





A Framework for Discussing U.S. Joint Force Structures during the Next Administration

12 November 2008



Multiple (Competing) \$T demands upon the Federal Budget for FY09 (and beyond)



How will budget demands upon the Federal Budget be “Resolved?”



Competing Views of Future Defense Budgets (FY10-FY16)

President Bush



Denis McDonough



Chairman JCS



Rep. Barney Frank



FY08-09

Option 1

Option 2

Option 3

Baseline Budget

\$515

\$515

\$515

\$386.25

Supplementals

\$188

\$60

\$0

\$0

Total:

\$703

\$575

\$515

\$386

FY08 Delta

\$0

(\$128)

(\$188)

(\$317)

0%

-18.2%

-26.7%


-45.1%



Obama Administration's Range of Alternatives?


Option 4

10% Growth: Resetting the force & Defense as a middle class jobs program to support economic recovery



What's NOT in the DOD Budget?

Factors NOT included in POM/POR



1. A SMALLER Force Structure



Joint Building Block Comparison (Force Structure Alternatives)


— POM 08
(What we wanted)

- POM 08 Program of Record**
- 313 ship Navy
 - 6 MEB Marine Corps
 - 43 Maneuver Bde Army
 - 10 EAF Air Force

Option 4

How do we cut by:


- 15%
- 21%
- 30%
- 45%



Joint Force Structure Taxonomy

What is your going-in position?

- **“Equal Pain”** (a la Colin Powell)



FY08 Service Splits of DoD TOA

Keep the Service Splits

- **“Disproportionate Cuts”** (data driven)

USAF & USN ~60% of Budget

- Most expensive platforms
- Highest O&S costs

USA & USMC forces are having the greatest influence in CENTCOM

- SASO/SSTR are ground operations


Change the Service Splits

Let the Debate Begin...

15% CUT

DoD Reduction (Level I)

- 260 ship Navy
- 6 MEB Marine Corps
- 40 Maneuver Bde Army
- 10 EAF(-) Air Force




- End Strength (~1.2M Active, 362K Reserves)
- Rationale Thematic: Equal pain
- Implications: Reduced Surge Capacity



20% CUT

DoD Reduction (Level II)

- 220 ship Navy
- 5 MEB Marine Corps
- 38 Maneuver Bde Army
- 9 EAF Air Force




- End Strength (~1.1M Active, 340K Reserves)
- Rationale Thematic: Air-Land Favoritism
- Impacts: Reduced surge capacity & additional dependence on FWD basing



30% CUT

DoD Reduction (Level III)

- 190 ship Navy
- 4 MEB Marine Corps
- 35 Maneuver Bde Army
- 7 EAF Air Force



~ 30% Cuts implies heavy dependence upon multinational coordination


- End Strength (~0.9M Active, 298K Reserves)
- Rationale Thematic: Disproportional cuts to “high cost of ownership” forces
- Impacts: Reduced surge capacity, additional dependence on FWD basing, dependence on coalition responses in medium scale contingencies



45% CUT

DoD Reduction (Level IV)

- 150 ship Navy
- 4 MEB Marine Corps
- 35 Maneuver Bde Army
- 4 EAF Air Force



> 30% Cuts will lead sacrificing missions


- End Strength (~0.7M Active, 234K Reserves)
- Rationale Thematic: Disproportional cuts to “high cost of ownership” forces
- Impacts: Reduced surge capacity, additional dependence on FWD basing, dependence on coalition responses in any/all contingencies



Level - I

15% Cut

- DoD Reduction (Level I)**
- 260 ship Navy
 - 6 MEB Marine Corps
 - 40 Maneuver Bde Army
 - 9 EAF(-) Air Force




Naval Forces

Ground Forces

Air Forces

20% Cut

- DoD Reduction (Level II)**
- 220 ship Navy
 - 5 MEB Marine Corps
 - 38 Maneuver Bde Army
 - 8 EAF Air Force




Naval Forces

Ground Forces


Air Forces

30% Cut

- DoD Reduction (Level III)**
- 190 ship Navy
 - 4 MEB Marine Corps
 - 35 Maneuver Bde Army
 - 7 EAF Air Force



- DoD Reduction (Level IV)**
- 150 ship Navy
 - 4 MEB Marine Corps
 - 35 Maneuver Bde Army
 - 4 EAF Air Force



Naval Forces

Ground Forces






Air Forces

(Smaller Squadrons)

- Low-Density, high-demand functions and features must be protected
 - Minor cut-back(s) can lead to the deactivation of large capabilities(!)

2. A DIFFERENT Force Structure






National Defense Strategy Security Challenge Descriptions

- **Traditional** challenges are largely represented by states employing legacy and advanced military capabilities and recognizable military forces, in long established, well known forms of military competition and conflict.
- **Irregular** challenges are unconventional methods adopted and employed by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents.
- **Catastrophic** challenges involve surreptitious acquisition, possession and possible terrorist or rogue employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects.
- **Disruptive** future challenges are those likely to emanate from competitors developing, possessing, and employing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to supplant an opponent's advantages in particular operational domains.

Shift in policy → Shift in priorities → Shift in investments

OLD

Classic Kinetic Assessment Methodology




Modified Performance Assessment Methodology

DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations

DOD GUIDANCE TO FOCUS ON "SOFT POWER"

NEW

Preventing War




4.1. **Stability operations** are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Not “Either-Or,” Rather “What the Balance Ought to Be?”

OLD

Classic Kinetic Assessment Methodology



99% : 1%
 60% : 40%
 50% : 50%
 33.3% : 66.6%
 25% : 75%


Old School
Cold War Style
Force-on-Force Threat
Correlation of Forces

Application of force
 Death & Destruction

New School
**Persistent SASO/
 SSTR Threats**

**NOT a “Lesser
 Included Case” (!)**

Modified Performance Assessment Methodology



Prevention of Conflict
 “Hearts & Minds”


How Should The Joint Forces be Trained, Equipped & Organized?

Sea-Air-Land Forces

*They come,
they do violent acts,
they leave*

They stay

<i>Expeditionary</i>		<i>SASO</i>	
<i>Forcible Entry Forces</i>	<i>Operational Maneuver Warfare Forces</i>	<i>Counterinsurgency Forces</i>	<i>SSTR & MOOTW Forces</i>



Expeditionary *Destroying enemy force structure, and (if needed) change of government (or identity)*

- **Forcible Entry Forces** – profoundly combined arms forces, optimized for rapid deployment and employment when theater access is denied or non-existent
- **Operational Maneuver Warfare Forces** – heavy mechanized firepower intensive forces designed to destroy enemy military units (designed for deployment to theaters once access has been gained and assured, and employed to destroy major enemy forces, conquer territory, impose regime change (or identity change))

Security & Stability Operations (SASO) *Competitive Governance: Protect populations & isolate populations from enemy influence*

- **Counterinsurgency Forces** – to support and enhance the capabilities for governance and military operations of a ruling coalition partner to suppress, defeat, neutralize an insurgent element, either locally or externally supported
- **SSTR & MOOTW Forces** – military diplomacy and furthering political engagement aimed at conditioning a future battlespace by enhancing the capabilities of potential allies and opposition units (not all are state actors) -- prevent crisis & conflict (if possible)

Sea-Air-Land Forces

*They come,
they do violent acts,
they leave*

They stay

	<i>Expeditionary</i>		<i>SASO</i>	
	<i>Forcible Entry Forces</i>	<i>Operational Maneuver Warfare Forces</i>	<i>Counterinsurgency Forces</i>	<i>SSTR & MOOTW Forces</i>
2001 ACTIVE	USA: 1.3 Div USMC: ~0.5 DE*	USA: 8 Div USMC: 1.5 DE	0	USA: 1 Div USMC: 0.7 DE
2001 Reserves	USA: 0 USMC: 0.5 DE	ArmyNG: 8 Div USMC: 0.5 DE	ArmyNG: 1 USMC: 0	USARes: 1 USMC: 0

*USA: ~10.3 Divisions (Active)
USMC: 8 RCT Equiv/s (Active)*

~ 13 Div Equ. (Active) + ~11 DE (Reserves) = 24 Division Force Structure

** Enough lift for only 1 Division Equivalent*

Sea-Air-Land Forces

*They come,
they do violent acts,
they leave*

They stay

	<i>Expeditionary</i>		<i>SASO</i>	
	<i>Forcible Entry Forces</i>	<i>Operational Maneuver Warfare Forces</i>	<i>Counterinsurgency Forces</i>	<i>SSTR & MOOTW Forces</i>
2007 ACTIVE	USA: 0.8 Div USMC: ~0.5 DE*	USA: 2 Div USMC: 0.5 DE	USA: 8 DE USMC: 1.5 DE	USA: 1 Div USMC: 0.5 DE
2007 Reserves	USA: 0 USMC: 0	ArmyNG: 3 Div USMC: 0.5 DE	ArmyNG: 5 USMC: 0.5 DE	USARes: 1 USMC: 0

*USA: ~11.8 Divisions (Active)
USMC: ~8 RCT Equiv/s (Active)*

~ 14.8 Div Equ. (Active) + ~10 DE (Reserves) = ~24.8 Division Force Structure

*There is a lot of artillery operating as infantry...
(USA/ANG: may be 3 or 4 Div heavier in Counterinsurgency forces)*

Sea-Air-Land Forces

*They come,
they do violent acts,
they leave*

They stay

	<i>Expeditionary</i>		<i>SASO</i>	
	<i>Forcible Entry Forces</i>	<i>Operational Maneuver Warfare Forces</i>	<i>Counterinsurgency Forces</i>	<i>SSTR & MOOTW Forces</i>
2010 ACTIVE	USA: 1 Div USMC: 0.5 DE	USA: 3 Div USMC: 1 DE	USA: 9 DE USMC: 1.1 DE	USA: 1 Div USMC: 0.7 DE
2010 Reserves	USA: 0 USMC: 0	ArmyNG: 3 Div USMC: 0.5 DE	ArmyNG: 5 USMC: 0.5 DE	USARes: 1 USMC: 0

*USA: ~14 Divisions (Active)
USMC: ~10 RCT Equiv/s (Active)*

~ 17.3 Div Equ. (Active) + ~10 DE (Reserves) = ~27.3 Division Force Structure

*There is a lot of artillery operating as infantry...
(USA/ANG: may be 3 or 4 Div heavier in Counterinsurgency forces)*

Sea-Air-Land Forces

*They come,
they do violent acts,
they leave*

They stay

	<i>Expeditionary</i>		<i>SASO</i>	
	<i>Forcible Entry Forces</i>	<i>Operational Maneuver Warfare Forces</i>	<i>Counterinsurgency Forces</i>	<i>SSTR & MOOTW Forces</i>
2010 ACTIVE	<i>USA: 0.8 Div USMC: 1 DE</i>	<i>USA: 4 Div USMC: 1 DE</i>	<i>USA: 7 DE USMC: 0.5 DE</i>	<i>USA: 2 Div USMC: 0.7 DE</i>
2010 Reserves	<i>ArmyNG: 0 USMC: 0</i>	<i>ArmyNG: 2 Div USMC: 0.5 DE</i>	<i>ArmyNG: 5 USMC: 0.5 DE</i>	<i>USARes: 2 USMC: 0</i>

*USA: ~4.8 Div (Active)
USMC: ~6 RCT Equiv/s (Active)
link to lift & re-use requirements*

*USA: 9 Div (Active)
USMC: ~4 RCT Equiv/s (Active)*

~ 17 Div Equ. (Active) + ~10 DE (Reserves) = ~27 Division Force Structure

Take Artillery out of the infantry, but give them a secondary mission of "Civil Affairs"

What do we re-set the ground forces to be? ... (2012 to 2020 horizon)

Summary & Conclusion (Part A)

- Implications for next DoD Analytic Agenda
 - Reflect the (1) Smaller and (2) Different Forces
 - Air-Land Combat Scenarios (1 to 3)
 - We must retain a cutting-edge military able to defeat conventional adversaries
 - New Scenarios to reflect “pockets of exploitation” (3 to 8)
 - Smaller Military, means less forward presence
 - Smaller Military, means fewer missions (new or existing)
 - Smaller Military, means disengagement
 - Significantly more cooperative peacetime operations

How can the Joint forces do “more with less?”


A Once-in-a-Century Opportunity...



1998




Programmatic Ebbs & Flows




1998



Window of Opportunity



Total Cumulative Planned Expenditures on Current Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs



Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Across the board: 100% over budget, 8+ year delays

Summary & Conclusion (Part B)


- DoD Force Structure
 - Virtually a “clean slate”
 - New DoD leadership can begin the process of doing whatever they want

– The Obama administration has the opportunity to set the stage for US Military forces for the next 50-100 years (!)



Does JFCOM seek to be “reactive?” or “proactive?”

Questions?

I:G Ratio
1.2



I:G Ratio
4.2



Over 20 years: Industry labor rates will have increased ~90%, Labor force will have contracted by ~42%
Government labor rates will have increased ~100%, Labor force will have contracted by ~83%

Joint Building Block Comparison (Force Structure Alternatives)

**VIEWGRAPH
GENERATED
IN DEC 2005**

POM 08 Program of Record

- 300 ship Navy
- 6 MEB Marine Corps
- 43 Maneuver Bde Army
- 10 AEF Air Force


Affordable Objectives?

- 190 ship Navy
- 5 MEB Marine Corps
- 35 Maneuver Bde Army
- 8 AEF Air Force

— POM 08
(What we want)

— What we can afford


RED indicates units that may be eliminated from the force structure



This level/degree of contraction is inevitable, unless we take actions to prevent it.

20% Cut

- DoD Reduction (Level II)**
- 220 ship Navy
 - 5 MEB Marine Corps
 - 38 Maneuver Bde Army
 - 9 EAF Air Force




Naval Forces

Ground Forces

Air Forces

Four Phases of Resolution

- Phase 2
 - The Hunt for Funds (Passing the Hat)




End Strength

- Army
 - 2008: This year the President approved accelerating the end-strength of the Army's Active Component to 547,000 and the Army National Guard to 358,200 by 2010.
- Navy –
 - 2008 (332,436): With the Navy's Fleet of the future established, and seeing cost-savings platforms being delivered to the Fleet, the Navy announced Feb. 5 2007 the plan to reach an end strength number of 328,4000 for active duty and 67,800 for reserves in 2008, reaching a floor of approximately 322,000 for active duty and 68,000 for reserves in 2013.
- Air Force –
 - 2008: of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne said, "I must stand by the 316,000" figure in USAF's budget request. A few minutes later, he declared, "We really would prefer to hedge our bet at 330,000."
 - At which point Chairman Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) sighed, "I kind of feel like Mark Twain, [who once said], 'The more is explained to me, the more I don't understand it.' "
 - He's not alone. We know that USAF today has 329,000 airmen. Whether that end strength is going up or down, though, is a topic snarled in the arcana of federal budgets and Pentagon politics.
 - Wynne himself is not confused. Far from it. He is simply trapped by what he officially must say.
 - Where did 316,000 come from? At the end of 2004, USAF had 376,600 actives. Service leaders, desperately seeking funds to support recapitalization, laid plans to cut 60,000 airmen, leaving 316,600. The last increment of 13,000 airmen was to go in 2009.
- USMC –
 - 2008 (194,000): We continue to retain Marines at unprecedented levels in order to grow the Marine Corps' end strength to 202,000. Retention goals were substantially increased in mid-fiscal year 2007 and will continue to increase through fiscal year 2011 to support the continued growth of our force. The dynamics of the Corps' manpower system must match the required skills and grades to stand up and staff additional units to enable a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell time ratio.





Impending Fiscal Realities

POM-08



Factors NOT included in POM/POR



FY08 Service Splits of DoD TOA

