

INFORMATION PAPER

NGB-ARZ
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SUBJECT: Definition of Operational Reserve Force

1. PURPOSE. Provide the Army National Guard's definition of "Operational Reserve Force."

2. DISCUSSION.

- a. The proposed Army National Guard definition of an Operational Reserve Force is: a reserve of operational capabilities organized and resourced in a recurrent predictable cycle to support Army requirements, in peace and war; an Operational Reserve Force is fully manned, equipped and trained to provide ready units across the full spectrum of operations.
- b. The ARNG's rationale for this definition of an Operational Reserve Force is as follows:


The qualifiers in the fore mentioned definition drive the resourcing requirements. The definition must state 'fully manned' as this is the key component to success in an operational force. You cannot be operational if you cannot fully man a unit. We were undermanned in the beginning of this epoch of conflict and quick fix solution like cross-leveling further exacerbated ARNG readiness. Untrained, non-available, and non-deployable Soldiers residing in deployable force structure minimize personnel readiness. Units which fall short of the requisite readiness level cannot be operational. The recurrent predictable cycle followed by organized and resourced is the mechanism which drives the cyclical resourcing indicative of an Operational Reserve Force without this we are simply a Strategic Reserve.

- c. The ARNG's Vision Statement: The Army National Guard is a community-based, dual-missioned, operational force that is fully manned, equipped and trained to provide the Army ready units in a recurrent predictable cycle and able to respond to domestic missions on behalf of the Governors. Our goal is to achieve full spectrum readiness for ARNG units and full deployment readiness on mobilization.
- d. The ARNG is employed as an Operational Reserve today and we have accomplished great achievements during an arduous era while transforming from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve. During this time, with the support of the Army; the ARNG has turned around recruiting and grown ARNG End Strength from 329,893 in 2005 to 357,647 currently. While increasing End Strength we also increased the quality of our ARNG Soldiers and formations from MOSQ 77.7% in 2005 to 92% currently. However, there remains a gap of 33,499 between the ARNG Trained Strength and overall End Strength, representing the ARNG training pipeline consisting of Soldiers Awaiting IET, Awaiting Phase II, and At Training. This perpetual gap of 9.4% to End Strength ensures that ARNG units will never exceed 91% readiness. We removed excess Force Structure; taking it from 376,105 in 2005 to 349,157 today. The ARNG has made tremendous gains in manning our units, but we still have much work to be done to become fully operational. With the continued support of the Army we will achieve these lofty goals.

- e. A TTHS account for the ARNG will produce increased readiness as a function of assigning only trained, ready, and available Soldiers to the operational force while accepting risk with the generating force. This will reduce the necessity to break trained units in order to cross-level Soldiers into sourced and alerted units. This ability to preserve future force pools will result in an increase in the ability of unit commanders to complete individual and collective training tasks prior to mobilization which in turn will reduce the time spent at the mobilization station.
- f. The ARNG's training posture also improved during this time period. In FY05 our training strength was 78%. We had significant personnel cross-leveling in order to field and deploy a unit, less than 60% equipment availability, and units mobilized for 18 months at a time. In FY09, ARNG units have all their required Soldiers and those Soldiers are trained and have 100% of the equipment available with a training strength of 91%. This allows us to mobilize Soldiers for a 12 month period which better permits stability for Employers and Families. While tremendous gains in training have been made there is much work ahead to become fully operational. The continued support of the Army will enable us to achieve these lofty goals.
- g. The ARNG's equipping readiness has improved. However, we are a long way away from being a fully Operational Reserve Force. We must field our units with modern equipment on par with AC units to maintain interoperability on the battlefield and for domestic support mission. We are maximizing effective training while increasing our domestic response. The ARNG trains the way we fight. So the question becomes how do we achieve this objective? The answer is to fully acquire the FY 07 -13 programmed resources of \$36B to achieve our goal. The ARNG equipping goal is to fully modernize and equip all ARNG BCTs by 2015 and all other units to 100% by 2019.
- h. When the ARNG is fully manned, fully trained, and fully equipped to the specified levels then, and only then, will we be a fully Operational Reserve Force. Not a full-time Operational Force, but rather a fully Operational Reserve Force.
- i. The Reserve Components have made great gains in this era of Army transformation of their institutional base to support an operational force. However, despite progress in many trends, the Reserve Components remain under- resourced for the demands of sustaining Operational Reserve Forces. They face serious equipment shortages, shortages of full-time support, and inadequate mobilization infrastructure.

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