



ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY



www.g8.army.mil

Front Cover

Sgt. Chris Coats and Pfc. William Westmeyer, 561st Military Police Company, attached to 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, pull security outside an open-air market in subdistrict 9 of Kandahar City, July 30. Coats' team conducted random searches of businesses in the area to identify possible improvised explosive device cells.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
201 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0201

JUL 27 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Army Equipping Strategy

1. Enclosed is the Army Equipping Strategy through fiscal year 2012. This equipping strategy builds on the success of the fiscal year 2010 Army Equipping Strategy that helped the Army move toward balancing requirements with resources and facilitated moving us into an Army Force Generation-based force during a period of persistent conflict.
2. This update was required due to changing economic and political realities. It retains the primary goal of ensuring Soldiers have the right equipment, in the right amounts, at the right time to accomplish assigned missions. Also, it is based on the same three Lines of Effort of Unit-Based Equipping, Managing Friction and Building Enduring Readiness. New concepts introduced in the strategy include equipping a supply-based Army, tailored equipping and greater agility in meeting equipping demands.
3. This strategy is effective immediately. Local reproduction is authorized to achieve maximum promulgation throughout the Army.
4. The point of contact for this action is Mr. Lane Van de Steeg, (703) 692-3804.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "P. Chiarelli", is positioned above the typed name.

Encl

PETER W. CHIARELLI
General, U.S. Army
Vice Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

Principal Officials of Headquarters, Department of the Army
Commander

- U.S. Army Forces Command
- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
- U.S. Army Materiel Command
- U.S. Army Europe
- U.S. Army Central
- U.S. Army North

(CONT)

SUBJECT: Army Equipping Strategy

DISTRIBUTION: (CONT)

U.S. Army South
U.S. Army Pacific
U.S. Army Africa
U.S. Army Special Operations Command
Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command
Eighth U.S. Army
U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Signal Command (Army)
U.S. Army Medical Command
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Army Military District of Washington
U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command
U.S. Army Reserve Command
U.S. Army Installation Management Command
Superintendent, United States Military Academy
Director, U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center

CF:

Commander, U.S. Army Accessions Command
Commander, U.S. Army Cyber Command
Director, Business Transformation
Director, Army National Guard
Executive Director, Army National Cemeteries Program (w/o encl)

U.S. ARMY

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

27 July 2011

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	4
BACKGROUND	4
Equipping Agility.....	4
Changing Combat Missions.....	4
Growth.....	5
Best Value Readiness	6
Changing Processes and Policies	6
EQUIPPING STRATEGY	7
1. THE ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES – ENDS.....	7
2. THE ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY – WAYS	7
UNIT-BASED EQUIPPING	7
Equipping to Aim Points	8
RESET	9
TRAIN/READY	10
SURGE AND AVAILABLE FORCES.....	10
Tailored Equipping	10
Post-CEF Mission Reset.....	11
High Priority Non-Rotational Units	12
Generating Force.....	12
Critical Dual Use Equipment	12
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive Requirements	12
MANAGING FRICTION	13
Army Acquisition Objective (AAO).....	13
Equipping Stewardship	14
Equipping Sets	14
Force Feasibility Review (FFR).....	14
BUILDING ENDURING READINESS	15

Equipped to Mission

3. ACHIEVING THE STRATEGY – MEANS	17
Precise Understanding of Demand Signal	17
100 Percent Equipment Visibility.....	17
Focused Leadership.....	17
Commodity-Based Equipping Strategies	17
Automation Tools	18
RISK ASSESSMENT.....	18
Generating Force Risk.....	18
Training Risk	18
Strategic Depth.....	18
HLD/DSCA Risk	19
CONCLUSION	19

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

The Army Equipping Strategy describes the ends, ways and means the Army will use to ensure Soldiers and units have the right equipment in the quantities needed to accomplish assigned missions in support of Combatant Commander (COCOM) requirements. It describes how equipment and capabilities, provided by the Army Modernization Strategy, are distributed and placed into a unit to synchronize it with its assigned mission. The strategy establishes goals, targets and metrics for achieving a balance between requirements and resources.

The scope of the Equipping Strategy includes the entire Army: Active Component (AC), Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). It addresses the Operational Force (both rotational and non-rotational) and the Generating Force. The Strategy is a dynamic and flexible document that addresses the divergent needs and requirements for all components.



BACKGROUND

In 2009, the Army published the Fiscal Year 2010 (FY10) Equipping Strategy to facilitate the Army's transition from a Cold War-tiered readiness system into an Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)-based force during sustained conflict. The strategy described the processes by which the Army ensures Soldiers operating within the ARFORGEN model have the right amount of equipment and the proper modernization level to meet their missions. It established three lines of operation: ARFORGEN-Based Equipping, Managing Friction and Building Enduring Readiness. Although much has remained applicable, significant changes have occurred that require the revision of the strategy. This revision addresses the Army's strategy to deal with those challenges. The challenges can be grouped into five categories:

1. Equipping Agility: Successfully equipping Soldiers and units in an era of sustained conflict requires the Army to be agile in its equipping processes. A key to the Army's success in Operation New Dawn (OND), formerly Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has been its ability to adapt to a dynamic

enemy and changing environment. The Army used Operational Needs Statements (ONS) and Mission Essential Equipment Lists (MEEL) to adapt units to theater-specific requirements, pivoting where needed from the Minimum Mission Essential Wartime Requirements articulated in their Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). The Army also established equipment-only Tables of Distribution and Allowances (E-TDAs) in theater to document the requirement for MEEL equipment. As we train and prepare for Full-Spectrum Operations (FSO), these adaptive strategies to meet mission requirements will be evaluated again. These strategies include equipping Contingency and Surge Force missions.

2. Changing Combat Missions: The Army has begun to draw down forces and equipment from OND and increased its presence in OEF. Drawdown operations are retrograding large quantities of equipment back to the United States and will also allow the Army to begin the process of increasing unit dwell times. It will also reduce the number of units with Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) missions, i.e., task organized to either execute planned operational requirements or are currently executing deployed missions, and will

Equipped to Mission

increase the number of units with Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) missions, i.e., Available Force units that are task organized to meet

non-linear battlefield conditions found in Iraq and Afghanistan. These conditions required all Soldiers to have equal levels of protection and lethality. Growth




Figure 1. Equipping Strategy Comparison

operational plans and contingency requirements. These changes will impact equipment Reset and transit operations and will mean more forces must be equipped in accordance with their MTOE authorizations, rather than to a MEEL, to execute FSO against a hybrid threat.

3. Growth: Although the Army has benefited from larger Base and Supplemental budgets, it still has to cope with equipment shortages. From 2003 to 2011, the number of items in MTOEs increased by 107 percent. The growth was in response to the

also resulted from technological advancements that provided Soldiers with new levels of situational awareness, battlefield survivability and combat power. Rapid acquisition and fielding, modularization and Grow the Army operations have outpaced the Army's ability to ensure the documentation (e.g., MTOEs, TDAs) is correct and current. The Army must apply discipline to the process of changing requirements and authorization documents while, at the same time, retaining the qualitative and innovative edge over our potential adversaries. The Army must improve its ability to provide new and innovative

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

equipment to units to meet COCOM requirements without creating the documentation changes that result in unrealistic resourcing requirements leading to adverse readiness impacts. It is important that units in theater get the most capable equipment. However, adding equipment to all MTOEs, while not having sufficient amounts to fill all requirements, creates unrealistic resource expectations and adverse readiness reports.

4. Best Value Readiness: The Army must become more efficient to preserve battlefield dominance in a time of reduced resources. Critical to success is the constant scrutiny of requirements through

5. Changing Processes and Policies: The Army gained efficiencies by developing new means to manage Friction (see below). A key efficiency will be refocusing leadership and Soldier attention on personal and unit responsibility for the maintenance and accountability of equipment. The Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), refers to this as refocusing ourselves on the “housekeeping” of the Army.

The years since 2001 have witnessed unprecedented Army transformation as we institutionalized Modular formations, based on Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) supplemented by functional and multi-functional enablers. The previous

Equipping Strategy initiated the changes necessary to move from a Cold War era, relatively static, equipping strategy to an ARFORGEN-based strategy focused on supporting FSO. This update incorporates changes based on a refined understanding of what it takes to equip an ARFORGEN-based Army capable of responding to



Sgt. 1st Class Seth Laughter U.S. Army photo

Logistical convoy

Laid out in a neat row, in front of gently-rumbling armored vehicles, the equipment of Paratroopers from the 407th Brigade Support Battalion sits ready for inspection before a logistical convoy to deliver supplies to outlying camps in the Anbar province of Iraq, Aug 1.

comprehensive cost benefit analyses within a capability portfolio construct and by prioritizing those most critical to supporting COCOM requirements. We must not only seek to fill gaps, but also to seek out and eliminate unnecessary redundancies.

new challenges. It introduces new concepts of efficiency required by a changing environment.

EQUIPPING STRATEGY

1. THE ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

OBJECTIVES –ENDS

Soldiers and units have the right equipment types, amounts and modernization to meet their mission requirements – whether in combat, training to go to combat, operating as part of the Army’s Generating Force or conducting Homeland Defense (HLD) and Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions (DSCA).

The Army’s equipping goal is to ensure that Soldiers and units always have the equipment they need to execute assigned missions; whether units are progressing through the cyclic readiness model, are non-rotational units, are in the Generating Force or are conducting HLD or DSCA missions. Ensuring Soldiers and units have the equipment they need, when they need it even though the Army does not have enough equipment to fill all units to their full authorizations, represents achieving equipping “balance.”

This strategy incorporates methods and measurements to assess whether equipping balance is being achieved. The Army must analyze its progress in equipping units to different missions to minimize operational risk. The Army uses ARFORGEN as the core process to generate ready forces to achieve equipping balance.

The Army will continue to equip units to their assigned mission. Army Force Generation-rotational units will receive the equipment they need for the different phases of ARFORGEN and their assigned mission. High priority non-rotational ARFORGEN units will be equipped to the S-1 level of readiness. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will have the equipment it needs to train. Finally, the ARNG will have the equipment it needs for HLD and DSCA missions.

2. THE ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

OBJECTIVES –WAYS

Army Force Generation is the structured progression of readiness over time to produce trained, ready and cohesive units. The Equipping Strategy encompasses three Lines of Operation that, together, support ARFORGEN. The first is the unit-focused main effort: Unit-Based Equipping, which provides increasing levels of equipment to rotational units based on their ARFORGEN phase, critical equipping points and assigned mission focusing on placing equipment into the hands of units. It also equips non-rotational units and ensures the Reserve Component (RC) has equipment to support HLD and DSCA responsibilities. The second line of effort is Managing Friction, (see below) which minimizes the impact of equipment not available to units. The final line of effort, Building Enduring Readiness, relates to institutional processes and requires ensuring the Army’s relevant policies and procedures are synchronized to support all aspects of equipping.

UNIT-BASED EQUIPPING

Success in the Unit-Based Equipping Line of Operation is measured by the ability of the Army to meet the equipping goals of units based on each unit’s mission and priority.

The Army’s default objective is to provide as much equipment as possible to units, whether it is for units rotating through the ARFORGEN cycles, forward deployed non-rotational units, Generating Force units, or ARNG Critical Dual Use (CDU) equipment. However, the Army does not have enough equipment to fill all requirements all the time. There are many reasons for these shortages, e.g., slow production rates, reset issues, lack of funding, requirements approved in advance of resourcing, or

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

deliberate Army decisions to procure to less than the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO)¹. These shortages may result in units not achieving Assigned Mission Equipping (AME)-1 and/or S-1 until they are close to deployment. Therefore, to satisfy the Army's highest priorities some equipment will be required to be redistributed across the force. The Army uses specific equipping points in the ARFORGEN cycle to ensure units have what they need as they need it.

through the ARFORGEN Force Pools. Aim Points reflect Army priorities and enhance the ability of Army leadership, resource managers and force providers to make accurate and timely decisions to mitigate risk on manning, equipping and sourcing.

The Army's long-term equipping targets for AC units, with a Boots on the Ground (BOG):Dwell of 1:2, is to equip them to S-2 at AP1 (Reset (R) +




Figure 2. FY13 and beyond equipping targets for AC, ARNG and USAR

Equipping to Aim Points – According to Army Regulation (AR) 525-29, Aim Points (AP) provide the Army a means to meter resources to units to achieve a prescribed state of readiness as they move

180 days) and S-1 at AP2 (R+1 year). The Army's long-term equipping targets for the RC with a Mobilization (MOB):Dwell of 1:4 are in line with those of the AC.

¹ Based on the current methods of calculating AAO and documenting organizational requirements directed in AR 710-2 and AR 71-32.

Equipped to Mission

However, a G-8 analysis conducted in fiscal year 2010 (FY10) indicates the best that may be achievable during FY11 and FY12 is to equip the AC to S-3 at AP1, at the end of RESET (R+6 months); and S-2 at AP2, during the Train/Ready phase (R+1 year). Units will be equipped to S-1/ AME-1, at the start of the Available phase. The best that may be achievable for the RC during FY11 and FY12 is S-2 at AP2, S-2 at AP3 and S-1 at AP4.

than R+180 days for RC units. At notification, the CEF units receive an Available Force Pool Date, a mission training focus and may be projected as a Surge Force CEF unit.

Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) units are equipped in accordance with their MTOE, the MEEL and the ONS required by the theater of operations and assigned mission. They measure




Figure 3. FY 11 & FY12 Equipping Projections

RESET – With the exception of ARNG CDU equipment, units in RESET do not have equipping expectations except for enough individual equipment (weapons, protective masks, etc.) to conduct individual training and a subset of the unit’s authorizations of crew served weapons, select Battle Command systems, tactical wheeled vehicles, night vision goggles and thermal weapon sights. Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) units are designated at R+90 days for AC units and no later

preparedness for mission according to AR 220-1. Deployment Expeditionary Force units use S- and AME-level standards. Contingency Expeditionary Force units are task organized to meet operational plans and contingency requirements. They must be prepared to conduct FSO. Therefore, CEF units are equipped to MTOE and readiness is measured against S-levels. Both types of expeditionary forces will be equipped to S-3 at AP1.

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

TRAIN/READY – When units enter the Train/Ready phase they are expected to begin collective and unit training which requires some MTOE and/or MEEL equipment. Full MTOE or MEEL equipment quantities at the start of the phase are normally not required. Equipping to S-3 at AP1 ensures most authorized items will be available at the beginning of the phase. Other items will be issued as they become available.

The Army will likely only be able to equip AC units to S-2 at AP2 and RC units to S-2 at AP3. If some specific items cannot be equipped to S-2, the unit will be equipped to the maximum extent possible, but not less than the quantity required to accomplish individual and collective training tasks. Enough equipment must be on hand for BCTs and equivalent units to conduct a Combat Maneuver Training Center rotation at the 15 to 18 month point after redeployment or the end of the Available Phase. Mitigating strategies will be worked directly with unit commanders to ensure there is a complete understanding of available equipment.

SURGE AND AVAILABLE FORCES – The Surge Force provides the Army with operational depth. It is comprised of selected units in the Train/Ready Force Pool designated for emergent requirements or contingency operations. Units selected for a Surge Force mission will be equipped to S-1 prior to commitment.

Units will be equipped to S-1/AME-1 for the Available Force phase. Deployment Expeditionary Force units will often not receive their full equipment quantities until arrival in theater and are issued theater provided equipment (TPE). Contingency Expeditionary Force units will be equipped to S-1 by the start of their Available Force phase.

Tailored Equipping – Equipping a supply-based force presents the Army with a significant

opportunity to generate better interoperable, fully modernized and equipped forces on a predictable basis. It allows the Army to leverage the distribution of selected items to manage shortages better and maximize capabilities in an affordable manner. The Army may tailor equipping solutions leveraging equipment when it is either necessary or desirable.

The concept of ARFORGEN tailored equipping re-allocates equipment from units in the Reset phase, early in the Train/ Ready phase, or when the unit's assigned mission is not projected to require that equipment, making it available to units who have a more immediate need. Tailored equipping can be used for commodities of equipment for which there is a minimal requirement in units except when they are deployed. Tailored equipping represents a deliberate decision to depart from established APs for certain items or commodities of equipment. The Army will strive to meet the ARFORGEN APs for **all** items of equipment, but there will be circumstances when tailored equipping solutions will be implemented.



Sr Airman, Asha Harris photo

U.S. Army Soldiers, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C., prepare to board a C-17 Globemaster III before a personnel airdrop mission in support of the Joint Operations Access Exercise, June 26, 2011, a two-week exercise to prepare Air Force and Army to respond to worldwide crisis and contingencies.

Rather than providing equipment to a unit that it does not need *at that time*, the Army can provide

that equipment to other units with more pressing needs. Key considerations are that the Army must maintain its ability to conduct fundamental missions with the appropriate equipment; some items require repetitive familiarization and training so should always be present; tailored equipping works best for those elements on a full ARFORGEN rotational cycle; and constantly moving equipment (Friction) creates costs in time and money.

The tailored equipping solution is applicable to several situations. These are when demand exceeds supply, when there is a validated need or opportunity to “over-equip” units engaged in operations (i.e., MEELS and ONS); when the Army cannot afford to equip every unit to their full authorization for certain items; when the technology is developing so rapidly that equipment becomes obsolete before the Army can field to the entire force; when the Army is unable to produce the necessary amounts of modernized items in time; and when friction creates shortages.

Tailored equipping solutions fall into two categories: Reduced Quantities – when a unit’s deployed mission requires less than MTOE authorization; and Differing Configurations – which provides enough equipment on which to train and the full requirements in theater.

Tailored equipping solutions can be either *temporary* or *enduring*. Temporary tailored solutions are those which are expected to revert back to a full equipping in less than two years, and are normally documented in FRAGOs or short duration directives. Enduring tailored equipping solutions are expected to remain in place for over two years and may be documented on MTOEs and TDAs.

A tailored equipping solution can be proposed whenever the need exists. Enduring tailored equipping solutions would most typically be

proposed as Capability Development Documents (CDD) and Capability Production Documents (CPD) in conjunction with an acquisition decision such as a Milestone B or C, when the program acquisition quantities are set. They could also be proposed during the resourcing portions of Program Objective Memorandum deliberations. Enduring tailored equipment solutions will be approved by the G-3.

To institutionalize the tailored equipping solution concept, the Army should first codify it in an Army Regulation, either in the ARFORGEN Regulation or in a proposed Army Equipping regulation, which should include detailed direction on proposal and approval of both temporary and enduring tailored equipping solutions, how these solutions will be documented to allow Army-wide visibility, how readiness will be measured, how often solutions should be reviewed and how the process will operate. The Army should then establish corporate visibility of approved enduring tailored equipping solutions. One way could be to incorporate a new column on Army MTOEs to reflect tailored equipping solutions. Finally, the Army should establish approved equipping configurations for certain tailored equipping solutions enabling units and the automated systems of materiel management and readiness to recognize the approved solutions as appropriate for units in that phase of readiness.

Post-CEF mission Reset – The orders that assign a unit its DEF or CEF mission will also specify what level of Reset it will undergo and what Reset resources it should expect to receive. Units will conduct unit recovery operations: cleaning, inspecting and repairing equipment to restore serviceability to Technical Manual 10/20 standards in preparation for entry into the Train/Ready Force Pool of ARFORGEN.

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

As CEF units reach the end of the Available Force phase, most equipment will remain assigned to the unit unless the unit is directed to transfer equipment to fulfill higher priority Army requirements. Specific equipment, identified as having maintenance issues that affect reliability beyond unit repair and field maintenance level capability, would be candidates for national-level sustainment. In these instances, commanders would nominate equipment for depot- and sustainment-level repair based on equipment condition, in accordance with the applicable Maintenance Allocation Chart. Fleet managers of equipment may also direct turn-in for fleet modernization actions, scheduled recapitalization, upgrade, or rebuild or through replacement as part of the overarching equipment strategy. Personnel strength will also impact the level of equipment the units can adequately maintain.

High Priority Non-Rotational Units – These type units are often forward-stationed or high priority units. They include theater committed forces, Army Service Component Command Headquarters, Army Special Operations Forces, and other units. These units will be filled to S-1. Levels of fill for Line Item Numbers (LIN) in short supply across the Army may be at less than 90 percent.

The Army will work to ensure they are equipped in accordance with operational requirements, priorities and missions.

Generating Force – Specific focus is continually placed on ensuring the Army's Institutional Training Process is equipped sufficiently to meet the expected training demand. These demands include the appropriate mix of the most modern and less modern equipment to ensure that Soldiers are prepared to operate any equipment they are likely to encounter. The minimum level of equipping necessary to meet programmed training mission demands is 80 percent fill for training units.

In all cases, existing Army prioritization processes, utilizing forums like the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B), will determine whether specific capabilities or specific units will be filled to a higher level.

Critical Dual Use Equipment – The CDU is a list of Army MTOE equipment that has been deemed critical to the execution of HLD and DSCA missions by ARNG units. The goal is to equip the ARNG to no less than 80 percent of its equipment requirements for each CDU LIN, ensuring that the ARNG always has the level of equipment fill needed to meet domestic operational requirements, regardless of units' positions within the ARFORGEN cycle. Some states may have less CDU equipment on hand than needed due to unit deployments. To compensate for this, the states have enacted Emergency Management Assistance Compacts with neighboring states where they pledge assistance to each other in the event that one state's capabilities are not adequate to meet an emergency. The list is available at www.g8.army.mil/pdf/2011CDU_List.pdf.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Requirements – Other challenges for the Army and the RC are their growing CBRNE response missions. The ARNG has specific CBRNE response force missions that span the range from Civil Support Teams, to assist state first-responders in the event of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident, to the Homeland Response Force (HRF), which is responsible for responding to large scale disasters (to include WMD and CBRNE) throughout the continental United States. The Army will ensure units assigned the HRF mission are equipped to meet mission requirements.

MANAGING FRICTION

Success in the Managing Friction Line of Operation is measured by how well the Army can see its own equipment inventories and make informed management decisions about how to allocate that inventory to build Army readiness, how to meet the goals established in the Unit-based Equipping Line of Operation and what new equipping goals will be feasible over time.

Friction is caused by a significant percentage of Army equipment that is unavailable to fill unit MTOE or TDA authorizations because it is in transit or reset. Friction is manageable and can be minimized but not completely eliminated. Friction will be reduced when the Army completes the drawdown of forces from OND and the associated equipment is reset and available for distribution to units. Friction is a drain on valuable resources and it increases the complexity of equipping units. The Army manages Friction three ways:

Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) –

Equipping units to their assigned mission is usually dependent upon the Army procuring quantities of equipment equal to the AAO. The AAO is calculated, in accordance with AR 710-2 and AR 71-32, as the sum of Army Requirements Documents (Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and TDAs, plus Operational Readiness and Repair Cycle Floats, Army Prepositioned Stocks, Operational Projects, Army War Reserve Stock and War Reserves Supporting Allies.) For the vast majority of items of equipment, it is imperative we procure to the AAO to have sufficient equipment available to support the varying levels of equipment across the ARFORGEN

phases and account for enduring requirements for equipment in reset and transit (“Friction”). Procuring to the AAO provides the Army the ability to mitigate Friction while meeting unit equipping requirements. Owning less than the AAO forces the Army to redistribute equipment from unit to unit, in some cases providing each unit with its full MTOE only just before it deploys. On the surface, it looks as if the Army can accomplish its missions with less equipment. However, the Army is doing so by creating risk to its operational depth and the increased equipping turbulence increases Friction.

In limited circumstances, there may be a deliberate decision to procure less than the AAO. These decisions require the Army to adopt alternate equipping strategies. For example, the equipping strategy for the Gray Eagle and Shadow unmanned aerial system programs maximizes the number of aircraft and ground support equipment available for use in theater. The strategy places one-third of a company’s authorization in the company for training and familiarization. The other two-thirds are in theater for the unit to fall in on when deployed.



U.S. Army Spc. Adam L. Mathis photo

Fortress Security

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Derrick Browne and Sgt. Jason Andrade from 1st Cavalry Division, provide security June 27 during a visit by Army officials to Bala Hesar, a fortress in Gardez, Afghanistan.

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

When the unit redeploys, it leaves the two-thirds of this authorization in theater for the next unit to fall in on. The documentation and readiness reporting strategies to support this concept are under development. Another alternate strategy is to buy smaller quantities, more frequently. It enables the Army to keep up with the speed of technological advances and stay ahead of adaptive enemies. Army Force Generation-Constrained Equipping is the Army's way to compensate for these shortages. It requires concerted prioritization and redistribution of equipment according to training and operational requirements.

Decisions to adopt alternate equipping strategies or to not procure equipment to AAO levels must be made carefully as they could have significant impacts on the ability of the Army to respond to changing equipping requirements in active theaters (i.e., ONS), and may compromise our operational and strategic depth.

Equipment Stewardship – The second way to manage Friction is to maintain accountability of all supplies and every piece of equipment. Unit rotation through the ARFORGEN cycle means that equipment and supplies are constantly redistributed between units. This has traditionally led to a “rental car mentality” and a decreased sense of equipment ownership.

It is imperative that the Army retain and maintain visibility of all property and supplies. The CSA's Campaign on Property Accountability, EXORD 259-10 (<https://pbuse.lee.army.mil/damessages.html>), directs an enduring property accountability campaign by inculcating a culture of good supply discipline and property accountability across the entire Army. We must ensure our Soldiers have the time, expertise and resources to execute maintenance and accountability tasks.

Equipping Sets – The third way the Army manages Friction is through equipment sets. The sets provide units with shortage equipment for training or theater-specific equipment. They consume equipment that would otherwise be assigned to units; therefore, we should constitute and employ them only in compelling circumstances.

– **Pre-Deployment Training Equipment (PDTE):** This equipment has been diverted from MTOE units in all components and is used to provide theater/mission-specific training opportunities to units within the same component. The goal is to reduce reliance on PDTE by increasing the equipment on hand in units.

– **Theater Provided Equipment (TPE):** The Army leaves TPE in theater for the purpose of providing deploying units with the equipment required to meet specific mission requirements. This process reduces transit requirements (times and costs) and achieves readiness for the deployed unit, but leads to cascading shortages for non-deployed units.

A significant percentage of equipment is in sets; this includes critical mission-unique equipment not documented on Army MTOEs, but which provides essential capabilities that should be captured in readiness reporting. It is imperative that we document and account for this equipment properly to convey an accurate picture of the Army's equipment resourcing to Army Leaders and other external audiences.

Force Feasibility Review (FFR) – A fourth way to manage friction is through FFRs. The FFR processes examines resourcing challenges and develops interim resourcing levels of selected LINs to enable equipping solutions until there are adequate resources to equip to full TOE requirements.

Equipped to Mission

BUILDING ENDURING READINESS

Success in the Building Enduring Readiness Line of Operations is measured by the Army's ability to continue to improve the utility of equipping goals and guidance over time as we understand better how varying levels and types of equipment affect Army readiness..

Building Enduring Readiness is the third line of operation. It will enable the Army to bring resources and requirements into better synchronization with cyclic equipping readiness requirements by focusing on Army management policies and structure. It is how the Army will ensure its requirements validation, prioritization and resourcing processes remain synchronized.

Concepts like ARFORGEN-Based Equipping and Friction are enduring. It is important for the Army to ensure they are recognized explicitly in Army requirements and resourcing processes. The Army performed essential, creative and effective work to develop new ways of dealing with equipping challenges brought on by the current strategic environment. This line of operation is focused on capturing that good work to integrate and improve it. It provides general characteristics that the Army must embrace (or reinforce) across its Materiel and Readiness Enterprises, unlike the other two lines of operation, which included concrete tasks, goals and metrics.

The Army has made strides to build enduring readiness. Reduced deployment requirements, combined with improving equipment inventories, allow units to retain more of their equipment on a

permanent basis; this creates a sense of ownership of the equipment and supports improved maintenance and accountability.

Many of the means to build enduring readiness listed in the FY10 strategy require continued emphasis.

The Army must continue to scrutinize new and existing requirements. During the next few years the budget environment may become more uncertain. Affordability and Risk will be critical issues as the Army looks to move through Balance and into



Sgt. Rebecca Linder U.S. Army photo

Movement Team Soldier

Sgt. 1st Class Joshua Cunningham, types a message into the blue force tracker system, during a mission on Feb. 23 in Kabul, Afghanistan. Cunningham is a member of the 196th's Movement Team that provides transportation for service members wanting to conduct business at other camps throughout the Kabul Base Cluster.

Enduring Readiness, while fielding new equipment and continuing Reset and Recapitalization. There must be explicit decision criteria in equipping decisions at all levels. Decisions concerning Unit Design and the Basis of Issue Plans for equipment must be fully resource-informed. The Army will re-examine some of its desired concepts and introduce new capabilities in more affordable ways, e.g.,

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

innovative pooling strategies or training strategies. We will also consider acquiring increments of capability, limiting our procurements to technologies that demonstrate maturity and making more frequent follow-on “buy decisions” that give us the opportunity to insert technology and more readily adapt to threats.

In the past few years ONS requirements have increased. The ONS approval process must be carefully managed to ensure commanders have the capabilities their missions require but not necessarily all the equipment they desire.

The Army must conduct a thorough documentation scrub. In Calendar Year 2011, the Army will conduct an Army Chief of Staff-directed Army-wide review of unit MTOEs to ensure documentation accurately portrays equipping to FSO mission requirements and that equipping readiness is accurately reported. Using a discrete group of units as a sample to form larger conclusions, the Army will systematically review those factors causing low equipment on hand readiness reporting, and bring the coordinated support of Headquarters, Department of the Army; Forces Command; and TRADOC together to mitigate or solve these issues.

The strategic end state for the document review is to have updated Army requirements and authorization documents that reflect the best current data and resource information through a detailed review and methodology.

The Army continues to update its readiness reporting system. The Army recently established the “Assigned Mission level” (A-level) with supporting levels for assigned mission manning (AMM), and AME to improve readiness reporting by deploying and deployed units. Deployment Expeditionary Force units approaching their

departure dates consider the mission required equipment items that they currently possess, as well as those equipment items projected for receipt in theater (i.e., TPE) to determine their AME levels. The Army continues to develop and refine the provisions for determining and reporting AME levels, such as when and on what basis should a unit start reporting TPE projections and distributions, in conjunction with the ongoing implementation of the ARFORGEN process. The Army should also modify reporting requirements covered by AR 220-1. For tailored equipping solutions, the Supply readiness (S- and AME- ratings) should reflect the approved non-MTOE standard, whether it be FFR or Tailored ARFORGEN equipping. At end state, improved Army readiness reporting policy and procedures will significantly enhance the ability of the commander to indicate the equipment status of the unit accurately and effectively in light of its mission requirements.

The Army must re-examine some long-standing equipping programs and policies. As the Army moves from demand-based to supply-based equipping, we should consider alternative means to provide authorized Stock Funded Items on MTOEs and TDAs. Some Items should be placed on a Common Table of Allowances to permit the commander to determine unit specific requirements. The Army should consider whether to continue both requisition-based and push-based equipping for items on MTOEs. Also, the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) may not be configured to provide the necessary capabilities for rapid equipping of expeditionary forces in today’s security environment. These and other equipping-related programs and policies must be reevaluated to ensure that they provide the right capabilities to support an ARFORGEN-Based Army in the current and projected security environment.

3. ACHIEVING THE STRATEGY – MEANS

Equipping Soldiers to win –today and tomorrow – in an uncertain fiscal and geo-political environment involves learned assumptions, trade-offs and risks. The challenges created by longer dwell times, fewer DEF and more CEF missions, increased commitment to equip Army trainers, fewer resources, alternatives to AAO, etc., make it imperative that the Army create an environment of success by providing the means to achieve the strategy.

Precise Understanding of the Demand Signal – The Army must understand unit equipment needs to maximize its ability to distribute equipment in the most effective manner. Unit equipment requirements are not only MTOE and TDA requirements but also ONS, MEELs, PDTE, etc. These requirements are frequently unique to a specific place, unit or mission, and they often change over time. These constantly changing requirements make it difficult to maintain a solid understanding of the real needs of commanders. To make the best use of limited resources and to be able to get the right equipment to the Soldier when needed, equippers must have a way to know exactly what equipment units have and what equipment shortfalls exist.

100 Percent Equipment Visibility – Implicit in the ability to make informed equipping decisions is 100 percent visibility of major end item assets that the Army owns, uses, stores or has in repair/recapitalization, transit or some other process. The Army is creating a major end item asset visibility and redistribution capability using the Logistics Information Warehouse (LIW) as the Army's single authoritative materiel data repository for this information. It is the Army's primary source for accessing, acquiring and delivering integrated logistics-domain data and information. The LIW provides the trusted information for reuse,

analysis and aggregation to enable timely and informed decisions. The capability must provide easily accessed visibility of potential equipment donors, at both the tactical and national levels, and then provide the capability to direct and track equipment movement.

Focused Leadership – A key aspect of ensuring that an equipping strategy is successful is focused leadership. Leaders create the conditions for success by providing the goals, resources, direction, intent, guidance and oversight needed to accomplish the mission. They also must clearly and unambiguously state requirements.

It is vital that leaders and commanders at all levels accurately report and continuously monitor their equipping status. Leaders must use this information to make the hard decisions necessary to shift equipment to the points of greatest need. This leadership involvement and action enables the Army to maximize the effective use of available equipping resources.

Leaders must ensure that their units have the equipment they need. They must also report their equipment on hand strength accurately and expeditiously. Without leader emphasis on disciplined reporting the Army cannot maintain visibility of equipment. Without visibility of equipment we cannot ensure equipment is where it is most needed.

Commodity-Based Equipping Strategies – Commodity-based equipping strategies that are synchronized with the Army Equipping Strategy are critical for the Army to its goal of equipping to ARFORGEN APs. Commodity-based equipping strategies require periodic reviews to optimize equipping agility to keep pace with evolving missions, MTOEs, processes and policies.

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

The Army leadership uses such venues as the AR2B and the Army Equipping Enterprise and Reuse Conferences to inform, decide and equip. The Army is committed to equipping to mission and must have leader support and input to make this happen.

Automation Tools – The Army continually needs to refine the automated tools that provide complete situational awareness of Army inventories and business tools that assist in the optimal distribution of equipment based on requirements.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Any strategy involves risk and this strategy incurs risk in several areas. The risk is moderate and risk mitigation opportunities exist in each area. In this strategy, the risk is managed against specific mission requirements by unit.



Staff Sgt. Joe Armas U.S. Army photo

CAMP MARMAL, Afghanistan– Staff Sgt. Travis Brown, a flight medic assigned to Company C, Task Force Lobos, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and a German soldier who is part of a German extrication team lowers to the ground with an aircraft hoist while latched on to a jungle penetrator during rescue hoist training, July 16.

Generating Force Risk – A minimum goal of 80 percent equipment fill is required for the Army schools and centers in the Generating Force. This is an area of risk within the strategy. However, for many of the equipping requirements within

the Generating Force, the Army has sufficient equipment to meet its other requirements and still fill the Generating Force in excess of the 80 percent minimum goal. Future processes will ensure they are equipped to operational requirements, priority and mission. As stated earlier, where equipping shortfalls require additional examination, the Army Campaign Plan, the AR2B and other processes remain available to make specific resourcing/risk decisions.

Training Risk – The Army has long insisted that Soldiers “train as they will fight.” Even though the minimum goal for equipping the training base is 80 percent this still creates some risk. Reduced equipping levels for the Generating Force and in units in the Train-Ready phase of ARFORGEN require commanders to adapt and plan training while being aware of reduced expected levels of equipment fill. Because the equipping goals of this strategy provide some level of predictability, developing effective training should be achievable.

Strategic Depth – One of the key factors of ARFORGEN has always been that when demand exceeded the available supply within the Available Pool, it would be possible to surge forces from the Train-Ready Pool. As the Army moves toward Balance, and as unit BOG/MOB:Dwell time ratios move closer to a 1:2 (AC) and 1:4 (RC), Army equipping will be challenged to ensure that it can rapidly support the equipping of Surge Force units from the CEF Force Pool for missions in new areas of operation – areas without existing TPE and APS sets. Equipping strategies will include redistribution from units in Reset, non-committed CEF units, PDTE, etc. The impact on other units will depend on factors such as the criticality of the mission, timing and equipment requirements.

The USAR’s longer period of time at the S2 level may result in increased risk in the ability

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

of the Army to provide fully resourced enabling capabilities – particularly within the Surge Force. It may exacerbate the need to redistribute equipment to achieve the S1/AME1 level in the Available Force Pool.

HLD/DSCA Risk – Like AC units, as ARNG units progress through the Reset and Train-Ready phases, they will be equipped at less than 100 percent. This represents risk in the ability to respond to HLD/DSCA requirements. Placing continuing emphasis on procurement and management of CDU items will help ensure that the necessary equipment is available for mission execution.



Army Sgt. Dennis W. Jackson photo

A CH-47 passes in front of the sun after dropping off a part for an improved river bridge on the Arkansas River during River Assault 11 at Ft. Chaffee, Ark.

CONCLUSION

The challenges of sustained conflict against an unpredictable adversary mandated that the Army modularize its formations and employ a rotational readiness model. These changes dictated the need for a new Army Equipping Strategy.

The changes came with associated issues with which the Army will continue to grapple for some

time. Procurement of the equipment associated with the completion of the Army's conversion to the modular force will be on-going beyond 2011. Fiscal realities dictate the Army must continue to be creative in managing equipment needed in its operating and generating forces, while still providing the equipment necessary to resource TPE and PTDE sets, fulfill its CDU equipment requirements and ensure that combat-worn equipment has the opportunity to go through a full and complete Reset.

The Army's Equipping Strategy is focused on ensuring that all Army units are "Equipped to Mission" and building operational depth. The three lines of operation in this strategy are designed to present, describe and organize the efforts the Army will use to achieve these goals. They establish the primary vision and guidelines. The Army has operationalized these concepts, in part through the tremendous work of the Army's Materiel and Readiness Core Enterprises and in annually updated annexes within the Army Campaign Plan. Most important, they will be operationalized as we institutionalize a culture of equipment responsibility and accountability in an ARFORGEN-based Army.

The Army measures success by achieving overall Army readiness while supporting a cost conscious culture. As we move toward the goal of increased readiness, Soldiers and commanders should have clear expectations regarding what levels of equipment they will receive and when they will receive it. Commands and staffs should have a clear understanding of how to allocate equipment using the most efficient and effective means to support Army training and readiness goals. Together, and with the Army's support, this strategy will ensure that the American Soldier remains the best equipped warrior in the world.



Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8
Planning Division (FDP)
700 Army Pentagon | Washington, D.C. 20310 | www.g8.army.mil