


READY TO SERVE? THE 48TH, 155TH, AND 256TH BRIGADES AND
THE ROUNDOUT CONCEPT DURING OPERATIONS
DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History

by
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

READY TO SERVE? THE 48TH, 155TH, AND 256TH BRIGADES AND THE ROUND-OUT CONCEPT DURING OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM, by MAJ James T. Brady II, 118 pages.

This thesis studies the events that unfolded when three National Guard roundout brigades were activated for Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The mobilization process for reserve component units is studied from the president's decision to mobilize to the unit's receipt of the alert order and then their post-mobilization training. All three units reported their ability to deploy when activated based on the standards applicable at the time of their activation. Once activated the units status for deployment changed based on the realities of their ability to conduct their wartime mission and the additional requirements placed on them after they mobilized. After activation the units went through a long drawn out series of postmobilization training events in order to get prepared for deployment to the theater of operations. In the end none of the three brigades deployed and only the 48th Brigade was certified and validated for deployment. This thesis will show that unit readiness, unrealistic requirements, and time all played their part in stopping the brigades from deploying.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
ILLUSTRATIONS	vi
TABLES	vii
CHAPTER 1. THE GOAL	1
CHAPTER 2. THE PROCESS	10
CHAPTER 3. THE STANDARDS.....	30
CHAPTER 4. THE CHALLENGE.....	47
CHAPTER 5. THE REALITIES	74
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION.....	88
APPENDIX A. 256TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (MECHANIZED) TASK ORGANIZATION	94
APPENDIX B. ROUNDOUT BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT ROADMAP.....	95
APPENDIX C. BRIGADE TRAINING PLANS	96
APPENDIX D. DEPLOYMENT CHRONOLOGY.....	99
APPENDIX E. REVIEW OF LITERATURE	101
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	104
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	109
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT	110

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Eighteen-Division Force	6
Figure 2. Joint Operational Planning Process	11

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Capstone Relationships of the Round-Out Brigades	14
Table 2. Graduated Mobilization Response	18
Table 3. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System	21
Table 4. Army Mobilization Plan	22
Table 5. FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System	24
Table 6. Unit Personnel Strength Report	36
Table 7. Unit Yearly Training Events	40
Table 8. Unit Mandatory Deployment Requirements	48
Table 9. Roundout Brigade Personnel Status on Mobilization Day	51
Table 10. Roundout Brigade Personnel Status on 15 March 1991	51

CHAPTER 1

THE GOAL

It was a dejected Staff Sergeant Brady who demobilized on 10 May 1991. His life ambition had been to serve his country in war and earn a Combat Infantryman's Badge. He joined the army in 1983, two days after his seventeenth birthday, and reported for infantry basic training in 1984. After serving four years as a heavy anti-armor infantryman, he decided to become an infantry officer and left the active army, after his four-year commitment was up, to attend Louisiana State University's Reserve Officers Training Program.

He joined the Louisiana National Guard's 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) as a squad leader. During his accession process he found out he was physically unable to be an infantry officer because of hearing loss, thus ended his chances to get his Combat Infantryman's Badge or so he thought.

Second Lieutenant Brady was commissioned on 18 May 1990 as a chemical officer. His fortunes turned when, on 18 November 1990, he was ordered to active duty in preparation for deployment in support of Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm¹. His commission having just been federally recognized in December 1990 he realized he was nondeployable because he had not yet attended the Chemical Officer Basic Course.

On 5 December 1990, Second Lieutenant Brady asked his battalion commander to accept his resignation, enlist him back into the battalion as a sergeant, promote him to staff sergeant, and assign him as a platoon sergeant in Echo Company, the battalion's

anti-tank company. The battalion commander readily agreed because Sergeant Brady had been the battalion's only soldier with active duty anti-tank gunnery experience.

After saying goodbye to his wife, Earline, he departed for Fort Polk, Louisiana to begin the mobilization process and then deployment to war. It became immediately apparent to everyone in the unit that they would not be going to Southwest Asia very quickly. There were many postmobilization training tasks to complete but everyone was confident they would get there in time to help destroy Saddam Hussein's Republican Guards.

After initial training at Fort Polk, the brigade moved to Fort Hood, Texas for maneuver training, with eventual onward movement to Fort Irwin, California, for certification at the National Training Center, the United States Army's premier training center. No one expected complications; the brigade had successfully completed a National Training Center rotation in 1987, the first National Guard unit to do so. This was the way it was supposed to happen.

Six months later, Staff Sergeant Brady was honorably discharged from the Louisiana National Guard in May 1991 and took the oath of office as a Second Lieutenant in June 1991 without ever having deployed to combat or earning his Combat Infantryman's Badge or achieving his life's dream. What had happened? Why did the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Louisiana Army National Guard along with the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Georgia Army National Guard or the 155th Armored Brigade of the Mississippi Army National Guard not deploy to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Desert Storm?²

In order to understand what happened to these units one must understand the concept of the National Guard in general and the roundout brigade concept specifically. The National Guard has served the country from the Revolutionary War to today. The Militia Act of 1792 would be the primary legislation for the National Guard until World War I. Under the Militia Act, the country would use the guard in the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish American War. The primary reason for use of the National Guard during this period was the need for additional manpower in both filling in active units and forming new units to fight alongside the regular army forces.³

Prior to and with the coming of World War I Congress passed the Dick Act in 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916. The Dick Act concerned premobilization activities and the training of National Guard units. The National Defense Act of 1916 became the foundation of the National Guard until 1955. It authorized the National Guard, by law, as a military force and as an integral part of our national defense and set guidelines for its equipping, training, and operational use. When mobilized, it required the National Guard to become part of the Regular Army.⁴ During World War I Guardsmen would serve in seventeen of the forty-three divisions sent overseas.⁵

During World War II, the National Guard would be federalized in mass for the duration of the conflict, and twenty National Guard and Army Reserve divisions would deploy next to the sixteen active and fifty-three conscripted divisions.⁶

During the Korean War, the guard mobilized 138, 600 officers and men, or 34 percent of its strength, who were used as combat fillers.⁷ The exceptions were the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions and the 65th Infantry Regiment which were complete National Guard units sent into combat to fight along side of their regular army

counterparts. In 1955, Congress passed the Reserve Forces Act, which forced the military to increase reliance on the reserves and provide measures to help increase their readiness. This would be the last major act regarding the National Guard and Army Reserves until the 1973 Total Force Policy changes.

In Vietnam, the guard was used differently than in every other previous war.⁸ After debating with his principal advisors, President Johnson refused to mobilize the guard and reserve until 1968. He then did so in reaction to North Korea seizing the USS Pueblo off the coast of North Korea and the Communist Tet Offensive in Vietnam.⁹

The roundout brigade concept can trace its genesis to the end of the Vietnam War. President Nixon wanted to end the Vietnam War and bring a calm back to the United States. One of the ways to do this was to end the draft.¹⁰ He told then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to find a way to meet the nation's needs for national security while ending conscription. Secretary Laird recommended to President Nixon that he appoint a commission to determine the most practical way of abolishing the draft.¹¹ Former Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates Jr. headed the commission and reported that an "all-volunteer force" could serve as a practical alternative to conscription. This report served as the basis for all subsequent reforms.¹²

In August 1970, Laird directed the services to achieve "economies" by "increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the National Guard and Army Reserve. Emphasis will be given" he wrote, "to the concurrent consideration of the Total Forces, active and reserve."¹³ Thus was born the Total Force Concept, which still guides integration of the United States military today. Total Force Policy means the integration of planning, programming and budgeting for the manning, equipping, maintaining and

training of a mix of active and reserve forces essential for meeting initial contingency demands for forces.¹⁴

The Total Force Concept would allow the army to, first, field more combat divisions and deter potential enemies. Second, it would save money, because reserve forces cost less to maintain than active units. Third, it was hoped, it would ensure that the nation's political leadership would have to seek (or feel assured of) popular support for a major conflict by requiring them to mobilize citizen-soldiers and remove them from their jobs, homes, and families. Many senior Army general officers, including the then Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., supported the Total Force Policy. This would become known as the Abrams Doctrine. Lastly, it would attempt to improve the readiness and visibility of the Army Reserve components.¹⁵ The Total Force Concept became policy in 1973.¹⁶

The roundout concept began as an effort to increase the number of Army divisions from thirteen to sixteen without increasing the Army's end strength as the Vietnam War drew to a close. This could be accomplished by providing divisions with a third brigade from the National Guard and Army Reserve forces. This led the Army to roundout divisions that were based in the continental United States with roundout brigades. Divisions stationed outside the continental United States retained three regular Army brigades, though some were separated from their parent divisions, the only exceptions to this was the 6th Infantry Division in Alaska and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii.

The Army would eventually expand to eighteen active duty divisions. The roundout brigade concept would eventually include ten Army National Guard and Army

Reserve brigades linked to eleven divisions and last from 1973 until 1996, the 256th Brigade would roundout the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 2nd Armored Division once the 5th deactivated in 1992 (see figure 1).¹⁷

Eighteen-Division Force

With Round-out Brigades




Figure 1. Eighteen-Division Force

Most would recognize the need for the concept. Some, to include one division commander, felt the concept and doctrine were not synchronized because active duty units would deploy before their reserve component units were ready and then division commanders would find themselves fighting a three brigade division (doctrine) with only two brigades (roundout concept) until their roundout brigade joined them.¹⁸

During the 1970s, 1980s, and the beginning of the 1990s a crucial part of US Army doctrine consisted of the roundout brigade concept. Many active duty divisions consisted of two active duty brigades and one brigade of either the National Guard or Army Reserve. Yet when the nation called on the concept to work during Operation Desert Storm, neither the 1st Cavalry Division nor the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) deployed with their roundout brigades. Worse, only one of the three roundout brigades was validated for combat operations and none of the three roundout brigades that were activated deployed.

The decision to activate the reserve component forces during Desert Storm was made relatively quickly. On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait; on 4 August 1990, General Colin Powell discussed the call up with President Bush and then on 22 August President Bush authorized the full mobilization of the guard and reserves.¹⁹

Pre-war Third Army plans, called for the deployment of roundout units for the 5th, 9th, and 24th Infantry Divisions for the defense in depth of Saudi Arabia.²⁰ The plans went through adjustments but roundout units were always in the projected force mix. President Bush ordered the 48th Brigade to active duty on 30 November 1990 and the 155th and 256th Brigades on 7 December 1990 in order to deploy to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Desert Storm. None of the three units would deploy overseas.

Why didn't the 48th, 155th, or the 256th Brigades deploy to Southwest Asia in support of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm? What happened to them, what lessons can be learned, what conclusions can be drawn from the information gathered? What lessons can future leaders learn from this mobilization and, perhaps, assist them with their next large scale activation of the National Guard?

In determining what happened to the brigades this thesis will analyze what were the standards for the deployment of roundout brigades before their mobilization. Were the three brigades ready for deployment per those standards? Roundout brigades reported their status to their wartime active component divisions and the Department of the Army; did those divisions and the Army agree with those reports? As a result of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, what changes to those standards took place after the brigades were mobilized? Did all concerned agree that changes were needed? Did the roundout brigades need additional training in order to deploy and if so were all concerned in agreement with what training was needed? This thesis will show that there were three critical elements that prevented the brigades from deploying: First, the premobilization standards set for the brigades were unrealistic, second, postmobilization standards were changed during and after the brigades mobilization with little past qualifications taken into account, and third the political process of mobilization and of active and National Guard political friction hindered the brigades in meeting timelines set for them.

¹Hereafter referred to as Desert Storm.

²Hereafter referred to as the 48th Brigade, 155th Brigade, and the 256th Brigade or roundout brigades.

³Thomas J O'Donnell, *Criteria to Mobilize Army National Guard Roundout Brigades with Its Active Component Division?* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992), 33-34.

⁴Ibid., 35.

⁵Ibid., 37.

⁶Ibid., 43.

⁷Ibid., 46.

⁸Ibid., 53.

⁹Ibid., 55.

¹⁰James J. Carafano, "The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future," *Heritage Lecture #869*, 18 April 2005, 1.

¹¹Ibid., 1.

¹²Ibid., 1.

¹³Ibid., 2.

¹⁴Robert N. Townsend, *Generating the Force: The Roundout Brigade* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992), 1.

¹⁵Travis L. Hooper, *Future Role and Structure of the Force XXI National Guard* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 1996), 4.

¹⁶US General Accounting Office, *Future Reserve Roles Shaped by New Strategy, Base Force Mandates, and Gulf War* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, September 1992), 8.

¹⁷John J. McGrath, *The Brigade: A History, Its Organization and Employment in the US Army* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 77.

¹⁸Ronald R. Rollison, *Are Roundout Brigades a Viable Concept for the Future?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 1990), 1.

¹⁹Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 248.

²⁰Richard M. Swain, *Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1997), 8.

CHAPTER 2

THE PROCESS

The long and complicated string of events that culminated with the mobilization of the roundout brigades and the execution of Operation Desert Storm started on 2 August 1990. Once Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the US military started the mobilization process that ended in Operation Desert Storm. The Third US Army was the army service component command responsible for planning and executing the ground portion of Operation Desert Storm. Its initial war plans called for the use of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) with the 48th and 256th roundout brigades respectively.¹ But General Schwarzkopf, the commander-in-chief of the United States Central Command, the unified command responsible for all US military forces in theater, asked for two fully manned heavy active duty divisions instead.²

The process that led to the mobilization of the roundout brigades in 1990 consisted of two parts that were continuously updated, planning and mobilization. The first step in the planning process began two years before when the National Command Authority published its defense guidance. That guidance provided national imperatives and priorities and started three military planning systems that resulted in the publishing of theater war plans that supported the strategy outlined by the National Command Authority. Those planning systems were all part of the Joint Operational Planning Process of the Department of Defense (see figure 2). The three systems, of the Joint Operational Planning Process, are the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, the

Joint Strategic Planning System, and the Joint Operations Planning System. This process began with the National Command Authority guidance and ended when the commander-in-chief's issued a wartime mission to their units.³




Figure 2. Joint Operational Planning Process

Source: US Department of the Army, *FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System* (FORMDEPS, VOL 1) (Fort McPherson, GA.: Forces Command, 1986).

Once the president approved the National Command Authority defense guidance the National Command Authority used the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System to manage the allocation of defense resources through the Service Secretaries and the Department of Defense agencies to meet national defense needs and specific Service and agency programs. It also provided the means to establish requirements and facilities needed to support them.⁴ The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System focused on objectives and the long-term alternative means for achieving them. As the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System was developed and updated the Department of Defense started their portion of the planning process.

Once the Joint Chiefs of Staff received the defense guidance they used the Joint Strategic Planning System to develop the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was the means by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff translated national security policy into strategic guidance, direction, force structuring objectives, resource planning, and operational planning. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was the culmination of this process and was published annually. It was developed by analyzing the National Command Authority guidance and the world situation, once published the Joint Operations Planning System was initiated.⁵

The objective of the Joint Operations Planning System was the timely development of effective operations plans throughout the unified and specified commands by using uniform planning procedures and formats.⁶ Through the Joint Operations Planning System, each unified command commander-in-chief, Pacific, Europe, and Southwest Asia, developed plans for fighting a war starting in their area and for sustaining operations should war start in another theater.⁷ The Joint Chiefs of Staff

then reviewed and approved the commander-in-chief's theater war plans or sent them back for updating. As a part of the war plan development the commander-in-chief developed a Time Phased Force Deployment List, this list assigned combat, above the line, units to a plan and associated command and control relationships to accomplish the theater mission. This list was then passed on to the service chiefs to resource and support.

The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System provided guidance for all components of the Army to plan and execute actions to provide and expand Army forces and resources to meet the requirements of the unified commands. The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System served as the Army supplement to the Joint Operational Planning System. It provided the interface between unified command plans for the deployment and utilization of forces and the Army plans for providing those mobilized forces and resources.⁸ It was the beginning of the mobilization process for Army units and will be described in more detail later. Within the framework of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System, Forces Command identified the specific Army units necessary to accomplish the Army's portion of forces and assigned them to the theater, regardless of component, in the order they were needed. The three components that made up the United States Armed Forces are the active forces, the reserve Forces, and the National Guard. This list included support, below the line, units. This updated Time Phased Force Deployment List ultimately generated a wartime mission assignment and a CAPSTONE command trace for each unit.⁹

CAPSTONE was the program that bridged the peacetime training relationships and wartime chains of command by developing the command and control relationships needed to implement a theater war plan.¹⁰ The CAPSTONE program established an

organizational structure that provided improved mobilization and wartime planning, mission capability, and deployability throughout the Total Army. It was the basis for unit commanders to enter into cohesive planning and training associations with designated wartime commanders. The program was established on 6 December 1979 to organize the Total Army into groupings of units to support the reinforcement of Europe. The program focused units training on three wartime scenarios – Europe, Pacific, and Southwest Asia.¹¹

The CAPSTONE program was divided into three separate and distinct training relationships. These were peacetime command and control, WARTRAIN, and Directed Training Association.¹² Peacetime command and control for a National Guard unit ultimately rested with The Adjutant General of the state the unit belonged to.

WARTRAIN was an army program that assigns Continental United States based units, assigned to a war plan, to a Continental United States based corps for training. Directed Training Authority was the assignment of one unit to another for training, the roundout concept followed this assignment.¹³ Table 1 shows the CAPSTONE relationships in 1990.

Table 1. Capstone Relationships of the Round-Out Brigades

<u>Unit</u>	<u>48TH</u>	<u>155TH</u>	<u>256TH</u>
Peacetime Command and Control	Georgia	Mississippi	Louisiana
Directed Training Authority	24 th ID	1 st CD	5 th ID
WARTRAIN Assignment	XVIII Corps	III Corps	III Corps

Once the planning process was complete and a unit was identified on a war plan the unit prepared for the execution of that mission until it was called on to execute it. For the roundout brigades the second step of the mobilization process was to actually mobilize. Mobilization at any level requires presidential or Congressional authorization. Mobilization was the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources.¹⁴ Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations guided military affairs during this period. Section 673 of Title 10 authorized the president or Congress to call up the reserves when needed. Once an event triggered the mobilization of the reserves the president used the Graduated Mobilization Response system to determine the appropriate level of response based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff's recommendation.

The Graduated Mobilization Response system was a flexible and tailored system designed to meet any contingency facing the nation. The president may start using the lowest level of mobilization and continually order a higher level of mobilization until he ordered total mobilization or he may jump to any level when required. The Graduated Mobilization Response system was used to mobilize the Armed forces and consists of five levels of mobilization.¹⁵

Selective mobilization was the lowest level of expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress and or the president to mobilize reserve component units, Individual Ready Reserves, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that was not the result of an enemy attack. The Individual Ready Reserves consisted of members of the Ready Reserve not assigned to the Selected Reserve and not on active duty. The Selected Reserves were

those individuals who actively participated in weekend drills and yearly two week training events. The Ready Reserves were units and members liable for involuntary active duty in time of war, national emergency, or when otherwise authorized by law. Activation of forces to assist New Orleans and the Gulf Coast in 2005 in response to Hurricane Katrina was an example of selective mobilization.

If a situation developed from enemy action or the threat thereof the president could order a partial mobilization. It was the lowest level of expansion of the active forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the president (not more than 1,000,000) to mobilize Ready Reserve component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security. The president ordered partial mobilization on 8 November 1990 in accordance with his decision for offensive operations against Iraqi forces operating in Kuwait.

If the situation required more forces the president could then order full mobilization. Full mobilization was the mid-level expansion of the active forces resulting from action by Congress and the president to call up reserve component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirement of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security; Korea was an example of this level of mobilization.

If the situation warranted a long term commitment against an overwhelming enemy force level then the president could order total mobilization. Total mobilization was the highest level of expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by

Congress and the president to organize and or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirement of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. It was the only response that authorized the generation of new forces; World War II was an example of this level of mobilization.

In a small conflict such as Grenada, the president could also call up to 100,000 selected reservists (not considered a mobilization) under the presidential call up of 100,000. The president could augment the active forces by a call-up of units or individuals of the Selected Reserve, up to 100,000 personnel, not to exceed ninety days, to meet the requirements of an operational mission.

The Graduated Mobilization Response system gave the president the flexibility to meet operational needs without wasting resources (see table 2). An example of wasting resources would have been the full Mobilization of the United States Armed Forces for the invasion of Grenada. The impact of calling up all reservists to invade a tiny nation would have had a tremendous impact on the nation's economy by taking personnel out of the work force. In addition the defense budget would have had to been increased to pay for the additional soldiers and for basing, equipping, and training them. The Graduated Mobilization Response system allowed the president the ability to call up the forces needed for the threat faced.

Table 2. Graduated Mobilization Response

MOBILIZATION LEVEL	DESCRIPTION	LIMITS	JURISDICTIONS	AUTHORITIES	UNITS/INDIVIDUALS ELIGIBLE
SELECTIVE	For a domestic emergency, the Congress or the President may order expansion of the Active Armed Forces by mobilization of RC units and/or individual reservists to deal with a situation where the Armed Forces may be required to protect life, federal property and functions, or to prevent disruption of Federal activities.	As determined by units selected.	President/Congress.	10 USC 3500, 8500, and appropriate orders of higher authority; 10 USC 331, 332, 333.	AC and RC units and individual reservists.
PRESIDENTIAL CALL-UP	The President may augment the Active Forces by a call-up of units of the Selected Reserve, up to 100,000 members for up to 90 days to meet the requirements of an operational mission.	Limited to 100,000 (all Services) for up to 90 days.	Presidential Executive.	10 USC 673b; PL 96-384.	Units and individual mobilization augments only.
PARTIAL	For a contingency operation or war plan or upon declaration of a national emergency, the Congress or the President may order augmentation of the Active Armed Forces (short of full mobilization) and mobilization of up to one million members of the Ready Reserve (units or individuals) for up to 24 months.	Up to 1,000,000 (all Services) for up to 2 years.	Presidential Proclamation of a national emergency and executive order.	10 USC 673(a).	Ready Reserve units, 1BR, Standby Reserve, retired Regular officers, Fleet Reserve, and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve.
FULL	Requires passage by the Congress of a public law or joint resolution declaring a war or a national emergency. It involves the mobilization of all RC units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, and the materiel resources needed for this expanded force structure.	Up to the strength of the approved force structure of the Armed Forces.	Public law or joint resolution by Congress declaring war or national emergency.	10 USC 671(a); 10 USC 672.	All of the above, plus national conscription as determined by the Congress and President.
TOTAL	Involves expansion of the Active Armed Forces by organizing and activating additional units beyond the existing approved troop basis to respond to requirements in excess of the troop basis and the mobilization of all additional resources needed, to include production facilities, to round out and sustain such forces.	Strength levels beyond full mobilization.	As above.	10 USC 671(a); 10 USC 672.	As above.

Source: US Department of the Army, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS, VOL 1). (Fort McPherson, GA: Forces Command, 1986), 3-4.

The DOD was responsible for providing the president with a Graduated Mobilization Response recommendation.¹⁶ To determine the correct level of mobilization to recommend to the president the Joint Chiefs of Staff used the Joint Operations Planning System. The Joint Operations Planning System was designed to provide timely development of effective operations plans throughout the unified and specified commands by using uniform planning procedures and formats. It facilitated the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of operations plans, incorporated Automatic Data Processing techniques and interchanges of data, minimized the number of operations plans, and provided for the reporting of any force shortfalls and limiting factors discovered during the planning process.¹⁷ The Joint Chiefs of Staff used the Joint Deployment System to facilitate the actual process. The Joint Deployment System consisted of personnel, procedures, directives, communication systems, and electronic data processing systems to directly support time-sensitive planning and execution and to complement peacetime deliberate planning.

Joint Operations Planning System planning began with the assignment of missions and publication of other data to unified and specified commanders in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Unified commands consisted of forces from a number of services grouped together to meet the operational needs within a geographical area. They usually consisted of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. The United States Central Command was an example of a unified command. A specified command consisted of support forces that can best be utilized at the national level and apportioned to support a unified commander when needed. United States Transportation

Command was an example of a specified command. All strategic transportation assets were assigned to Transportation Command.

Once commanders received their mission they scheduled their force lists to sequence the arrival of forces in accordance with the supported commander's concept of operations. These detailed list of combat and support forces included not only the forces but also the required closure time the forces were needed in theater. This effort culminated in the Time Phased Force Deployment Data. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then approved the plan or directed changes to the plan. Once they approved the plan and the president authorized mobilization it was sent to the service chiefs to direct the mobilization of the forces required.

Once the Chief of Staff of the Army received the mobilization plan he directed Army forces mobilization using The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System, AR 500-5, now titled Army Mobilization. The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System set the premobilization standards and guidelines of units to deploy. The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System was a short range, current capability planning system that was the Army's part of Joint Operational Planning System. It provided the interface between unified command plans for the deployment and utilization of forces and the Army plans for providing those mobilized forces and resources. It served as a centralized planning system, provided disciplined planning procedures needed for the conduct of mobilization and deployment planning and execution, provided guidance during mobilization, and consolidated Army policies in relation to mobilization. This system was the key that tied all other Army systems together; table 3 shows the components of the Army Mobilization and Operations

Planning System.¹⁸ The collected mobilization plans of Headquarters, Department of the Army and Army Major Commands were published as the Army Mobilization Plan. The required plans are shown in table 4:¹⁹

Table 3. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System

Volume	Title	Guidance
I	System Description, Responsibilities, and Procedures	Defined the Process
II	Strategic Deployment of Army Forces	Mobilization and Planning Guidance to Deploy Forces
III	Mobilization and Deployment Planning Guidance	Mobilization and Planning Guidance for Reserve Forces
IV	HQDA Mobilization Plan	HQDA internal actions

Other commands and agencies that published mobilization orders included area commands such as the Continental United States Armies. Continental United States armies commanded units assigned, command readiness groups, provided command and control to units and installations for mobilization, conducted CAPSTONE planning, supervised, evaluated, and inspected training, reviewed mobilization plans bi-annually, coordinated mobilization plans, and command and controlled state area commands. Continental United States armies were the commands that executed the Army's mobilization plan and the mobilization of Army units in the Continental United States area. Continental United States armies reported directly to Forces Command. The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command assisted with training and utilization of reserve component Criminal Investigation teams.

Table 4. Army Mobilization Plan

Volume	Title	Guidance
I	HQDA Mobilization Plan	Directed mobilization for the Staff
II	FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System	FORSCOM Mobilization Plan
III	TRADOC Mobilization and Operations Planning System	TRADOCs Plan to Expand and Support the Mobilization
IV	Military Traffic Management Plan	Strategic Movement of Forces
V	Army Material Command Mobilization Plan	Support the Equipping of Forces
VI	United States Army Information Systems Command Mobilization Plan	Signal Requirements for Mobilization
VII	Intelligence and Security Command Mobilization Plan	Intelligence Requirements for Mobilization
VIII	Health Support Command Mobilization Plan	Medical and Dental Support for Mobilization
IX	The United States Army Western Command	Mobilization Support for WESTCOM Area
X	United States Army Corps of Engineers	Facilities Management Support

All these elements came together to provide a quick and efficient mobilization of forces to get them to the operational theater fully trained when required by the supported commander. Once mobilization was initiated a General Officer Mobilization Review board oversaw the process and addressed issues concerning the mobilization. It was chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. The Army Mobilization Review was a periodic review of mobilization and deployment issues and addressed issues to the General Officer Mobilization Review board for action.

Within the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System the United States Army Forces Command had the responsibility to provide forces to the unified

commanders. In conjunction with this responsibility the Forces Command commander used the *FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System* to plan for mobilization. Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System was a comprehensive system subdivided into four volumes that covered all areas of mobilization.²⁰ The purpose of Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System was to provide guidance and procedures and assign responsibility for planning within Headquarters Forces Command, other Major Commands, subordinate commands, mobilization stations, and reserve component units for the execution of Forces Command missions.²¹ Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System was Volume II of the Army Mobilization Plan, table 5 shows the Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System volumes. Forces Command conducted mobilizations based on centralized planning and decentralized execution. This system had its advantages and disadvantages. The roundout brigades would see both sides of the process once they were mobilized.

For the roundout brigades the key document for their mobilization was Volume II, Part 3, Reserve Component Unit Commanders Handbook. It was all inclusive from all Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System volumes and also included sections from the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System. It provided mobilization planning guidance that enabled them to plan for mobilization, to mobilize and move to assigned mobilization stations, and prepare their postmobilization training plans. This regulation was the base of chapter 3 and provided the standards for mobilization and postmobilization activities.

Table 5. FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System

Volume	Title	Guidance
I	System Description	Overview of the Mobilization Process
II	Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan	Secret Document that helps Tailor the Forces Required
III	Mobilization and Deployment Planning	Basic Guidance for Units to Mobilize The Actual Plan
	1 FORSCOM Mobilization Plan	Provides Guidance to Reserve Units for Mobilization
	2 Deployment Guide	
	Reserve Components Unit	
	3 Commanders Hand Book	All Inclusive for Unit Commanders
	Installation Commanders Hand	Provides Guidance to Installation
	4 Book	Commanders
	5 STARC/MUSARC Handbook	NG/RC MACOM Guidance
	6 Mobilization Support Systems	For Commanders Who will Support the Mobilization
	7 Total Mobilization	Guidance for Total Mobilization
IV	Emergency Operations	FORSCOM Staff Guidance

Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System coordinated mobilization through the National Guard Bureau. The National Guard Bureau directed mobilization of its units and coordinated with the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, and Forces Command for selection of the right units capable of meeting the theater commander's requirements. Within the National Guard and at the state level the State Area Commands was the mobilization entity within the Army National Guard state headquarters that provided control of mobilized Army National Guard units from home station until their arrival at a mobilization station.²² State area commands assisted units at their home station, moved units to mobilization stations or port of embarkations, and

managed the disposition of residual personnel, equipment, and property left behind. They also conducted the mobilization planning, movement, training, and deployment of their subordinate units and notified units of their mobilization order.

Once a unit was mobilized it moved to its home station and prepared for movement to a mobilization station. Mobilization stations received, filled, supported, and directed activities of incoming reserve component units to optimize the number of operationally ready units. At mobilization stations units prepared for deployment, received equipment and personnel, conducted administrative actions, conducted postmobilization training, and deployed to the operational theater.

The last part of the mobilization structure is the unit itself. Before mobilization, units trained to maintain the ability to mobilize and conduct their wartime mission. As a part of the readiness process it prepared mobilization books to facilitate the mobilization process. Upon receiving mobilization orders it mobilized in five phases: preparation, alert, mobilization at home station, movement to mobilization station, and lastly operational readiness improvement or postmobilization training. Chapter 3 will address the five phases of mobilization.

The instrument of a unit's mobilization and deployment was the document or the plan that called for its use. This could be a contingency plan or an operations plan. A unit may also be activated without prior warning or listing on any plan. The unit would be alerted on a Prepare to Deploy Order. Any one of these documents could generate the required activation of an Army Reserve or National Guard Unit. Contingency plans and operations plans were a product of the Joint Operational Planning Process.

For the roundout brigades the process that started them on the mobilization path was Third Army's plan 1002 which dealt with a scenario just like the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. Phase one of this plan was for the 82nd Airborne Division, an aviation unit, and a United States Marine Corps brigade to deploy immediately following the Iraqis invasion. Its objective was to deter further aggression and secure key Saudi Arabian ports and oilfields. Phase two included the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) with their roundout brigades, and one brigade of 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) as the theater reserve. The purpose of phase two was to conduct a defense in depth of Saudi Arabia. Phase three consisted of the counter offensive to restore lost territory and facilities.²³

Operating within the Joint Operational Planning Process framework Central Command conducted exercise Internal Look in July 1990 to validate its war plan. Using the data from Third Army's plan Central Command, instead, planned for the immediate deployment of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 1st Cavalry Division without their roundout brigades but with attached active duty brigades.²⁴ This was done in order to get forces into theater in the shortest possible time. It would not require the division to wait on their mobilizing roundout brigades. Unfortunately, this plan had not been approved yet so the Time Phased Force Deployment Data list had not been generated either.²⁵ This meant that there was no approved mobilization plan in effect and one would have to be drawn up and executed while deploying forces for the emergency. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 General Schwarzkopf, the commander-in-chief Central Command, requested two full strength heavy divisions sixteen days prior

to the president's 22 August 1990 call up. The two divisions called up were the 24th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division along with the 197th Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) and the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division to be the third brigades of the divisions in lieu of their CAPSTONE aligned roundout brigades.

With the invasion of Kuwait the president used his authority to order a presidential selected reserve call up on 7 August 1990. This was one of the key factors that affected the National Guard roundout brigades, as will be shown later.²⁶ This decision allowed the president to back fill deploying active duty units and personnel with mobilized reserve component units. The goal at the time was the defense of Saudi Arabia.

On 22 August 1990, upon the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the president used his authority under Section 673b of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations to call up an additional 200,000 reservists and to extend the service of individuals called up to 180 days. This was a partial mobilization with directed limits.²⁷ On 13 November 1990 the president finally authorized partial mobilization without limits. The president made this decision because he had decided to liberate Kuwait. Desert Shield, the defense of Saudi Arabia, now became Desert Storm, the liberation of Kuwait.

This decision sent the VII Corps from Germany to General Schwarzkopf and Central Command. Because of this decision the president authorized the mobilization of the roundout brigades. This was the process that brought the roundout brigades to the threshold of deployment but did not allow them to actually deploy to the operational theater. It was a very complex and comprehensive process that would also add to the

confusion of the mobilization of the roundout brigades once they were actually mobilized.

¹Swain, 8.

²Thomas J. Strauss, *The Role of the U.S. Army's National Guard Roundup and Roundout Brigades in Force Reconstitution* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 1992), 24.

³Anthony L. Barnhill, *Train as You Will Fight: Factors Affecting Development of a Strategy to Train National Guard Units to the Level Organized* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1990), 18.

⁴US Department of the Army, *FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System* (FORMDEPS, VOL 1) (Fort McPherson, GA: Forces Command, 1986), x-40.

⁵Ibid., B-2.

⁶Ibid., B-5.

⁷Barnhill, 19.

⁸FORMDEPS, VOL 1, 2-1.

⁹Barnhill, 19.

¹⁰Ibid., 19.

¹¹US Department of the Army, FORSCOM Regulation 11-30, *The Army CAPSTONE Program: Program Guidance* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1989), 3.

¹²Stephen L. Goff and Ralph E. Kahlan, *The Roundout Program: Is it Still Valid?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 1991), 1.

¹³Barnhill, 23.

¹⁴FORMDEPS, VOL 1, x-36.

¹⁵Ibid., 3-1.

¹⁶Ibid., 3-2.

¹⁷Ibid., B-5.

¹⁸US Department of the Army, *The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System* (AMOPS) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1986), 1.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 3.

²⁰FORMDEPS, VOL 1, 1-2.

²¹*Ibid.*, 1-1.

²²*Ibid.*, x-44.

²³Swain, 8.

²⁴Strauss, 24.

²⁵US General Accounting Office, *Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, March 1992), 15.

²⁶Executive Order 12727, 22 August 1990.

²⁷Executive Order 12733, 13 November 1990.

CHAPTER 3

THE STANDARDS

From World War II to the Persian Gulf War the time allotted units to mobilize, train, and deploy has changed dramatically. World War II units had forty-four weeks of postmobilization training; Korean War units had thirty-three weeks, the Berlin Crisis allowed twenty-seven weeks, and during the Vietnam War and Desert Storm fifteen weeks was the norm.¹ In all cases combat units had to go through complete train up programs before deployment, at each level units required more time and support to meet the standards for deployment. Today, the base timeline for a National Guard unit to deploy is dependent on the unit's current level of proficiency.

Upon receiving mobilization orders a unit mobilized in five phases: preparation, alert, mobilization at home station, movement to mobilization station, and lastly operational readiness improvement or postmobilization training. This chapter will discuss the standards units were expected to have up to the postmobilization training phase.

During premobilization units conduct training in accordance with the guidance received from their higher headquarters. During the preparatory phase, reserve component units were at home station. They prepared mobilization plans and files to improve their state of readiness during peacetime in preparation for mobilization. Each unit takes positive steps to accomplish as many personnel and administrative actions as possible prior to an actual mobilization. When a reserve component unit receives notification that an order to federalize is imminent, it enters the alert phase.

During the alert phase, the alerted unit takes specific actions, as outlined in FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System, to transition from reserve component to active component status. Further, the unit completes the personnel and administrative readiness assessment actions begun in the preparatory phase.² The alert phase of premobilization ends when the unit enters active Federal service.

In order to understand what happened to the roundout brigades during their mobilization you must first understand the premobilization standards for their activation and secondly you must understand what they reported and or were rated before they were activated. The US Army uses several programs and documents to determine to what standard an Army Reserve or National Guard unit should achieve in order for it to activate. The US Army, also, tracks the readiness of units through many different reports. The status of a unit helps the Army determine when to mobilize and or deploy a unit based on operational needs.

The primary report the United States Army Forces Command used to determine when a unit was ready, to be mobilized and deploy, was the Unit Status Report, then it looked at the Forces Command 1-R report, and the Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System tasks explained below.³ The Unit Status Report is a monthly report used by all separate numbered units in the Army from detachment to Army to report its operational status. A major weakness in the Unit Status Report was what was not reported on it. Such important equipment as night vision goggles, communications (radio) equipment, tactical vehicles other than tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were a few of the items not reported. More importantly the report allowed units to substitute equipment in lieu of what it should have had. This caused the

roundout brigades problems because some substitutions were no longer valid such as the tactical truck High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles which were used for many purposes on the battlefield. The National Guard were using Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles in lieu of the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles but they were basically army green painted Chevy trucks that did not have the same hauling capacity or mobility as the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. Though many active duty units deployed to Desert Storm with Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles in lieu of the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles this substitution allowed reserve units the ability to report a higher status on their Unit Status Report when supply shortages were not their fault, per Army Regulation 220-1.⁴

The Department of the Army's Inspector General Report on the roundout brigade's performance during Desert Storm simply states that the units overstated their Unit Status Reports.⁵ This statement was backed up by a Congressional study which stated Unit Status Reports were misleading up to Desert Shield/Desert Storm.⁶ This was done with the approval from their active duty roundout division commanders.⁷ One division commander said it would take 120 days for his roundout brigade to get to standard, for deployment, but routinely reviewed and approved a C-2 rating for the brigade. Another division commander who had one of the three roundout brigades said he would take them with his unit to war tomorrow.⁸ The brigades were reporting ratings of C-2 or C-3 requiring fifteen to twenty-eight days or twenty-nine to forty-two days of postmobilization training according to the Forces Command Commander.⁹ These statements highlighted a problem the roundout brigade concept caused, because the brigades were not directly in their divisions chain of command during peacetime, the

division commanders could not fully influence the brigades training, equipping, or manning.

The US Army uses the Unit Status Reports to determine the deployability of a unit. The five category levels of the Unit Status Reports are:

C-1. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

C-2. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

C-3. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake major portions of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

C-4. Unit requires additional resources and or training in order to undertake its wartime mission, but if the situation dictates, it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission with resources on-hand.

C-5. Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not prepared, at this time, to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.¹⁰

In addition to the Unit Status Reports completed by each brigade, Forces Command required an active officer to conduct an annual 1-R report. This report utilized an external unit to evaluate the brigade during its, summer, two-week Annual Training period. It includes both a quantitative and narrative evaluation of a units Mission Essential Task List.¹¹ However, the 1-R focused more on administrative tasks rather than tactical tasks. This important evaluation drove training plans for the units following year.¹² The Department of the Army Inspector General report stated “as with the Unit Status Reports, the postmobilization training performance left little doubt that most active component evaluators had generally inflated 1-R reports and that skills had seriously eroded because of the elapsed time since the last Annual Training period.”¹³

The third report that units report mobilization readiness is Forces Command Regulation FC 500-3-3. This regulation lists the twenty-three tasks a unit must complete during the preparatory phase and the six tasks it must complete during the alert phase. In the same Congressional report that highlighted the inflated Unit Status Reporting it noted that all Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System tasks were good to go on mobilization for all roundout brigades.¹⁴ Colonel (Retired) Roy Nomey, who was the Second Battalion 156th Infantry (256th Brigade) S1 and Unit Status Report Officer, stated that all Forces Command regulation 500-3-3 tasks were evaluated and met for the battalion's mobilization.¹⁵ In a statement to Chairman Les Aspen of the House Armed Services Committee, Colonel Fletcher Coker, the 155th Brigade Commander stated: "I would not have hesitated to have taken this unit into a combat theater of operations. ...Nobody wants to go to war, but we were prepared to do our duty."¹⁶

Within the personnel, training, supply, and equipment readiness categories the ratings to support the overall C rating would be P for personnel, T for training, S for supply (equipment of hand), and R for equipment readiness and assessed with the same criteria as above. In general support units are permitted to deploy at C-3 and combat units as C-1. The report is based on quantitative data but may be subjectively upgraded by the unit's commander.

Official reports are not the only judge of a unit's strength and weaknesses. Joseph Galioto concluded in his study, *An Analytical Study Describing the Organizational Culture of the Army National Guard and its Effect on Readiness* that within the National Guard:

The readiness of the Guard is predicated on a value system that places emphasis on a freedom of a citizen to pursue his own interest, while, at the same time, providing for the common defense of one's neighborhood, community, town, state and nation. And, it is the unique characteristic of the Guard, as a military establishment, its dual role as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution that makes it such a formidable force.¹⁷

This spirit would serve the soldiers well when tested by the harsh conditions they would face once mobilized. Their tight *esprit de corps* would help them through the long days and nights ahead.

So what then could have caused the delays in the mobilization of the units? One key reason was due largely because premobilization readiness reports on the brigades overstated their actual readiness status; the readiness reports used were not specific enough regarding readiness criteria; and the requirement for massive postmobilization training of leaders was not understood by all.¹⁸ Another reason was that expectations of the initial level of training were too high based on standards that were out dated or upgraded because of the circumstances of each unit.¹⁹ There was nothing in the past that would foretell this. The 256th Brigade had the first successful reserve component National Training Center rotation in 1987, and the 48th Brigade followed them in 1990, just six months before their mobilization.

At the unit level, readiness was measured against the personnel strength of a unit, the level of supply and equipment a unit had, the readiness of that equipment, and the training proficiency of the unit's personnel and the unit itself. At home station the units were engaged in completing their processing during the three to five days they had between call up and departing to its mobilization station.²⁰ What was the status of the units before they entered their mobilization stations in preparation for the movement to

their mobilization stations? All three brigades reported P-1 on their previous USR reports (see table 6). Upon movement to home station to conduct alert tasks the 48th and 155th brigades went to P-2 while the 256th brigade maintained P-1 and in fact was overstrength.

Table 6. Unit Personnel Strength Report

PRE-MOB	Personnel Required	Personnel Assigned (%)	Unit Status Report Rating	Personnel Available (%)	Unit Status Report Rating
48th	4297	4066 (95)	P1	3693 (86)	P2
155th	3858	3741 (97)	P1	3288 (85)	P2
256th	4167	4850 (116)	P1	4219 (101)	P1

Source: US Department of the Army. *Inspector General's Report* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991).

Once mobilized, however, the medical and dental checks required for active component units took the first bite out of the brigade's readiness. The unit's dental readiness had an immediate impact on postmobilization time due to the number of class three dental category soldiers within the brigades. National Guard soldiers were not required to report for annual dental examinations and, in fact, they were not even authorized routine dental care in Army facilities. Once mobilized, however, reserve component personnel were subject to the same standards for dental health as were active duty soldiers.²¹ Thirty percent of all soldiers in the three brigades had either dental conditions or incomplete dental records that, based on Army regulations, would have

prevented them from being deployed.²² This required much more time to fix than had been previously anticipated.

A number of other Guard members, mostly over age forty, had serious medical ailments such as ulcers or chronic asthma. More than 250 in the 48th Brigade had to be sent for treatment before they could rejoin their unit for training.²³

Equipment similar to personnel is a quantitative resource; you either have it or you do not. As discussed earlier some substitutions caused problems but could be overcome once activated. The Gulf War demonstrated the impact of equipment shortages on the mobilization of reserve support units. Because units had to have at least 65 percent of the required equipment considered essential for their mission to meet minimum deployment standards, the Army had to extensively transfer equipment between units to rectify shortages. Accordingly to some Army Reserve Command and National Guard officials, filling equipment shortages became more difficult as the operation progressed and more units were activated.

Unfortunately, the roundout brigades were activated late in relation to the president's initial call up on 22 August 1990. The state National Guard Bureaus worked overtime to equip the brigades with what was needed but in the end essential equipment available for training such as chemical, biological, and radiological equipment, communications radio equipment, and night vision goggles were not readily available to the units as they activated.²⁴

This problem became readily apparent once the units were mobilized. Equipping the roundout brigades has always determined their readiness level. Representative G.V. Montgomery, from Alabama stated: "There is virtually no limit to the level of readiness

which can be achieved if the Guard is provided funding for sufficient exercise opportunities at all levels, adequate technicians and Active Guard/Reserve, manning and training and modern equipment.’’²⁵ If the roundout brigades had been adequately resourced before deployment their mobilization process could have proceeded faster than it actually did.

The third category that units used to track readiness was equipment condition or readiness. In all cases this was a problem for the roundout brigades for several reasons. Most of the unit’s equipment was maintained at Maintenance and Training Equipment Sites and maintained by full-time personnel. Units only drew this equipment out when needed for Annual Training periods or when they would conduct gunnery over a weekend drill. Because of this most equipment received little use. Another reason for equipment readiness being a problem for the brigades was the fact that many of the mechanics were not trained in there specialty and did not have the time to train on their systems during drill weekends. Unit maintenance automation equipment also impacted readiness once the roundout brigades were mobilized because they had to switch to an automated maintenance tracking system that many of them did not have and were therefore untrained on when the systems were fielded to them once mobilized.²⁶

The only subjective rating on the Unit Status Report was in training and herein is where the real problems laid. Unlike the active component commander who looked only to his wartime commander and installation support staff, the National Guard commander had to look to many. These included the active component or reserve component headquarters within his wartime organization, the appropriate Readiness Region, his state National Guard headquarters, the National Guard Bureau, and Forces Command since

readiness oversight and actual training support responsibilities were split between several organizations in the active components and the National Guard itself.²⁷

The overarching training guidance a National Guard unit used was the four-year training cycle. National Guard units trained in a four year cycle that culminated in an Army Training and Evaluation Program evaluation.²⁸ These training cycles included individual training, small unit collective training, and training to the level organized. It included gunnery training, every other year for the combat brigades.²⁹

Training guidance provided by United States Central Command emphasized that mobilization stations were to ensure that units were given training in tasks essential to their wartime missions and geographic areas of deployment. Units' postmobilization training plans, which were prepared periodically based on unit status reports and Forces Commands 1-R reports, reflected the additional training that units would require upon mobilization. The 1-R reports assess the level of proficiency demonstrated during a unit's two-week annual training period. In theory, these postmobilization training plans should have provided a complete assessment of the training that the roundout brigades would require when they were mobilized. Army officials at mobilization stations said that they had not considered the units plans to be reliable because they contained outdated information.³⁰ This in turn caused confusion and delay as the units had to conduct training events that had not been forecasted.

At the unit level roundout units normally trained one weekend each month, called Inactive Duty Training, and two weeks during the summer months, labeled Annual Training. Together these equaled thirty-nine annual unit training days.³¹ During these limited number of available training days the units were required to conduct other

training besides Mission Essential Tasks List related tasks. See table 7 to see an example of a units training schedule in a given year. This typical unit yearly training plan would ensure it met the minimum yearly Army training requirements but it left little room for anything else. National Guard commanders were hard pressed to properly prepare for training events with instructors and trainers because they could normally not meet, in between drills, to prepare and rehearse training events but they did try. Many unit commanders conducted National Guard business on their own time to prepare for upcoming training events. Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Stouder noted however that, “The vast majority of Individual Duty Training periods are not fully productive. The scheduled individual training either did not occur or was not conducted to standard.”³²

Table 7. Unit Yearly Training Events

Month	Training Event
January	Individual Training
February	Individual Training
March	Field Training Exercise
April	Gunnery Training
May	Weapons Qualification
June	AT Preparation
July	Annual Training
August	AT Recovery
September	Unit Inspections
October	CTT Testing
November	Riot Control Training
December	Mobilization File Preparation

Within the realm of training there were several levels units had to train in. They include individual, crew, small unit (platoon and company), battalion task force operations, brigade combat team operations, unit gunnery, and leader training. As can be seen from table 7 an attempt was made to include most of these events, but battalion task force and brigade combat team training was rarely conducted. Based on the four-year cycle a battalion would either conduct maneuver training or gunnery during its two week Annual Training period.

Leader training has always been hard to accomplish in all components of the Army but was especially true in the reserve components. Many key leaders lacked technical/tactical skills along with basic leadership abilities. These shortfalls could be attributed to the lack of formal schooling, limited training opportunities, inefficient training accomplished during Individual Duty Training and or Annual Training, nonavailability of reserve component configured officer professional development and noncommissioned officer professional development courses, and existing procedures for leader selection. This lack of individual leader skill and proficiency and staff development training was a crucial factor for the extended mobilization of the roundout brigades.³³ Many leaders were removed from the brigades to attend schools that were not required or available to them until they were activated.

At the individual level leaders underestimated what their soldiers needed to achieve the proper level of qualification for their military occupational specialty. In the 155th and 48th Brigades 15 and 19 percent respectively of their soldiers had not been trained to their assigned military occupational specialty. Nearly 600 soldiers needed formal schooling in forty-two specialties.³⁴

In the small unit category of training mission changes and the introduction of new equipment combined to create a retraining problem for units. For example, when the 256th Brigade received the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle in March 1990, 824 soldiers had to receive training to prepare them for their new military occupational specialty (11M).³⁵ Individual soldiers as well as fifty-four crews also required training. The battalion conducted two Annual Training periods that year to familiarize with their new vehicles. One was focused on gunnery and the other on maneuver. In the other brigades the unit's 1-R report over reported the ability of M1 crews who did not know how to bore sight their tank weapons thus causing additional delays in certification.³⁶

As stated earlier, the level of an organization determines the amount of time it needs to train to be proficient at its assigned Mission Essential Tasks List tasks. Within the reserve components the amount of training a unit conducted, at any level, was proportional to the size of the unit. Therefore the more complex battalion and brigade level maneuvers were rarely conducted even though they required more time to reach proficiency. Reserve component battalions maneuvered every other year, if nothing overrode their training plans, and brigades only maneuvered if a special event was planned such as an NTC rotation. This lack of realistic training, especially force-on-force, night and chemical training had to be made up once the units were activated.³⁷

The last major training event a unit had to conduct to maintain training proficiency was gunnery. All units were required to qualify 100 percent of its soldiers every year on their personal weapons as well as qualify on their Abrams tank or Bradley infantry fighting vehicles during a gunnery cycle. The reserve component units used the same standards as active duty units, but many did not qualify as often because of the

limited number of training days available. In the case of vehicle crew gunnery, crews were not required to qualify on the higher tables due to resource and time availability constraints. Of the units that qualified before activation, all their scores were disregarded upon activation. The units then had to go through additional training and qualification before certification.³⁸ This led to more delays in their mobilization. The reason for this was bureaucratic; the Forces Command plans drawn up for the brigades dictated what the units had to do, and it did not account for past training. Many units knew they would need to qualify some personnel on their assigned weapons, those who had not yet qualified, and especially on the higher vehicle gunnery tables. They were not prepared to have to qualify 100 percent of their personnel again on both individual weapons and vehicle crew gunnery, since in some cases units had qualified within two months of mobilization.

Two weeks after mobilization the brigade commanders conducted reassessments of their units; the commander of the 48th Brigade who reported a C-2 status revised his assessment to C-3, while the commanders of the 155th and 256th Brigades reported a C-3 status revised their assessments to C-2 and C-5 respectively.³⁹ The 256th Brigade commander changed to C-5 due to the fielding requirements of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. With the new assessment initial training plans, that had understated the number of postmobilization training days by as much as three times the number actually required, were changed and units started in-depth training in accordance with their new plans.⁴⁰ After Desert Storm General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army said, “We know now that expectations were too high. First, we cannot achieve, in the limited training time available, an adequate level of training proficiency to be able to deploy high

priority combat units in less than sixty to ninety days; divisions will take substantially longer.”⁴¹

Chairman Les Aspen of the House Armed Services Committee alluded to many of these problems in a hearing with the three brigade commanders on 8 March 1991. “If the readiness of the brigades showed they could be combat ready within twenty-eight to forty days, what caused them to change once they were activated?”⁴² The main reason was that peacetime training had not adequately prepared the roundout brigades for combat.⁴³

Once the three National Guard combat brigades were activated, their pre-war mobilization plans came to a halt. New standards were directed by Forces Command and new requirements were added to their postmobilization training. All of their premobilization training would count for nothing, but it would prepare them for the rigorous training to come.

¹Norman L. Williamson, *Army Readiness and the Reserve Roundouts: A New Perspective* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 1993), 9.

²Ronald E. Sortor, *Planning Reserve Mobilization, Inferences from Operation Desert Shield* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 12.

³US GAO, *Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces*, 26.

⁴*Ibid.*, 26.

⁵US Department of the Army, *Inspector General’s Report* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991), 2-7.

⁶Robert L. Goldich, *The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 22 October 1991), 38.

⁷Richard L. Stouder, *Sharpening the Sword, Combat Readiness of the National Guard Combat Brigades* (Fort McNair, VA: US National War College Press, 1992), 30.

⁸*Ibid.*, 30.

- ⁹Goldich, 15.
- ¹⁰Ibid., 35.
- ¹¹US Department of the Army, FORSCOM Regulation 135-3 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1989), 1.
- ¹²Barnhill, 24.
- ¹³US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 2-7.
- ¹⁴Goldich, 36.
- ¹⁵Colonel Roy I. Nomey, (Retired), S1, *2/156th Infantry Battalion Personal Correspondence*, 12 December 2006, 1.
- ¹⁶J. Paul. Scicchitano, "Total Force or Total Failure?" *Army Times*, 15 April 1991, 14.
- ¹⁷Joseph. Galioto, *An Analytical Study Describing the Organizational Culture of the Army National Guard and its Effect on Readiness* (Arlington, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, December 1988), 54.
- ¹⁸Ibid., 29.
- ¹⁹US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 2-7.
- ²⁰Sortor, 17.
- ²¹Gary W. Allen, *Dental Health in the Army Reserves and National Guard: A Mobilization Problem?* (Fort McNair, VA: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University Press, 1992), 16.
- ²²US General Accounting Office, *Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, September 1991), 4.
- ²³Ibid., 21.
- ²⁴US General Accounting Office, *Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, November 1992), 35.
- ²⁵Goff, 26.
- ²⁶US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 3-13.
- ²⁷Barnhill, 14.

²⁸US Department of the Army, FORSCOM/NGB Regulation 350-2 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1989), 3.

²⁹Barnhill, 38.

³⁰US GAO, *Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support*, 37.

³¹Townsend, 23.

³²Stouder, 14.

³³Goldich, 21.

³⁴Hooper, 6.

³⁵US GAO, *Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War*, 13.

³⁶Stouder, 31.

³⁷US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 3-4.

³⁸Robert H Scales Jr., *Reports, Army National Guard, Roundout Brigade Concept, 1991, Gulf War Collection, Group Scales Papers, SG Unit Histories, SSG HRNG-001* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991), 78.

³⁹US GAO, *Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf*, 24.

⁴⁰US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 3-9.

⁴¹General Gordon Sullivan, "Guard Divisional Post Mobilization Training to be Length," *National Guard*, April 1992, 4.

⁴²Robert H. Scales Jr., *Reports, Army National Guard, Roundout Brigade Concept, 1991, Gulf War Collection, Group Scales Papers, SG Unit Histories, SSG HRNG-005* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991), 61.

⁴³US GAO, *Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf*, 3.

CHAPTER 4

THE CHALLENGE

Four months had expired since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. During that time, President Bush announced a state of emergency, the first American combat units had deployed to Saudi Arabia, and the president ordered the call up of 200,000 reservists. The American armed forces mobilization process was in full motion set to meet the United States Central Command's force requirements. Posts prepared, received units, trained them for deployment, and then shipped them overseas. The National Guard and the roundout brigades had not been idle during these four months. As the units mobilized the situation became confused and convoluted as premobilization plans and regulations met real world circumstances.

The roundout brigades had already completed four of the five phases of mobilization; preparation, alert, mobilization at home station, and movement to mobilization station. Once they reported to their mobilization stations, they entered the last phase of their mobilization; the operational readiness improvement or postmobilization training phase. This phase would end when they were evaluated as ready to deploy. Normally the goal of this phase was to meet the minimum deployability requirements as soon as possible. During this phase unit members completed the transition to active duty and underwent preparation for overseas movement to include administrative as well as training requirements. Once mobilized the roundout brigades had to complete twelve mandatory events in order to deploy (table 8).¹ This was the time

for the roundout brigades to complete the process started by the president and guided by the Joint Operational Planning Process.

Table 8. Unit Mandatory Deployment Requirements

	Tasks	AC Planned Days	Actual Days Required
Mobilization Activities	Mobilize and move to the mobilization station		4
	Move from mobilization station to collective training site		7
	Prepare for over sea		3
Crew/Platoon Training	Maintenance, gunnery preparation, conduct of fire training, and crew gunnery skills test	7	10
	Gunnery tables IV-VIII	21	29
	Gunnery tables XI-XII	5	6
	Squad drills, platoon lanes, and situational training exercises	11	11
Training while task organized	Company team lanes and situational training exercises	15	22
	Company/Battalion Combined Arms Live Fire Exercises	7	11
	Battalion Task Force Operations	6	7
	Brigade and Battalion Task Force Operations	14	12
Training Recovery and Preparation to Move	Maintenance, Recovery, and Preparation for Loading		9
Total Days		86	131

Source: Thomas F. Lippiatt et al., *Post-Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Units* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), x

Before deploying overseas, all Army units had to be validated for deployment. This validation process included personnel, logistics, and training tasks that a unit must complete in order to deploy. The purpose of validation was to determine a unit's ability to perform its assigned wartime mission when it was scheduled to deploy and to ensure that a unit not able to meet the minimum deployment criteria was not deployed without the prior approval of the gaining commander-in-chief.² During peacetime, the validation authority lay with the installation commander who could have reported to Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, or another major command that owned installations. During Desert Storm, under the partial call up, the authority rested with the continental armies which in turn reported to the Forces Command commander. With the partial mobilization call up authority being limited to 200,000 soldiers, there was confusion as to whom to report to because the plans were based on full mobilization to include the installations to support it.³ As well as the known premobilization tasks, the roundout brigades had to meet the validation criteria that came from the United States Central Command. Though this requirement was understood by all from the beginning, the tasks were not what the roundout brigades had anticipated.

The roundout brigades were supposed to be a strategic reserve for the European theater response to an invasion from Warsaw Pact forces. The realigned CAPTSTONE relationships and mission changes caused by Desert Storm made previous postmobilization training plans obsolete.⁴ Even so, the Army National Guard argued that the roundout brigades met Department of the Army standards for deployability when federalized and could easily have been deployed within the thirty to sixty day period projected based on their readiness ratings. Only after they were federalized did Forces

Command change the deploy ability criteria to reflect a higher standard based on their assessment of the training needs of the roundout brigades.⁵

As reported by the units, all three roundout brigades met the readiness deployability criteria established by the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System on their first day of federalization. A significant number of active units, however, did not meet the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System criteria before they deployed but their readiness ratings were subjectively upgraded to meet deployment requirements.⁶ The 197th Infantry Brigade, for example, which replaced the 48th Infantry Brigade as the 24th Infantry Division's third brigade conducted Bradley training after they arrived in Saudi Arabia while the 256th Brigade conducted this training stateside. This perceived double standard would shake the long held bonds between the active Army and the National Guard to this day.

As outlined in the previous chapter, the standards and the truth of the unit's status as outlined in the Unit Status Report the Forces Command 1-R report, and the Forces Command Mobilization Deployment Planning System tasks were not in line with the reality of the unit's situation. The four main areas a unit was assessed against were personnel, equipment on hand (supply), equipment readiness (maintenance), and training. Each one of these played their part in complicating and delaying the roundout brigade's validation and eventual nondeployment to Desert Storm.

Four main factors combined to make personnel deficiencies a key factor in delaying the roundout brigades: availability, medical and dental readiness, and the transition of records to active duty systems. The primary cause as mentioned in the previous chapter was personnel available for training and eventual deployment. Upon

movement from home station to their mobilization stations the 48th and 155th Brigades were at P-2 while the 256th Brigade maintained P-1 and in fact was over strength. The 48th Brigade would stay at P-2 until deactivation, the 155th Brigade attained P-1, and the 256th Brigade maintained P-1 throughout the mobilization process (tables 9 and 10).

Table 9. Roundout Brigade Personnel Status on Mobilization Day

M-Day	Personnel Required	Personnel Assigned (%)	Unit Status Report Rating	Personnel Available (%)	Unit Status Report Rating
48th	4306	3842 (89)	P2	3842 (89)	P2
155th	3858	3756 (97)	P1	3430 (89)	P2
256th	4167	4861 (116)	P1	4471 (107)	P1

Source: US Department of the Army. *Inspector General's Report* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991).

Table 10. Roundout Brigade Personnel Status on 15 March 1991

15 MAR 91	Personnel Required	Personnel Assigned (%)	Unit Status Report Rating	Personnel Available (%)	Unit Status Report Rating
48th	4228	3580 (87)	P2	3623 (86)	P2
155th	3858	3671 (95)	P1	3626 (94)	P1
256th	4167	4216 (101)	P1	4112 (99)	P1

Source: US Department of the Army. *Inspector General's Report* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991).

From mobilization to demobilization the turbulence in personnel could be imagined just by comparing the raw numbers of available soldiers. In three months the 48th Brigade lost 219 personnel, the 155th Brigade gained 199 personnel, and the 256th Brigade lost 359 personnel. Though the 256th Brigade could afford its losses the turbulence caused by a 3 to 8 percent loss of personnel cannot be understated. In some instances, the roundout brigades were better off than their active component counterparts, such as senior enlisted personnel strength, sergeant to sergeant major (E-5 to E-9). The roundout brigades were 10 percent higher than their active component counterparts.⁷ These were just the raw numbers and do not fully reflect the true turbulence as many nondeployable personnel were replaced by deployable personnel making the percentages of turnover even greater. In general the roundout brigades could fall back on a cohesive force because of the stability inherent in the reserve units. Before mobilization, personnel turnover was lower, 4 percent versus 10 percent, as might be expected, in the roundout brigades than for active units.⁸

Once mobilized, many soldiers became nondeployable for medical and dental reasons. On M-day one brigade reported 215 nondeployable personnel due to medical and dental reasons. Two weeks later the same brigade reported 2400 soldiers nondeployable. In general units reduced that amount to less than 10 percent of their authorized strength within four weeks.⁹ Previously, units reported only one to 4 percent medical nondeployable on their unit status report.¹⁰ This difference can partly be explained because of the difference in medical requirements between the active and reserve component forces.

The key medical reasons for nondeployment were the soldiers who required physicals for being over the age of forty; there were 700 in one brigade alone. The problem stemmed from Army Regulation 40-501 which covered the reserve component physical requirements. It stated the need for a physical every four years but did not mandate one upon turning forty. Compounding this problem during the mobilization of the roundout brigades was the release of a Department of the Army message that stated the physicals were not required for mobilization. Within the confusion of mobilizing the country's armed forces, not every mobilization station received this guidance and the enforcement of the previous guidance meant that many soldiers were missing from training while taking their "over forty" physicals.¹¹

The third factor in personnel availability was dental readiness. Once mobilized and at their mobilization stations the roundout brigades lost from 30 to 35 percent of their strength due to dental problems. The main two reasons for dental unpreparedness within the roundout brigades was nonavailability of dental facilities, at their home stations, and the requirement for yearly physicals for their soldiers which made many of them category three (nondeployable). The second reason was that many soldiers' panoramic x-rays of their teeth either did not exist or were of poor quality.¹² Once again the lack of facilities and time affected the ability of the reserve components to meet this requirement. Both of these dental problems were corrected at the mobilization station with the trade off to the loss of training time.

Premobilization and postmobilization training was focused on training and preparing soldiers to meet the combat requirements of the theater, not the roundout brigade's administrative needs. As a result many personnel who conducted administrative

tasks were not trained on the systems available to them and not familiar with the active component systems they would have to work with once mobilized. This affected the roundout brigades during the transfer of personnel, finance, health, dental, and mobilization files to the mobilization station for processing. Premobilization plans outlined in Forces Command Mobilization Deployment Planning System and the reserve component Unit Commanders Handbook was not clear as to how and when this should happen the National Guard Bureau had to clarify the issue.¹³

The transition from reserve component to active component systems was drawn out because the systems were not compatible and the roundout brigades were not equipped with Standard Installation and Division Personnel Reporting System used for processing personnel transactions in reference to soldiers.¹⁴ Once activated one brigade had to process over 10,000 transactions for its soldiers.¹⁵ All three roundout brigades had to conduct a manual transition from their reserve component systems to the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System but yet they had no one trained to operate the system.¹⁶ By M+90 one brigade still had not finished transitioning its personnel files. The reason for this was because its' support unit deployed and a United States Army Reserve garrison unit took over but was not trained on the Standard Installation and Division Personnel Reporting System so could do little to support the brigade.¹⁷ The inability of the reserve component and active component systems to be fully inter-operable and the lack of trained operators in the roundout brigades caused delays in personnel and finance transactions for the soldiers of the brigades. Some of these issues would not be solved during their six months on active duty.

Whereas personnel shortages and all the turmoil that went with the process were a critical problem for the roundout brigades, they did not affect the number of days added to the postmobilization timelines as did the equipment shortages which added forty-one days to one brigade's timeline. The second main factor that affected the postmobilization process for the roundout brigades was equipment on hand. The reserve components received equipment from appropriations to the Army's regular procurement budget, a separate appropriation specifically for reserve equipment, and other Army units through redistribution.¹⁸

Since the Army cannot always fill all units to 100 percent of their equipment needs at one time it establishes an equipping priority list so that units are equipped in a sequence commensurate with their anticipated war fighting missions. The Army implemented the first-to-fight, first-to-be-equipped policy primarily through the Department of the Army Master Priority List, which established the relative priority in which units would receive equipment and other resources. The assigned priorities were based on several considerations, including a unit's projected deployment date in Army operational plans and mission priority. Based on these factors units were placed in one of four Force Packages and assigned a Force Activity Designator. Early deploying units were assigned Force Activity Designator I or II and Force Packages 1 designators as the highest priority.¹⁹ Even though the roundout brigades were Force Activity Designator I Force Packages 1 units they still were short critical items. The reason for these shortages was that the Army deviates from the Department of the Army Master Priority List fielding list and other programs have priority over the Department of the Army Master

Priority List such as foreign military sales, force modernization, equipping units for training, and fixing a nondeployable unit.²⁰

These factors combined to create the levels of equipment on hand for the roundout brigades which included critical shortages in many items of equipment to include the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle for the 256th Brigade. The 256th Brigade had to complete forty-one days of New Equipment Troop Training in order to deploy at the proper level of proficiency with their new Bradley vehicles. This added forty-one days to their mobilization timeline. Equipment shortages also included basic items such as radios and communications security equipment available for training. In the 48th and the 155th, the roundout brigades were short 105 radio sets compared to their active component counterparts who deployed in their place; in communications security equipment they were 455 pieces short.²¹

Whether the equipment was on hand or not was only one of the issues the roundout brigades faced in the supply area for deployment. In Mississippi, conflicting guidance was received as to what items should be taken to the mobilization station, what items would be issued at the mobilization station, and what items would be issued in theater.²² Some mobilization stations required units to bring equipment not authorized by their Modified Table of Organizational Equipment lists with them such as sleeping cots and chemical battle dress over garments.²³ These items were not in any prior plans or guidance and therefore were not allocated in budgets and transportation plans.

As with personnel, the roundout brigades did not have the current active Army supply systems such as the Unit Level Logistics System. This affected unit supply sergeants who had to attend fielding and training events and units training. These fielding

events were not allocated time on training schedules and so supply sergeants missed training and were not there to perform their day-to-day tasks for their units.²⁴ While at Unit Level Logistics System training the supply sergeants were not available to their units to conduct routine company business. As a result one brigade had 4800 equipment transactions to post and process as it received new equipment and transitioned to the Unit Level Logistics System, this caused issuing delays as paper work was sorted out within units. The roundout brigades were also not equipped with the Standard Army Maintenance Management System or the Standard Army Retail Supply System computers and just as with the personnel systems there was no interface between reserve component and active component systems.²⁵

The third main factor that affected a unit's deployment readiness was the state of readiness of the equipment it has on hand and at what level it was maintained for use. In this area personnel shortages combined with few training opportunities and limited time to perform preventive maintenance checks and services combined to negatively affect the unit's equipment readiness. This compounded the roundout brigade's ability to conduct maneuver training.

In two of the roundout brigades the maintenance personnel were manned at 73 and 85 percent of their authorized strength.²⁶ In Military Occupational Specialties with few people such as the Army Maintenance Management System clerks, the lack of training hindered their ability to order parts. To exacerbate the problem, once activated the State Area Commands canceled all open requisitions when the roundout brigades were mobilized per Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System and Forces Command guidance. The Army Maintenance Management System clerks had

to re-order everything. These factors brought operational readiness rates to below 50 percent. In some infantry and armor companies only six of fourteen combat vehicles were operational for training which caused delays and problems with training exercises.²⁷

Added to the maintenance problems was the fact that parts were not on hand to replace broken items because there were no demand histories. In order to be able to carry a repair part in a unit it must be shown that a need exists for it. This is normally established during peacetime support operations. When a part breaks on a vehicle, the operator puts in a request for a part to the Army Maintenance Management System clerk who then orders it. After the same part is ordered a number of times the unit may then stock that part in its Prescribed Load Lists and no longer has to order the part when it breaks. The part is on hand and can be issued to the mechanic to fix it. The Army Maintenance Management System clerk then orders another part to replace it in the Prescribed Load Lists. So in consequence, there were few parts in the Prescribed Load Lists stocks at the company level or Additional Stockage Lists parts at the warehouse level. In addition, frequently changing guidance from Forces Command, Second Army, and the Material Readiness Support Activity to improve the problem added to the confusion of what could be stocked and ordered.²⁸

The 48th Brigade faced time constraints as they alerted and moved to their mobilization stations. It also had less advance warning than the other two roundout brigades. Many units were not able to properly perform preventive maintenance checks and services of their vehicles at home station in their rush to move to their mobilization station. The 48th Brigade was not able to catch up until well after its move to the National Training Center and their mechanics returned from technical training.²⁹ The

lack of maintenance proficiency among the crews and mechanics impacted both time needed to validate the brigade because equipment was not available for training and the ability of the roundout brigades to train themselves. Usually the first indicator of a problem was identified when the equipment broke down.

The last of the four major factors affecting postmobilization training was training. Training was the biggest single factor affecting the roundout brigade's deployment, and the only subjective one. Unforeseen problems combined with additional requirements ensured that the postmobilization training would be long and hard for the brigades to master and meet the old, the changed, and the new requirements. The unrealistic status of the brigades training readiness did not help. A key component missing at M-day was the lack of validation criteria which were not clearly defined or issued in writing; this led to numerous changes to the postmobilization training plans.

One key reason was that leaders underestimated their unit's abilities. This has been discussed in the previous chapter, it is sufficient to say that everyone was involved in the process from active component commanders and evaluators to reserve component unit commanders and staffs. Many planning assumptions were based on these unit capabilities along with premobilization planning assumptions from the Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System. These planning assumptions were based on the roundout brigade's unit status reports, 1-R reports, and unit leader's assessments based on the Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System tasks in relationship to its readiness. All concerned agreed that shortages in personnel and equipment could be made up before M-day. Training in Mission Essential Task List tasks were rated as T or P, this would drive the pace.³⁰

In reality, the training process employed to prepare the three roundout brigades to deploy and fight was situational and specific to Desert Storm. The overall concept was a departure from the basic roundout concept with its associated CAPSTONE alignments; see table 1 and appendix B for these relationships.³¹ Since units were not called up with their CAPSTONE units the facts and assumptions based on that program were no longer valid. In reaction, a flurry of planning occurred at all levels to prepare the roundout brigades for deployment.

Headquarters, Department of the Army established 31 March 1991 as the date the roundout brigades needed to validate. Because of this, initial plans and training events became time as opposed to standards driven. The postmobilization training plans were developed from above without the needs of the specific brigades taken into account. Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System guidance was not applied in assessing the individual brigade's requirements.³² Forces Command developed and passed their plan to Second Army who tailored it to the 48th Brigade with some input from the brigade commander. Second Army then passed this plan to III Corps for use by the 4th Infantry Division with the 155th Brigade and to the 5th Infantry Division for use with the 256th Brigade; neither brigade commander had any input to it because of the time between their alert and their activation (see appendix C).

In order to meet the timeline of 31 March 1991, Second Army's plan for training was based on the Cardinal Point concept. This required active component trainers to conduct the training so that the reserve component leaders could be free to participate in the training and other tasks that required their attention.³³ This infusion of active component personnel was generally acknowledged as beneficial for the roundout

brigades by all but it did cause leadership issues as the brigade leaders took little ownership of a plan they had not developed.

The initial Forces Command plans envisioned thirty-four to eighty days for the roundout brigades to complete; reality would be 115 days for the 48th Brigade, 130 days for the 155th Brigade, and 160 days for the 256th Brigade. This timeline also included fourteen days allotted by the commander of Forces Command to allow the brigades to catch their breath and conduct activities the commanders deemed necessary.³⁴ The plan generally followed mobilization, movement to mobilization station, conducting collective training, a National Training Center rotation, preparation to deploy, and lastly deployment to the theater.³⁵

Once at the mobilization station the units had to transition to an active duty status. This included personnel, finance, medical, dental, logistics, and maintenance records processing and also included the personnel themselves. In conjunction with this in-processing units went through individual training. Major events included Common Task Testing, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical training, and weapons qualification.³⁶ Though the training was beneficial and conducted professionally in many cases it was considered a waste of time that could have been used to train on tasks the units needed. One brigade commander considered much of the mobilization station individual training to be redundant and unnecessary. Results of his units' Common Task Testing evaluations confirmed his assessment.³⁷ In other cases some tasks were not completed to standard because of time constraints and had to be made up in parallel with other training.

Critical low density military occupational specialties in the area of supply management were ten to thirty personnel below active component unit strengths at the

same time.³⁸ It was a surprise to no one that active component unit's military occupational specialties qualification was 22 percent higher than reserve component units.³⁹ Military occupational specialties qualification training was conducted for soldiers who were not currently qualified. Because of the number who required training Forces Command ordered the Fifth Army to activate the 4159th School to provide this training for the 155th and 256th Brigades at Fort Hood. The Georgia State Area Command had already conducted this training for the 48th Brigade before M-day.⁴⁰ These soldiers were missing during platoon, company, and battalion task force operations in some cases. This affected the unit's ability to conduct these training events to standard.

Most training tasks up to this point had not been included in the Forces Command training plan because it was assumed that the units had achieved proficiency in them before mobilization. Though the mobilization station training plan provided the brigades the opportunity to complete individual and crew level training such as Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Test and gunnery qualification which were needed for the transition to the collective training phase, the 48th Brigade had only 13 percent of its tank and 43 percent of its Bradley crews trained before leaving for the National Training Center. This training was made up at the National Training Center as the unit conducted other planned events because of the time driven approach applied to the brigade's postmobilization training.⁴¹

Crew gunnery proficiency posed significant training challenges for the roundout brigades as well. Although it normally took an active Army unit a week to conduct tank crew qualification gunnery, it took the two armor battalions of the 155th Brigade seventeen and twenty-four days to achieve the same qualification. The shortage of master gunners, who were the key trainers for gunnery at the company and battalion level,

affected the unit's ability to conduct simple training tasks such as bore sighting the gun systems of the vehicles.⁴² In comparison to reserve component companies, active component companies usually had two opportunities to fire tank tables IX to XII in the year leading up to Desert Storm; reserve component units had no opportunities during the same period.⁴³ In addition the companies of the 197th Brigade conducted thirty-three live fire exercises compared to the 48th Brigades twenty-one.⁴⁴

Once the individual and crew training phases were completed the units started collective training. These plans were developed to prepare the roundout brigades for a brigade maneuver rotation at the National Training Center. The National Training Center commander developed the plan for the 48th Brigade and adjusted it based on Second Army guidance, while III Corps developed plans for 155th and 256th Brigades based on the Second Army plan. Both the 4th Infantry Division and 5th Infantry Division commanders added tasks and provided personnel to assist the brigades in conducting training. The 256th Brigade received 2800 personnel from the 5th Infantry Division to train and evaluate the brigade.

A former 4th Infantry Division Commander and brigade commander in the 5th Infantry Division during Desert Storm stated in an interview that,

Maneuver is too hard for anyone at the maneuver unit (Battalion and Brigade level Command of Armor and Infantry forces) to maintain any decent level of proficiency. Active duty units struggle with this one. It is a bridge too far to expect National Guardsmen to be able to execute these difficult tasks with only thirty-nine training days.⁴⁵

The battalions and companies of the 197th Brigade conducted thirty-six Field Training Exercises from October 1989 to July 1991 while the 48th Brigade and its units only conducted thirteen during the same period.⁴⁶ As might be expected, the roundout

brigades struggled to meet proficiency at all levels. The 155th Brigade had 40 percent of its platoons rated as unsatisfactory in platoon and company lanes training evaluations during this phase.

Once the units finished the collective training phase they were supposed to move to the National Training Center and conduct brigade level maneuver training. The 48th Brigade went to the National Training Center on 3 January 1991 and started its brigade maneuver training on 17 March 1990. It had to draw over 500 pieces of equipment, the heaviest equipment draw ever. The brigade went through training that simulated a Southwest Asia enemy and successfully completed its training program.⁴⁷ The 155th Brigade moved to the National Training Center on 8 March 1990 and was delayed fourteen days as the 48th Brigade continued to turn in its equipment which in turn delayed the 256th Brigade's rotation. Because of this delay and the quick conclusion of the ground war in Southwest Asia, the 256th Brigade did not conduct its planned rotation to the National Training Center.

Other problems plagued the roundout brigade's postmobilization training from the beginning of their mobilization. The 155th Brigade faced delays as they prepared to move to their mobilization station at Camp Shelby as facilities were prepared to receive the brigade which caused a one week delay until 7 December 1990. In general the facilities met the needs of the brigades but were not necessarily available to the units when they needed them. Once mobilized both the 155th and the 256th Brigades had problems at both their mobilization and collective training sites because the active component units stationed at Fort Polk did not deploy and the 155th and 256th Brigades had to wait for units at Fort Hood to deploy before they could move into those facilities. In some

instances the units were housed in sub-standard World War II facilities because there was no room for them anywhere else. These facilities had been neglected for some time because of Congressionally mandated tear down guidance. This caused the guardsman to believe they were being treated as second class citizens instead of the recruiting slogan “Twice the Citizen.”

The roundout brigades also had to compete with active component formations for training facilities and resources. Facilities at Camp Shelby did not allow the 155th Brigade to conduct gunnery.⁴⁸ This caused delays as the brigade had to move to Fort Hood to conduct this training and then had to compete with the 256th Brigade.⁴⁹ The 155th Brigade also had to wait on the 48th Brigade to turn in equipment at the National Training Center because no time had been allowed in the training plan for a full turn-in of equipment.⁵⁰

The force that affected all other factors, however, was leadership. Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization. All agree that there was a high level of motivation and team spirit shown by the members of the roundout brigades.⁵¹ Leaders at all levels were doing their best but they were not as trained as they should have been. Many leadership issues quickly became obvious to all concerned.

Some issues were caused by leader turbulence as those not prepared to lead were removed, resigned, or were found physically unable to perform. One reason for this was there were few opportunities for units to operate under stressful conditions during weekend drills or the two weeks of annual training; the forward support battalion of one brigade had never had to support the entire brigade during an annual training.

Another reason for the leadership problems shown by the roundout brigades had to do with the neighborhood flavor of National Guard units. This bred a social culture of the guard leadership which was more closely knit to the civilian relationships involved in the units. This caused issues with leaders who found it hard to uphold standards or discipline for those who they knew from outside of the Army.

These conditions combined with a lack of formal military leadership training caused many units problems. Leaders failed at basic tasks such as personnel accountability because they themselves were not around to check on their soldiers.⁵² As the brigades mobilized and started the postmobilization training many leaders shunned their duties because they had no ownership of the training plans.

Another factor that affected the leadership of the units was the mis-understanding between the leaders of the active component and reserve components. One active component officer observed that officers and noncommissioned officers were often less than enthusiastic about the mission. "I personally ejected a company commander from a tank range for talking on his personal cellular phone to his office while firing live ammunition on a tank range."⁵³ On the other hand the guardsmen were sometimes treated as second class soldiers by their trainer and evaluators. After a long day of maneuver training at Fort Polk, Staff Sergeant Brady's company, Echo Company, Second Battalion, 156th Infantry Regiment, was assembled in the cold rain for a speech by our active duty company advisor, a captain in the 5th Infantry Division, who told us he did not expect much from us because we were just a bunch of weekend warriors! This was two months into the 256th Brigade's mobilization.⁵⁴

The noncommissioned officer corps is considered the back bone of the army. This statement reflects the strength of the corps in the army system. Within the reserve components the noncommissioned officer corps, in many instances, was not as strong as it needed to be. The reason for this was the way in which reserve component noncommissioned officers were selected and trained. Whereas active duty soldiers attended local boards for the ranks of sergeant and staff sergeant and Department of the Army selection boards for sergeant first class, master sergeant, and sergeant major, reserve component soldiers attended local promotion boards all the way up to sergeant Major.⁵⁵ This was also true of the officer corps which was state selected for commands instead of by the central selection process used by the active army.

Not every noncommissioned officer was wanting of the basic skills he needed and as a whole the roundout brigade's noncommissioned officers showed a high level of tactical proficiency. It was in the technical areas that they were weak.⁵⁶ Reserve component noncommissioned officers were not familiar with soldier counseling and the Uniform Code of Military Regulations legal processes.⁵⁷ This hampered their ability to develop both good soldiers positively and punish bad ones. Reserve component noncommissioned officers were not familiar with soldier support systems such as the Army Emergency Relief, Red Cross, and Army Community Services. These services and agencies were neither needed nor used during drill periods and were not available to them when they were conducting annual training.⁵⁸ Since most were transplanted from their familiar support facilities and had no means of communication or transportation they could not familiarize themselves with the post they were stationed at for mobilization.

Most of these short comings in leadership could be traced back to the training the reserve component leaders received. They rarely participated in the same level of training or had the opportunities to attend training. The professional development of all officers and noncommissioned officers occurred in three areas: in the officer and noncommissioned officers education system (institutional training), through experience gained in operational assignments, and through self development. The typical reserve component officer receives less training and development than did his active component peer. In most cases he has a full time job not related to his military responsibilities.⁵⁹

Leadership was a critical problem for the roundout brigades and it stemmed from the roots of the officer corps training system. Officer basic course is a course designed to prepare officers for their first four years in the Army. Attendance for active duty units was 100 percent but within the 48th and 155th Brigades those trained were at 86 and 54 percent respectively.⁶⁰ This fact adversely affected the roundout brigade's areas of tactical and technical competence, understanding and applying training standards, and enforcing discipline. Although in active Army units the percentage of captains who had attended the officer advance course which prepared officers with four to five years of experience for their next five to eight years in the Army, was greater than ninety 90 percent; the corresponding percentage in the 48th and 155th Brigades was barely 50 percent.⁶¹

Similarly, active Army junior noncommissioned officers who had attended the Primary Leadership Development Course which was designed to prepare young soldiers with three to five years of experience for their next two to four years of service was also greater than 90 percent, while the same group in the 48th and 155th Brigades was 28 and

51 percent respectively.⁶² There could be no mistaking the correlation between this training and a leader's ability to lead. The roundout brigades would find no fix to this deficiency, though many junior noncommissioned officers would attend some training during activation and staffs would conduct formal training exercises, they could not replace the years of experience and formal training of their active component counterparts who had completed this course as a part of their regular career progression.

Another deficiency that reserve component leaders had was experience in their profession. Whereas most active component leaders progressed through various assignments that offered more responsibility and diversification through moves to different locations every two to four years, reserve component leaders could stay in the same job and unit for much longer periods of time. In many cases they had to wait for someone to move, get promoted, or retire to ascend to a higher position. Since he attended training only thirty-nine days a year, it took him five years to get just six months of training an active component leader would get.

The third area a reserve component leader could be found deficient in was self development. Active component leaders could and would in general conduct self development through attendance at army schools, correspondence courses, and exercises designed to improve their skills. As has already been noted, reserve component leaders did not have the same requirements or chances to attend formal schooling as his active component counterpart. He could and in many cases did enroll in and complete correspondence courses but he had competing requirements against his personal time that his active component brothers did not have, namely their civilian jobs. Lastly, he could

attend exercises designed to improve his skill and often did but once again this training was competing against his other vocation.

As the roundout brigade leaders struggled to deal with unfamiliar plans from units they had in many cases never seen before, their over-optimism in their soldiers and units abilities would bog them down in the post-mobilization training phase. To add to their problems the roundout brigades would face new problems and realities for which they could not control.

¹Thomas F. Lippiatt et al., *Post-Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Units* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), x.

²Sortor, 23.

³Ibid., 24.

⁴US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 2-1.

⁵Hooper, 10.

⁶Goldich, 36.

⁷US GAO, *Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades*, 26.

⁸Ibid., 27.

⁹Ibid., 23.

¹⁰US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 3-12.

¹¹Ibid., 3-13.

¹²Ibid., 3-12.

¹³Scales, *SSG HRNG-001*, 84.

¹⁴US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 3.

¹⁵Ibid., 3-10.

- ¹⁶Ibid., 3-11.
- ¹⁷Ibid., 3-11.
- ¹⁸US GAO, *Aspects of the Army's Equipping Strategy Hamper Reserve*, 10.
- ¹⁹Ibid., 30.
- ²⁰Ibid., 32.
- ²¹US GAO, *Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades*, 36-39.
- ²²Scales, *SSG HRNG-001*, 80.
- ²³Ibid., 79.
- ²⁴US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 3-4.
- ²⁵Ibid., 3-13.
- ²⁶Ibid., 3-14.
- ²⁷Ibid., 3-14.
- ²⁸Ibid., 3-15.
- ²⁹Ibid., 3-13.
- ³⁰Ibid., 2-3.
- ³¹Ibid., 2-1.
- ³²Scales, *SSG HRNG-001*, 34.
- ³³US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 2-2.
- ³⁴Ibid., 2-6.
- ³⁵Ibid., 2-3.
- ³⁶Ibid., 3-5.
- ³⁷Ibid., 3-4.
- ³⁸US GAO, *Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades*, 22.

- ³⁹Ibid., 25.
- ⁴⁰US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 3-12.
- ⁴¹Ibid., 3-5.
- ⁴²Keith Vore, *The Training Relationship between the Army National Guard Brigades and their Active Army Resident Training Detachments: Is this an Effective Relationship?* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1999), 11.
- ⁴³US GAO, *Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades*, 31.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., 28.
- ⁴⁵Hooper, 14.
- ⁴⁶US GAO, *Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout*, 28.
- ⁴⁷US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 2-5.
- ⁴⁸Ibid., 3-4.
- ⁴⁹Scales, 35.
- ⁵⁰US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 3-6.
- ⁵¹Ibid., C-1.
- ⁵²Ibid., C-2.
- ⁵³Hooper, 7.
- ⁵⁴James T. Brady II, *2nd Platoon, E Company 2/156th Infantry Battalion After Action Report for Operation Desert Storm*, April 1991.
- ⁵⁵US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, D-3.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., D-5.
- ⁵⁷Ibid., D-8.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., D-8.
- ⁵⁹William H. Kennedy III, *Reserve Component Leader Development: A Shortfall* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 1992), 7.

14. ⁶⁰US GAO, *Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout*,

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 15.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 17.

CHAPTER 5

THE REALITIES

Sadam Hussein precipitated the call up of the roundout brigades with his invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The United States responded and set in motion the mobilization process to bolster its active armed forces to meet the threat this invasion posed to Saudi Arabia. The standards for the process were well documented (FORMDEPs Series) and known by most involved from the reserve component commanders to the FORSCOM Commander. However, once mobilized reserve units faced many challenges on their way to the “front”, many of these challenges were foreseen and prepared for. Now, the roundout brigades would face, their biggest challenge, the realities of the situation they found themselves in.

The politics behind the activation along with Guard and active component relations and the timing of the activation would now add to the problems faced by the roundout brigades. The belief had always been that the roundout brigades would have ample training time, 90-180 days, to ramp up their training proficiency in order to deploy to Europe and fulfill its reinforcing role. The “fire drill” call that occurred as a result of Desert Shield was believed by many, a “bridge too far” for the roundout brigades. Thus the roundout brigades were not activated until four months after their parent divisions were alerted for deployment to Southwest Asia.

The four reasons the Department of Defense and the Army cited for this decision were: first, the immediate objective of Operation Desert Shield was to deter and defend against an Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia. Second, General Schwarzkopf, the

commander-in-chief of Central Command, requested two full strength heavy divisions when Desert Shield began. Third, the request for two full strength heavy divisions was received sixteen days before the president approved the reserve call up on 22 August 1990. And lastly, the reserve call up authority invoked by the president on 22 August 1990 and which was still in effect until 19 January 1991, allowed reservist to be on active duty for only ninety to 180 days.¹ This delay in the call up was based on the realities facing the president and his commanders at that time. Underlying these realities were the politics going on behind the scenes which dictated the path the roundout units would take.

To meet Saddam Hussein's threat, the president made the decision to call up the reserves. As discussed in chapter 2, he had five choices to choose from: selective mobilization was the lowest level of the mobilization of reserve component units, Individual Ready Reserves (IRR), and the resources needed for their support. Partial mobilization was the lowest level of expansion of the active forces to mobilize Ready Reserve component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support. Full Mobilization was the midlevel expansion of the active forces to call up reserve component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support. Total mobilization was the highest level of expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress and the president to organize and or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support. And lastly, the president could also call up to 100,000 selected reservists (not considered a mobilization) under the presidential call up of 100,000.

The National Command Authority chose initially to federalize the selected reserve units under the presidential selected reserve call up, Title 10, Section 673b. But this authority had limitations which impacted the roundout brigades. One restriction of Title 10 Section 673b was that it only allowed the president to call up individuals to serve on operations; it did not allow the activation of soldiers who still needed additional training.² This impacted the roundout brigade's time-line. The roundout brigades could have sent their many soldiers, who needed MOS training, to schools before they were called up. Another restriction was that it only allowed forces to be called up for ninety days and extended an additional ninety days for a total of 180 days.³ The Army decided not to call up the brigades for training initially, as they thought there was not enough time to train and then utilize the roundout brigades. The time available would not allow the operational deployment and utilization of the roundout brigades. The call up restriction also hindered the Army's deployment because several ad hoc organizations were created because the units designated to serve in Southwest Asia were reserve component units and were not called up early enough in the flow for deployment. As an example, movement control teams were not available to facilitate the deployment and reception of units to the theater because of this delay and ad hoc control teams were created to fulfill this role.⁴ In the Army's report on the call up authority, the report found that the federalization authority needed to be refined to meet the needs of the military situation, to include length of time federalized and access to the Individual Ready Reserves.⁵

By Title 10, the presidential selected reserve call up limited the number of selected reserves, up to 200,000 personnel.⁶ On 15 August 1990 the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, requested the president use his authority to call up the selected

reserves. Third Army planning and their Operation Internal Look assumptions had presumed the immediate use of the full 200,000 man presidential call up authority under Title 10, United States Code Section 673b. The Department of the Army, however, estimated for 33,772 reservists by 31 August 1990, assuming combat operations had not begun and 88,000 if hostilities had commenced. On 22 August 1990, the president informed leaders of Congress that he had authorized the Secretary of Defense to exercise his authority under Title 10 Section 673b. On 23 August 1990 Secretary Cheney authorized the Army to order to active duty no more than 25,000 members of the selected reserve for the purpose of combat support and combat service support, but no combat forces were ordered to active duty. The other services were not as restricted as the Army. This placed artificial constraints on the early use of the roundout brigades by the Secretary of Defense, not the president.

By October 1990, there were no more than 250,000 personnel in theater; the initial plan to defend Saudi Arabia was abandoned with the decision to liberate Kuwait. A second corps was needed to conduct offensive operations.⁷ To support offensive operations the president ordered partial mobilization on 8 November 1990 in accordance with his decision for combat operations against Iraqi forces operating in Kuwait and Iraq. With this decision the president ordered the roundout brigades to mobilize. He also ordered the VII (United States) Corps from Germany to deploy to Saudi Arabia to give Central Command and the Third Army the heavy (armored) forces it would need to conduct this new offensive phase of the operation.

As stated earlier, the initial call up was limited by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's decision on what was needed for the defense of Saudi Arabia. He limited the

number of Army forces to be called up, especially combat brigades, but not the combat forces of other services. There has been much debate on whether the roundout brigades could perform effectively in combat. Other services deployed reserve fighter wings and ships and the Army deployed reserve field artillery brigades that, by all accounts, performed effectively. The United States Marine Corps had deployed several ground combat units in Kuwait by 15 January 1991.⁸ They included the 4th Tank Battalion, of which Bravo Company destroyed fifty-nine Iraqi tanks in four engagements with no friendly losses.⁹ The Marine Corps also deployed the 8th Tank Battalion, 3rd Battalion/23rd Infantry, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions/24th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion/25th Infantry all of which performed to standard. If these units performed so well why were the Secretary of Defense and the Army leadership so wary of deploying the roundout brigades?

Many believed there was resentment between the active Army and reserve components. For the most part, there has always been a mutual understanding and friendly relations between individuals of the active component and reserve component forces. Between the components though, there has always been friction. Currently, working relationships have been strained since at least the end of the Gulf War mobilization. With the Global War on Terror, relations seem to be less strained with the high operations tempo of both the active duty and reserve component soldiers serving together, in some cases reserve companies are serving with active duty battalions and vice versa. During Desert Storm there were units in Germany planning to integrate National Guard companies into active duty battalions for combat but this was not put into practice.

Some guard officials believed the roundout brigades were held to a double standard and that this was the reason for the roundout brigade's lengthy postmobilization training period rather than any real readiness problems. Active army officers believed that Guardsmen continually underrated their abilities and were not prepared for combat operations.¹⁰ These feelings were voiced in a 1995 General Accounting Office report on the combat readiness of the roundout brigades. It went on to say that there appears to be considerable bitterness, recrimination, and sharply varying views among the institutional participants – active Army, Army National Guard, and others – about who is to “blame” for what happened, or did not happen, during the Desert Shield/Storm activation of the roundout brigades.¹¹

But these differences between the active and guard forces goes much further back. Shortly after World War I, General John J. Pershing (Commander of the Army Expeditionary Force) coming to the defense of the National Guard, said that “the National Guard never received the wholehearted support of the Regular Army during the World War.”¹² During World War II, Lieutenant General Lesley J McNair, then commander-in-chief of the Army Ground Forces, wrote to General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, in 1944 that:

One of the great lessons of the present war is that the National Guard, as organized before the war, contributed nothing to National Defense. On the other hand dependence of this component as a great part of the Initial Protective Force of our nation was a distinct threat to our safety.¹³

Ignoring all the contributions of National Guard divisions during World War I, and World War II up to that time, Lieutenant General McNair went on to recommend that “the National Guard be dispensed with as a component of the Army of the United States.”¹⁴

More recently, a year after the Gulf War, in a survey of 142 students of the 1992 Army War College, conducted by Colonel Robert L. Cooch Jr. while writing on the readiness of reserve component leaders

found in general that all believed in the role of the National Guard and its ability to fight with the army but still found, eighty of 135 officers stated that active duty officers didn't treat their National Guard counterparts as equals, ninety-nine didn't believe guardsmen were capable of making a positive contribution on the day they were activated, seventy-four thought that political constraints would slow the mobilization process down, and 100 stated that the National Guard had 100 percent more power with Congress than the active forces.¹⁵

This was the environment that guardsmen found themselves in during the time frame of Operation Desert Storm.

The last statement about politics highlights one of the critical decisions politicians must take when making reserves available to active forces because doing so is not trouble-free. Each call up requires presidential and Congressional approval which is weighed against the political cost to mobilize citizen soldiers. Mobilization is an act of political will that sends strong signals to both our allies and enemies alike.¹⁶ The use of the Army National Guard is a political statement not just a military decision. When guardsmen are called to active duty, Congressional constituents leave Congressional districts. The decision makers reach out and touch the grassroots American. As a result a great deal of interest is generated at the local level. Part of the tradition concerning the use of reserves is that their use is tied to national resolve and public opinion.¹⁷ Reserve forces serves as the popular face of the regular Army, most Americans only come in contact with military forces through their local reserves.¹⁸

National Guard units are constitutionally protected creatures of the states and territories where they maintain their headquarters. Unless the president calls them up,

guard units are at the command of the state governors, who also choose their senior officers.¹⁹ In a hearing on military strength, in 1991, to Congress the Secretary of Defense stated “if we are going to cut active-duty personnel, and we are -- the Army’s going from 18 to 12 active divisions--I don’t need as many Reservist or Guardsmen to back them up.”²⁰ Over objections from the Secretary of Defense the House voted to add \$650 million to the \$18 billion the Pentagon had requested for the guard and reserves in 1992. It also voted to trim a planned cutback in guard and reserve strength from 108,000 to 37,500.²¹

Was the Secretary of Defense trying to secure active force structure by not sending guard combat units? In the words of the then chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General John B. Conaway:

The bottom line was painfully clear to us in the Guard. There were plenty of active Army units that wanted to get into the fray and there was little real chance the active Army leadership would send Guard troops in the active’s place, war plan or no war plans. The fact was the active Army missed a tremendous opportunity to solidify their total force policy position with the 48th.²²

The army would, however, take individual replacements from units that were not considered ready to go to fill active units. Though neither Secretary of Defense Cheney nor Lieutenant General Conaway foresaw it at the time the number of active duty divisions did go from eighteen to twelve the number of roundout brigades stayed the same until the program was retired and enhanced separate brigades took their place. This allowed the Army to maintain twelve full strength divisions on active duty and have fifteen enhanced separate brigades prepared to reinforce them when needed.

That the roundout brigades were treated differently was made clear from the moment Secretary of Defense Cheney announced that the roundout brigades were being activated:

I want to be absolutely certain that units drawn from the Guard and Reserve have the opportunity for the additional workup training our people think they require... before they go; they need to go to the National Training Center to get into shape as if they were an active duty division.²³

No active duty brigade was required to complete a National Training Center rotation before they deployed and the 48th had just completed a rotation in 1990. If the roundout brigades had deployed to Saudi Arabia after initial postmobilization training, the range facilities and maneuver space would have been available in the theater of war to enhance their skills. These ranges were larger than the ranges available at the National Training Center in California and were utilized by VII Corps units coming from Germany to prepare for combat.²⁴

Why was the call up so political then and not now? Units such as the 49th Armored Division and 29th, 34th, and 35th Infantry Divisions have served as the United States higher headquarters for forces in Bosnia, and by all accounts their rotations were successful. In Kosovo, the 28th and 34th Infantry divisions have served as the higher headquarters. In the current Global War on Terrorism the 42nd Division served in Iraq, commanding both active and National Guard brigades, along with most of the National Guards Enhanced Separate Brigades.

Other issues during Operation Desert Shield surfaced to cause the roundout brigades problem as well. One minor issue that caused many units confusion was FORMDEPS itself. A new version of FORMDEPS Volume III (Mobilization and

Deployment Planning), was issued just before the mobilization. Many units and installations did not have the updated version. There were changes between the versions that effected units as they tried to mobilize.

As units were mobilized and deployed, glitches in the Total Force Policy became readily apparent. The most visible, early on, was the delay in utilizing Title 10 United States Code Section 673b call up authority. Consequently, the roundout program did not function as designed.²⁵ Roundout units were not activated with their parent divisions and did not conduct their train up programs with them but with unfamiliar units. The Army's CAPSTONE program which aligned units for training with their wartime headquarters was broke and the roundout brigades suffered as a result. Though the 48th was planned for operational use with the 24th Division in the desert, the 155th and 256th Brigades along with their parent divisions the 1st Cavalry and 5th Infantry Divisions were prepared for war in Europe. Now they were preparing for combat in the desert with varying guidance and, with the exception of the 256th Brigade, with different higher headquarters.

It is important to note that it was never envisioned, prior to the Persian Gulf War, that a roundout brigade would be able to deploy as part of an immediate response to a no-notice/short notice, rapid response contingency.²⁶ General Gordon R. Sullivan stated in a speech to the 113th General Conference of the National Guard Association on 4 September 1991: "The roundouts originated to increase the strength of active divisions for major, protracted combat in Europe. They were not meant to be used as contingency forces for immediate, short duration deployments."²⁷ If that was so then why were roundout brigades in the rapid deployment forces of the XVIII Airborne Corps' 24th

Infantry Division (Mechanized)? There seemed to be a contradiction between the program and the roundout brigade force assignments.

The program never envisioned immediate deployment of combat roundout units. A combat roundout unit simply could not be considered fully combat ready with only thirty-nine training days a year. European wartime plans gave guard units the time they needed. The rapidity of events in the Persian Gulf crisis was never planned for, and consequently, did not fit neatly into a European-like scenario. Units were needed immediately. Training time was simply not available.²⁸ Army planners apparently assumed that there would be ample strategic warning in the event of war with the Soviet Union. This would allow for the mobilization and training of the roundout brigades.²⁹

But even so, some in the active components believed as did General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, then commander of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), who had the 48th Infantry Brigade as his roundout brigade, and stated: "Roundout is a fact of life...the 48th Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, is the third brigade of my division...I expect them to fight alongside us. They have demonstrated (their capability) through three demanding rotations at the National Training Center...they are, in fact, combat ready..."³⁰ In the reserves most commanders feelings can be summed up in a statement to Chairman Les Aspen of the House Armed Services Committee, by Colonel Fletcher Coker, the 155th Brigade commander: "I would not have hesitated to have taken this unit into a combat theater of operations...Nobody wants to go to war, but we were prepared to do our duty."³¹ This could have been said by any commander but these statements show the environment the roundout brigades found themselves in when they were activated.

Another critical constraint was strategic sealift, especially roll on/roll off ships that carried unit equipment sets; there simply were not enough ships to establish a continuous arrival rate equal to the capability of the available ports in the theater to receive units.³² Army planners had to decide who would come and when based on ships and heavy equipment transporters available. In theater, there were 1295 military and 788 civilian heavy equipment transporters available. They could not clear the ports of equipment that could actually be discharged at the port in any given day. Even if the brigades could have been ready earlier than they were, their position in the force flow would have to have been moved up in front of other units that Central Command had requested.

Lastly, it did not help the roundout brigades when in early February 1991 fifty-three soldiers from the 256th Brigade went absent without leave from Fort Hood, TX. This lack of discipline was heightened by the fact that the units knew they would not be deployed to Southwest Asia in time for the impending ground war.³³ This was the proof many active officers needed to put the nail in the coffin of the roundout brigades.

¹Hooper, 8.

²US GAO, *Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces*, 17.

³Ibid., 17.

⁴Ibid., 17.

⁵Scales, *SSG HRNG-001*, 10.

⁶Lewis, 21.

⁷Swain, 42.

⁸Stephen M. Duncan, "Gulf War was a Test of Reserve Components and they Passed," *Reserve Officers Association*, June 1991, 28.

⁹*Ibid.*, 22.

¹⁰US GAO, *Combat Brigades' Ability to be Ready for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain*, 34.

¹¹Goldich, 51.

¹²Barnhill, 105.

¹³*Ibid.*, 104.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 105.

¹⁵Robert L. Cooch Jr., *Reserve Component Leader Development: Pre/Post-Mobilization* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 1992), 38.

¹⁶Williamson, 8.

¹⁷Goff, 16.

¹⁸Townsend, 28.

¹⁹Alex Prud'Homme, "Lessons of the Desert Storm Phantom Army," *Time*, 10 June 1991, 3.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 2.

²¹*Ibid.*, 2.

²²Les' Melnyk, *Mobilizing for the Storm: The Army National Guard in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau Office of Public Affairs Historical Services Division, 2001), 7.

²³*Ibid.*, 18.

²⁴Strauss, 28.

²⁵Goff, 14.

²⁶Strauss, 26.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 26.

²⁸Goff, 30.

²⁹Townsend, 8

³⁰Goff, 8.

³¹Scicchitano, 14.

³²Swain, 105.

³³Melnyk, 21.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Seventeen years passed since Staff Sergeant Brady was mobilized to serve for Operation Desert Storm. In that time he rose to the rank of Major and deployed for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom four times earning the Combat Action Badge while serving his country. This thesis was his search for the answers to what had happened to him and his unit during Operation Desert Storm.

Since the founding of our nation, the National Guard has protected the country by serving in conjunction with the regular Army. As a result of the Vietnam War the Total Force concept was developed to ensure that the reserve forces would be fully integrated with the active. The Round Out concept was born from the Total Force to help bolster the number of active component divisions that could be fielded during the Cold War.

During the 1970s, 1980s, and the beginning of the 1990s the roundout brigade concept was a crucial part of United States Army doctrine. Ten active duty divisions consisted of two active duty brigades and one brigade of either the National Guard or Army Reserve. Yet when the nation called on the concept to work during Operation Desert Storm, neither the 1st Cavalry Division nor the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) deployed with their roundout brigades. Worse, only one of the three roundout brigades was validated for combat operations and none of the three roundout brigades that were activated deployed.

The three main reasons the roundout brigades did not deploy to Operation Desert Storm during the war were that they were unprepared to deploy; the standards they had

prepared for in peacetime changed once they were activated; and finally the initial operational needs of Desert Shield did not call for their presence so they were not activated until late in the mobilization process when Desert Shield became Desert Storm. The Department of the Army Inspector General's report stated that the process was a success overall and validated the mobilization concept.¹ The report, however, criticized the link between the active Army and the roundout brigades.² Though this appears to be a minor criticism it should be remembered that the reason the roundout brigades were formed was because the Total Force concept required the strong integration of the active and reserve forces.

It is clear when you analyze the evidence that the systems that existed for the use of roundout brigades for the Cold War were not maintained or updated for the situation the roundout brigades found themselves in during the Desert Storm period. The secretary of defense stated, on 13 March 1991, "it may well be that one of the lessons we'll learn out of this is that the roundout brigade concept for the early deploying forces is not a good one."³ This statement is at the crux of the problem. The roundout brigades were unprepared to deploy because their leaders along with their active component evaluators continuously overrated their unit's real readiness capabilities. This led all involved into believing that the roundout brigades could deploy almost immediately, once mobilized, with little or no training. This was never envisioned within the roundout brigade concept. Indeed the roundout brigades were conceived to be reinforcing units to a major European conflict. This would allow them the training time they needed in order to prepare themselves better for their impending employment in Europe.

It is clear however that starting with the mobilization process itself, within the Joint Operational Planning System the roundout brigades had been identified in pre-war plans to deploy to the Central Command region for just such a contingency as Operation Desert Shield. Once Iraq invaded Kuwait the roundout brigades were not included based on the operational needs of the United States Central Command commander, General Schwarzkopf. The roundout brigades were aligned under the CAPSTONE concept with their parent divisions during peacetime but once activated this critical relationship was severed and the roundout brigades prepared for deployment with different units except for the 256th Brigade, but its division was no longer a part of the operation. This realignment caused delays and confusion with the roundout brigades when they were mobilized. Had the roundout brigades been activated with their parent divisions they would have had ample time to train the required 115 days and then deploy to join their parent or assigned divisions in Saudi Arabia.⁴ Lieutenant General (RET) Herbert Temple Jr. the National Guard Bureau Chief from 1986-1990 stated “It is conceivable that the roundout brigades would have been as capable as the active units had they deployed to Saudi Arabia and been allowed to train there with their active counterparts.”⁵ Considering that most active duty units benefited from this postmobilization training his statement is not unreasonable and the roundout brigades would have been able to maintain their long standing command relationships with their assigned divisions.

If the roundout brigade concept intended the brigades to be more prepared than the rest of the National Guard and Army Reserves because of their role with active duty divisions, then why were the roundout brigades not required to achieve the same standards as their parent divisions? It is clear that both the medical and dental

requirements were different from the active forces. If the roundout brigades had to be ready to deploy immediately then the time, facilities, and resources should have been provided them during their yearly training cycles to meet the required readiness rates. The evidence shows that they were not required to achieve the same medical and dental standards so there was no emphasis placed on the roundout brigade commanders to achieve a higher standard.

It can also be inferred that the roundout brigade commanders and their active component advisors put their best foot forward on their unit status reports and the Forces Command 1-R reports. These reports were very subjective and did not adequately paint the full picture of the brigade's readiness. This caused everyone to believe that they were more ready than they actually were and capable of deploying faster. These reports played their part in complicating and delaying the roundout brigade's validation and eventual nondeployment to Desert Storm.

Once the roundout brigades mobilized their shortages became readily apparent. In personnel the roundout brigades went through massive turmoil as personnel became nondeployable, were removed for various reasons, or were sent to training because they were not qualified in their military occupational specialty. Equipment availability hindered the unit's ability to train because they were missing many critical items such as radios and nuclear, chemical, and biological equipment. Even when the roundout brigades had equipment on hand they could not fully use them to train with because, in some cases such as tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, they were breaking down faster than their mechanics could repair them because of a shortage of trained mechanics and a lack of spare replacement parts to repair the equipment.

Because the roundout brigades readiness had been overrated their planned postmobilization activities had changed dramatically. Units that only days before had rated themselves fully capable of performing their wartime mission suddenly found themselves unable to control their training destinies and then sent off to the National Training Center for final validation. Unit's mobilization timelines doubled then quadrupled as the peacetime manning, equipping, maintaining, and training policies that drove their preparations for mobilization showed the flaws in the system.

If the Department of Defense, the US Army, Forces Command, the National Guard Bureau, and everyone else involved in the mobilization of the roundout brigades had been preparing for this eventuality for so long then why was the mobilization process so long? There can be no doubt that even though Forces Command mobilized and deployed over 147,000 reservists to the combat theater, there were problems with the process. Confusion reigned because the FORMDEPs guidance had changed just before the mobilization and not all installations had the new guidance. It is clear even without the change that the process was not ready for the roundout brigades. The 155th Brigade's mobilization was delayed one month because its mobilization site, Camp Shelby, Mississippi was not ready to receive the brigade. This was three months after the first call up of reservists. What had Forces Command been doing all this time? Clearly blame for this should rest with Forces Command because the roundout brigade's mobilization had been discussed from August 1990 onward.

In the end, there was no conspiracy to keep the National Guard roundout brigades from deploying to the theater of operations. It came down to the system that allowed everyone involved to believe that the roundout brigades could be just as ready as an

active component brigades with little or no additional preparation before deployment. This system did not allow for the same manning, equipping, maintaining, or training of the roundout brigades as their active component counterparts; but because their leaders overestimated their readiness, supported by their active component evaluators, everyone thought they were ready to go at a minutes' notice. This violated the concept of the roundout brigades program and ultimately led to confusion, frustration, and misunderstanding. None of this detracted from the fact that the roundout brigade soldiers were in fact prepared to do their duty.

¹US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 3-1.

²US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 4-1.


³Scicchitano, 11.

⁴US DA, *Inspector General's Report*, 5-1.

⁵Scicchitano, 11.

APPENDIX A



















256TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (MECHANIZED) TASK ORGANIZATION



*The Brigade activated with several other combat support units that were integrated into the 5th Infantry Division such as a chemical platoon.


APPENDIX B

ROUNDOUT BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT ROADMAP

Round Out Unit			
	48 th	155 th	256 th
Home Station			
	Macon 30 NOV 90	Tupelo 07 DEC 90	Lafayette 30 NOV 90
Active Duty Division			
	24 th ID	1 st CAV	5 th ID
Mobilization Station			
	Fort Stewart 04 DEC 90	CP Shelby 08 DEC 90	Fort Polk 06 DEC 90
Evaluation Unit			
	Second Army	4 th ID	5 th ID
Training Site			
	Fort Irwin 03 JAN 91	Fort Hood 31 DEC 90	Fort Hood 12 FEB 91
NTC Rotation	17 MAR 91	08 MAR 91	N/A

APPENDIX C


BRIGADE TRAINING PLANS




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

155

BRIGADE TRAINING PLAN





BRIGADE TRAINING PLAN



 = EVENTS CANCELLED

APPENDIX D

DEPLOYMENT CHRONOLOGY

July 16, 1990	ARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 published
August 2, 1990	Iraq invades Kuwait
August 6, 1990	Saudi Arabia requests assistance of US forces to defend Saudi Arabia
August 7, 1990	President Bush declares a National Emergency, Desert Shield begins
August 9, 1990	82nd Airborne Division starts to arrive in Saudi Arabia
August 22, 1990	President Bush signs 200K call up order
August 24, 1990	First army reserve units ordered to active duty
August 29, 1990	82nd Airborne Division closed in Saudi Arabia
September, Early	Congressional debate on National Guard combat units not called up
September 7, 1990	First reserve units deployed to Saudi Arabia
September 12, 1990	24th Infantry Division arrives in Saudi Arabia
October 6, 1990	101st Airborne Division arrives in Saudi Arabia
October 22, 1990	1st Cavalry Division arrives in Saudi Arabia
November 5, 1990	Congress amends Section 673b for up to 360 days
November 8, 1990	President Bush announces offensive plans
November 8, 1990	SECDEF announces three National Guard combat brigades mobilized
November 15, 1990	Alert order to 48th and 155th Brigades
November 30, 1990	48th and 256th Brigades mobilize

December 1, 1990	SECDEF orders to active duty 188,000 reservists
December 7, 1990	155th Brigade mobilizes
January 7, 1991	48th Brigade moves to Fort Irwin
January 14, 1991	<i>Army Times</i> article critical of the 48th Brigade, 3rd Armored Division starts to close in Saudi Arabia
January 15, 1991	Six USMC combat battalions in Saudi Arabia, four Infantry, two Tank, deadline for Iraqi withdrawal
January 17, 1991	Operation Desert Storm begins; air offensive begins
January 18, 1991	Individual Ready Reserve called up and extensions for those already called up
January 28, 1991	Chief of Staff of the Second Army refutes the <i>Army Times</i> article
February 6, 1991	VII Corps closes in Saudi Arabia
February 15, 1991	3rd Armored Division still not ready for combat after one month in Saudi Arabia
February 20, 1991	President Bush issues four day order to Iraq
February 21, 1991	National Guard artillery brigades are in Saudi Arabia
February 24, 1991	Ground war begins
February 27, 1991	US Army fights largest tank battle since World War II
February 28, 1991	48th Brigade certified for deployment, ground war ends
March 4, 1991	48th Brigade moves back to Fort Stewart
March 11, 1991	155th Brigade arrives at Fort Irwin, 48th Brigade ordered to demobilize
March 23, 1991	48th Brigade demobilizes

APPENDIX E
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Primary Sources

Government Documents

As is the case with all army operations the United States Army conducted an official Inspector General's investigation into the mobilization of the roundout brigades. This report was a key document for any future researcher. This document was intended as a lessons learned for the United States Army and as such held few punches with both the active and reserve components. It should be considered that it is biased because it is an army report for the Army. This should be the first stop for any future researcher as it contains detailed statistics on personnel, equipment, and training for the three roundout brigades and the situation they found themselves in.

Regulations and Field Manuals.

I used the field manuals and regulations from the period of Desert Storm to understand the requirements that existed at the time. These documents provided the organizational data, training and evaluation standards and operational framework. They explained how a unit should have performed a given task. They also provided a standard for measuring an organization's success. The Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) manuals were useful in this endeavor though they are a shining example of how one could get confused with the process as there are many volumes and sub parts to the set.

After Action Reports.

During and after the mobilization, many organizations produced after action reports describing their performance. Great assets to any researcher of the Desert Storm time period are the Scales reports located at Fort Leavenworth's CARL library. The Scales reports were gathered to assist in writing the official history of the campaign and the after action reviews the Army sanctioned for the whole conduct of the war. The reports were a great source for the lessons learned in the active and reserve forces involved with the deployment.

Secondary Sources

Government Documents.

There is an enormous assortment of government documents concerning Operation Desert Storm. The General Accounting Office conducted investigations into the National Guard roundout Brigades to answer the question of what happened. The Department of Defense conducted a multitude of reports on the Persian Gulf War. The Army presented its official account of the war in *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War*. While all of these reports are valuable references, they are often overly congratulatory in their presentation or are very specific in focus. There have been many studies by students at the US Army War College and Command and General Staff College concerning Desert Storm which contain useful information from detailed looks at dental readiness to leader training and should be considered to broaden any further study of the subject.

Articles.

In using articles from the period for this thesis I was able to pull information that normally is not included in official documents or is critical of the Army as an institution. It is important to note that they are usually flavored to the benefit of the interviewee or for a specific purpose for the interviewer. One can and should use them for expanding beyond the official points of view.

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