Integration Functional Areas (FIFA), Force Feasibility Review (FFR), and Force Validation Committee (FVC) for implementation and evaluation.