

CJCS Guide 3401D



# CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System



15 November 2010



Directive current as of 25 Nov 2013

**(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)**



We are a Nation at war. The coordinated attacks of September 11, 2001, forever changed the lens through which we view the world. In the span of just a few short moments, our country confronted the stark reality that we could be attacked anywhere in the world, even at home.

As a guarantor of global security for more than six decades, America's military remains the world's most credible force for peace and stability. The sustained support of the President, the Congress, and the American people increased our ability to prevail in current conflicts, while we remain ready for emerging threats in the future. Despite the challenges associated with fighting the longest wars in our Nation's history, our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coastguardsmen remain superbly trained and equipped to conduct their missions.

The Chairman's Readiness System (CRS) is designed to measure the preparedness of our military to achieve objectives as outlined by the National Military Strategy. Over the years, this process has improved to include the Joint Combat Capability Assessment. This guide is designed to familiarize you with those policies and procedures used to assess and report current readiness.

Across the Department of Defense, we are working together to enhance our readiness reporting systems. The goal is to retain insight into readiness concerns that impact Joint Warfighting ability. Participation from Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat Support Agencies remains a key to illuminating specific shortfalls that drive risk at the military and strategic levels. We will continue to refine the assessment process to ensure our leaders stay informed of our readiness to fight and win.

M. G. MULLEN  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

**(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)**

# Table of Contents

---

Introduction .....	Page I-1
--------------------	-------------

## Chapter

1. Readiness Defined .....	1
Understanding Readiness.....	1
Historical Readiness Perspective .....	2
2. The Chairman’s Readiness System.....	7
Force Readiness Reporting .....	8
GSORTS.....	9
DRRS.....	10
Joint Combat Capability Assessment (JCCA).....	13
Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR).....	15
Plan Assessments .....	18
Readiness Deficiency Assessment (RDA).....	19
Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC).....	19
3. CRS Consumers of Readiness .....	21
Senior Readiness Oversight Council .....	22
Force Management Community .....	22
Capabilities Community .....	23
Planning Community .....	26
4. Future Readiness.....	29
Keeping the Force Ready to Fight and Win.....	29
Readiness Priorities.....	30
Appendixes:	
A. Glossary .....	A-1
B. Glossary of Acronyms.....	B-1
C. References .....	C-1

CJCS Guide 3401D supersedes CJCS Guide 3401C dated 28 May 2004

Effective Date. This guide is effective upon receipt.



*“My belief remains that political means are the best tools to attain regional security and that military force will have limited results. However, should the President call for military options, we must have them ready.”*

*~ Admiral Mike Mullen  
(CJCS Guidance for 2009-2010)*

# Introduction

---

*Today's international security environment is particularly volatile, presenting a broad range of threats to U.S. interests across the spectrum of conflict.*

The fundamental purpose of our Armed Forces is to fight and win our Nation's conflicts. Therefore, it is critical the Department of Defense (DOD) continually assesses warfighting readiness and capabilities.

The Chairman's Readiness System (CRS) provides a common framework for conducting commanders' readiness assessments, blending unit-level readiness indicators with combatant command (COCOM), Service, and Combat Support Agency (CSA) (collectively known as the C/S/As) subjective assessments of their ability to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS).

Specifically, the CRS provides the C/S/As a readiness reporting system measuring their ability to integrate and synchronize combat and support units into an effective joint force ready to accomplish assigned missions.

This Joint Guide serves as a source of information on readiness programs, assessments, and procedures. It is not intended to replace current regulations, orders, or approved instructions and manuals. It is published to provide guidance on how we define, measure, and maintain the readiness of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Applicability. This guide applies to the unified and specified COCOMs, Services, Joint Staff, National Guard Bureau, and the following DOD CSAs: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).

Releasability. This guide is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

---

**(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)**



# Chapter One

---

## Readiness Defined

*We must understand what constitutes readiness of an effective fighting force to ensure we are prepared to respond.*

One of the major obstacles to ensuring a force is ready is understanding what readiness really means. Doctrinally, readiness is defined as “The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS.” Through the early 1990s, readiness was narrowly defined as the capability of a unit to accomplish the missions for which it was designed. Readiness was therefore *Service* oriented, without regard for the requirement to operate as part of a joint or multinational force.

### Understanding Readiness

To better understand readiness, one must consider the question “*Ready for what?*” The CRS provides an overall readiness assessment of the department’s ability to execute the NMS and captures the overarching readiness for each level of warfighting: *strategic, operational, and tactical.*

*The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for assessing the national military capability and readiness to execute strategy.*

Readiness from the *strategic perspective* focuses on the ability of the joint force to perform missions and provide capabilities to achieve strategic objectives as identified in strategic level documents (e.g., National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and NMS). Assessing strategic readiness requires a global perspective to account for demands between regional and functional responsibilities.

Readiness from the *operational perspective* focuses on the ability of the joint force to perform missions identified in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), theater campaign plans (TCPs), and named operations. Joint readiness is a synthesis of readiness at the operational and tactical levels and is defined as the Combatant Commanders’ ability to integrate and synchronize

# Chapter One

---

ready combat and support forces to execute assigned missions.

Readiness from the *tactical perspective* focuses on *unit readiness*, defined as the ability to provide capabilities required by the Combatant Commander to execute assigned missions, and derived from the ability of each unit to conduct the mission(s) for which it was designed.

## Historical Readiness Perspective

*We were not prepared to participate immediately in World War II.*

The effort to define readiness is not just an academic endeavor -- history holds numerous examples of the cost our Nation has paid when its Armed Forces were not prepared to respond.

**World War II.** The last time the United States had the luxury of advanced warning of pending involvement in conflict was World War II. Although military leaders started preparing for war in the late 1930s, the reduced readiness of the force precluded large-scale operations until late 1942. We learned that even with warning it takes time to build a ready force.



# Chapter One

---

*We were unprepared for Korea after drastic post-World War II defense cuts which left us unable to respond adequately to the attack and increased our casualties.*

**Korea.** The surprise attack of the North Korean forces offered no time to “get ready.” Cuts in defense at the end of World War II left the military fragile, demoralized, and unable to respond to the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. The Army was particularly decimated by the cuts in defense -- shrinking from over 11 million Soldiers at the end of World War II to just 592,000 in June 1950. America’s failure to maintain readiness was apparent during the initial attempt to stop the invasion with ground forces -- Task Force Smith.

Task Force Smith was a battalion-size force of 540 men, composed of 2 under-strength infantry companies and a light howitzer battery. Few of the officers or noncommissioned officers had seen action in World War II and had not received adequate training. The task force sorely lacked anti-armor capability.



## Chapter One

---

On July 5, 1950, near Osan, Korea, south of Seoul, the task force was employed to halt a North Korean drive south. The North Korean force was greater than 1000 Soldiers and had 33 tanks. Task Force Smith was decimated by the North Korean onslaught, losing 150 men and all of its equipment in just 7 hours of fighting. Because of the lack of personnel, training, and equipment -- the key elements of readiness -- U.S. forces suffered over 19,000 casualties before the Pusan perimeter was stabilized.

*After Vietnam, the American military again went through drastic downsizing, creating the “hollow force” of the late 1970s.*

**Post-Vietnam.** After withdrawing from Vietnam, the American military went through an abrupt downsizing similar to that experienced at the end of World War II. In 1980, General Edward C. Meyer, then Army Chief of Staff, used the term “hollow Army” in congressional testimony to describe the imbalance that existed between the number of Army divisions and the combat personnel available to fill those divisions. Soon after his testimony, the term “hollow force” became widely used to characterize not only the shortages of experienced personnel, but also shortages of training, weapons, and equipment. These conditions undermined military readiness during the mid-to-late 1970s.

The Defense Science Board Readiness Task Force, created in 1993 by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and chaired by General (Retired) Meyer, in its report dated June 1994, characterized the military of the late 1970s and early 1980s as “hollow forces,” and the Service members during that period as “...on average less well educated, more involved with drugs, less well trained, less well equipped, less well sustained, less strategically mobile, and less highly regarded by the American public.” The “hollow” American military of that period was not prepared to respond to most contingencies without considerable warning. America relied on well-maintained nuclear

## Chapter One

---

forces for deterrence, while conventional forces languished with personnel shortages, aging equipment, and constricted training and maintenance budgets.

*The American military executed Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada successfully, but flaws in the campaign demonstrated that we still needed to learn to operate “jointly.”*

**Grenada.** Operation URGENT FURY began shortly before dawn on October 25, 1983, 12 days after the prime minister was overthrown and later killed by leftist military officers supported by Cuba. The United States committed over 8,500 members of the Armed Forces to the operation, which was planned and successfully executed in the course of only days. However, numerous interoperability problems with the joint operation were later cited: Army helicopters could not communicate with naval support ships; the Services conducted separate, uncoordinated tactical operations instead of mounting a more effective joint effort; liaison procedures, where present, were untried, or altogether nonexistent. Although the operation was termed a success after 3 days of sometimes heavy fighting, Grenada highlighted abundant issues confounding our ability to operate as a “joint force.”

**Goldwater-Nichols Act.** The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was the most sweeping change to the U.S. Department of Defense since its establishment under the National Security Act of 1947 and instrumental in changing the way the services interact. Under the act, military advice is centralized with the CJCS, as opposed to the service chiefs, and the Chairman is designated as the principal military adviser to the President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Effectively, the services no longer had operational control of their forces -- service component forces would now support functional or geographical COCOMs. The result has been unity of command, with each individual service changing from relatively autonomous warfighting

## Chapter One

---

entities into organizational and training units, responsible for acquisition, modernization, force-development and readiness as a component of the integrated force. This in effect allows a COCOM with assigned specific naval, ground, and air forces to accomplish objectives, eliminating the inefficient method of each individual service planning, supporting, and fighting the same war.

**Operation DESERT STORM.** Goldwater-Nichols underwent its first scrutiny in 1991 in the Gulf War with “Operation DESERT STORM.” It was an unqualified success, allowing the U.S. Commander, Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, the ability to exercise complete control over assigned Marine, Army, Air Force, and Navy forces without the hindrance of time sensitive negotiation with each individual service.

**Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) & Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).** With the advent of OEF in October 2001 and OIF in March 2003, the U.S. embarked on the challenge of supporting two wars in the same theater. The extraordinary requirements placed on our joint force have tested and strained resources and readiness, and the ability to support operations under the NMS.

The Armed Forces of the U.S. have made monumental strides in improving their ability to operate “jointly.” From Desert Storm to OEF and OIF, each successive operation has shown improvements in joint operations. Each has further highlighted requirements for a system to effectively measure, assess, and report readiness from a joint perspective. The CRS is designed to incorporate a strong foundation of readiness reporting and assessment ensuring our joint force is ready to respond.

# Chapter Two

## The Chairman's Readiness System

### "The Chairman's Perspective"




Figure 1. Chairman's Readiness System

*The CRS provides information to fulfill requirements to keep the SecDef and Congress informed of force capabilities and deficiencies.*

The CRS was implemented to provide the Chairman the necessary information to fulfill statutory requirements. It establishes a common framework for assessing Unit Readiness using Force Readiness Reporting and Strategic Readiness utilizing the JCCA (Figure 1). This comprehensive system provides uniform policy and procedures for reporting the ability of the Armed Forces of the United States to fight and to meet the demands of the NMS.

Title 10, United States Code (USC) directs the Chairman to advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans, and to assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy (section 153(a)(3)(c)). The statute further requires the Chairman to establish, after consultation with Combatant

## Chapter Two

---

Commanders, a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each COCOM to carry out assigned missions (section 153(a)(3)(d)), and a uniform system for reporting on the readiness of the CSAs to respond to a war or threat to national security (section 193(c)).

Information derived from the CRS assists the Chairman in fulfilling requirements of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which requires the CJCS, in conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders, to assess the nature and magnitude of the strategic and military risks associated with the successful execution of missions under the current NMS.

Until the establishment of the CRS in 1994, the only specific system DOD had to measure readiness was the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). GSORTS served two key roles; 1) functioned as the central registry of all operational units in the U.S. Armed Forces and 2) contained unit readiness metrics on select operational units.

### Force Readiness Reporting

**Force Readiness Reporting.** Units currently register and report readiness in the two existing, complementary readiness-reporting systems: the GSORTS and the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Strategic (DRRS-S). SORTS functionality will be integrated into DRRS-S, providing standardized resource metrics to inform Mission Essential Task (MET) assessments and functions as the central registry of all U.S. Armed Forces and organizations, as well as certain foreign organizations.

*GSORTS* reports provide resource-based assessments in the personnel, equipment, and training domains, an assessment of a unit's ability to



## Chapter Two

---

accomplish its mission in a chemical and biological environment, and an overall status of the unit's ability to meet its designed mission requirements. The Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) is a capability based, Department wide readiness system that provides mission assessments through its METL construct. It provides timely and accurate information for planning, readiness, and risk assessments for joint and Service unit commands.

Taken together, these assessments provide a comprehensive view of a unit's capability status.

### GSORTS

**Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)**. GSORTS provides broad bands of readiness information on selected unit status indicators and includes a commander's subjective assessment on the unit's ability to execute the mission(s) for which the unit was organized or designed.

As a resource and unit monitoring system, GSORTS indicates the level of a unit's selected resources and training status. This information supports responsibilities to organize, train, and equip combat-ready forces for the COCOMs.

GSORTS also provides the Chairman with the necessary unit information to develop adequate and feasible military responses to crisis situations, as well as information to assist in joint planning and the readiness assessment process associated with contingency planning.

**Unit Resource Overall Assessment**. Each measured unit will report an overall category level (C-level). The C-level reflects the status of the selected unit resources measured against the resources required to undertake the wartime missions for which the unit is organized or designed. The C-level also reflects the

## Chapter Two

---

condition of available equipment, personnel, and unit training status. C-levels, by themselves, do not project a unit's performance once committed to combat.

Unit Resource Measured Areas. Units will measure and report status in four measured areas: Personnel (P-level), Equipment and Supplies on hand (S-level), Equipment Condition (R-level), and Training (T-level). They will also measure and report the status of their Chemical-Biological Defense Readiness Training (CBDRT).

Commanders use *resource* data to report unit readiness. Although senior leaders use resource data in the decision-making process, they understand the data is not all encompassing -- other factors weigh into the readiness equation. It is also important to understand that readiness systems are not predictive systems -- they cannot project future readiness.

### DRRS

**Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).** DRRS provides a mission-focused, capabilities-based common framework for all DOD readiness reporting organizations. This authoritative, collaborative environment allows users to evaluate, in near real-time, the readiness of Armed Forces of the U.S. to accomplish assigned and potential tasks. It provides readiness data in the form of capability-based mission assessments and establishes a common language of *tasks*, *conditions*, and *standards*.

DRRS provides mission assessments based on capabilities, measured using the MET construct. This construct includes a mission essential task, coupled with a set of conditions in which the task is expected to be executed, and a set of standards which the commander deems necessary for determining successful accomplishment of the task. Standards

## Chapter Two

---

are based on performance measures and criteria that can be output, outcome, or process-oriented. Conditions are based on considerations of the environment such as terrain and weather, military force characteristics and political considerations such as access rights and civil conditions.

Overall, these METs allow the C/S/As to measure their mission readiness based upon their mission essential capabilities under specified standards and conditions. Furthermore, by linking these Mission/MET assessments to parent, subordinate or planned units, those parent subordinate or gaining units can, by extension, make more informed Mission/MET assessments.

### DRRS: Capability Assessments.

All units required to assess capabilities do so by reporting their ability to accomplish METs, and their associated conditions and standards -- referred to as a Mission Essential Task List (METL). METLs provide the means for a commander to assess the organization's ability to conduct assigned mission(s). Capabilities are represented via the METL construct.

There are three categories of METL assessments that are used to reflect the unit's capabilities: Core Tasks, Named Operations, and Top Priority Level 4 Plans. The Core category relates to the "designed" mission of the unit, while the Named Operations and Top Priority Plans categories relate to the "assigned" mission(s) of the unit. The reporting of both Core and assigned missions and their METL in DRRS informs both joint and Service organizations and provides commanders readiness information and status.

As part of the assessment, the unit commander must consider the environment in which the unit will be required to execute its designed mission and tasks.

## Chapter Two

---

This includes: the Joint mission; enemy and friendly capabilities; weather and terrain; etc.

**Registered and Measured Units.** Registered Units. At a minimum, all units and organizations that are assigned in the “Forces For Unified Commands” document or have the potential to support, by deployment or otherwise, a directed Operation Plan (OPLAN), Concept Plan (CONPLAN), contingency operation, homeland security operation, or Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) will be registered. This includes units such as Marine Expeditionary Forces, Marine Expeditionary Units, Brigades, Battalions, Regiments, Ships, Squadrons, Groups, Wings, Regional HQs, Bases, Stations, Installations, Hospitals, Training Units, and Schools. The Navy will register Coast Guard units. The Joint Staff and COCOMs will register selected joint units not having a Service affiliation organized under an approved joint manning document.

Measured Units. All combat, combat support, combat service support units of the operating forces, including Active, National Guard, and Reserve and units apportioned to or allocated in support OPLAN, CONPLAN, Service war planning document, Named Operation, or Forces For Unified Commands are designated as measured units. Provisional, task-organized and “ad hoc” combat, combat support, and combat service support units of each Service and COCOM are also measured units. Measured units will provide capability assessments to DRRS-S and their status of training and resources in GSORTS (until functionality is resident in DRRS-S).

**Reporting Criteria.** All measured units are required to continuously monitor their resource capability status. Measured units are required to report any unit location changes, major equipment relocation upon partial unit deployment or unit relocation, or any

## Chapter Two

---

change affecting their ability to accomplish a MET. Units must report their changes within 24 hours of the event necessitating the change. If no change in overall unit level or resource category levels occurs within 30 days of the last report submission, then measured units will submit a validation or complete readiness report to DRRS-S and GSORTS. Units will continue to report when deployed for training, contingency, or an Operation Order (OPORD) in execution.

The Chairman, in coordination with the Service Chiefs and the affected Combatant Commanders, may require units to report more frequently. Combatant Commanders may require assigned units, or units over whom they exercise Operational Control (OPCON), to report more frequently. In each case, consideration should be given to the impact on the unit of increased reporting.

### Joint Combat Capability Assessment

#### **Joint Combat Capability Assessment (JCCA).**

The JCCA is the process used to provide the CJCS a strategic readiness assessment of DOD's ability to meet the demands of the NMS. It also provides the Chairman a readiness snapshot and informs other Joint Staff processes requiring readiness input. It is a near-term analysis of readiness and ability to execute required priority plans, and provides a common framework for conducting commander's readiness assessments providing visibility on readiness issues across the C/S/As.

The JCCA provides a forum to synchronize staff actions, quickly generate consensus, streamlining mitigation solutions for warfighters. It incorporates unit and mission readiness data to provide comprehensive assessments of the unit's ability to execute missions called for by the NMS and GEF/JSCP guidance. In addition, the JCCA also informs Global Force Management (GFM) sourcing

## Chapter Two

---

decisions and CJCS risk assessments.

**Joint Combat Capability Assessment Group (JCCAG).** The JCCAG is the working group for the JCCA and has 0-6 level representation from all Joint Staff directorates, the C/S/As, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The JCCAG convenes quarterly to collaborate on JCCA assessments as they relate to the Department of Defense's ability to execute the NMS, and synchronizes the delivery of those assessments to inform other Joint Staff and OSD processes.

**Joint Staff directorates.** The Joint Staff J-Directorates provide subject matter expertise (SME), office of coordinating responsibility (OCR) functions, and liaison with appropriate Functional Capabilities Boards (FCBs). Additionally, they serve as OPR for briefing Plan Assessments and providing JCCA assessments to the Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA) process and the Annual Report on Combatant Command Requirements (ARCCR) and Capability Gap Assessment (CGA). Table 1 delineates Joint Staff responsibilities.

**Combatant commands and Combat Support Agencies.** Inform the JCCAG of issues affecting their ability to support assigned missions from the GEF and JSCP.

**Services.** Inform the JCCAG of issues impacting their ability to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces in support of current operations and plans.

The JCCA includes three assessments and one readiness report evaluating the Department of Defense (DOD) readiness to execute the NMS:

## Chapter Two

---

- Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR)
- Plan Assessments
- Readiness Deficiency Assessment (RDA)
- Input to the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC)

**The JFRR is the principal assessment of the CRS.**

**Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR).** The JFRR is the principal assessment of the CRS and is conducted on a quarterly cycle. It combines and analyzes unit and joint COCOM, Service, and CSA readiness assessments, pulled from DRRS and GSORTS, to assess the Department of Defense's strategic readiness to execute the NMS. The JFRR assists the Chairman in providing best military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense by informing the Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA), Annual Report on Combatant Commander Requirements (ARCCR), Capability Gap Assessment (CGA), and the Input to the QRRC.

The JFRR receives inputs from the C/S/As. Services, at the strategic level, report aggregated readiness against approved Joint Capability Areas (JCAs). The COCOMs and CSAs report readiness to integrate and synchronize joint forces using JMETS/AMETs to execute NMS missions, as derived from the Guidance for Employment of the Force and JSCP. JCCA inputs to the JFRR are reported quarterly on 15 October, 15 January, 15 April, and 15 July of each year and in part consist of the following:

**Overall Readiness Assessment (RA).** The C/S/As assign an overall Readiness Assessment (RA) level to their respective Current and Projected Readiness Assessment. Overall RA levels are determined by commanders, Service Chiefs, and directors. When making a determination for an overall RA level, reporting organizations consider:

## Chapter Two

---

- 1) JMETL/AMETL/JCA assessment
- 2) Results of recent plans assessment
- 3) Readiness deficiencies.

Note: Refer to Table 2 for RA Level Definitions.

**JMET/AMET/JCAs.** Commanders, Service Chiefs, and directors assess the ability of their organization to accomplish a task to standard(s) under conditions as specified in their JMETL/AMETL. This assessment is informed by observed performance, resource availability, and military judgment. Service Chiefs, and Commander USSOCOM assess the ability of their respective organization to organize, train, and equip forces capable of executing their designed tasks and providing capabilities to support assigned missions. JMETS/AMETS and JCAs are assessed using the three-tiered, Yes/Qualified/No (Y/Q/N) Readiness Metric as shown in Table 3.

**Top Concerns.** Every commander, Service Chief, and director identifies the top two readiness concerns for their organization. Discussion includes background information, causal factors, and functional information to better understand the concern. The purpose of reporting top concerns is to improve joint readiness assessments and to inform the Chairman of the most important, near-term readiness issues.

**C/S/A Narrative.** Commanders, Service Chiefs, and directors can provide narrative allowing an opportunity to present additional discussion, detail, or issues regarding organizational readiness reports.



## Chapter Two

**Table 1. Functional Areas, Joint Staff & OCR**

	<i>OCR</i>
Manpower & Personnel <i>SME -- Manpower related issues</i>	<b>J-1</b>
Intelligence <i>SME -- Intelligence related issues</i>	<b>J-2</b>
Operations <i>SME -- Operations related issues-- JCCAG Chair</i>	<b>J-3</b>
Logistics <i>SME -- Logistics related issues</i>	<b>J-4</b>
Strategic Plans & Policy <i>Incorporates Assessments into CRA &amp; briefs JCCAG</i>	<b>J-5</b>
Command/Control/Communications/Computers <i>SME -- C4 related areas</i>	<b>J-6</b>
Operational Plans and Joint Force Development <i>Leads Plan Assessments &amp; briefs JCCAG</i>	<b>J-7</b>
Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment <i>Incorporates Assessments into ARCCR &amp; CGA</i>	<b>J-8</b>

**Table 2. Readiness Assessment (RA) Level Definition**

RA Level	Definition
<b>RA-1</b>	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact on readiness and ability to execute assigned mission(s) in support of the NMS as directed in the GEF and JSCP.
<b>RA-2</b>	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact on readiness and ability to execute assigned mission(s) in support of the NMS as directed in the GEF and JSCP
<b>RA-3</b>	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact on readiness and ability to execute assigned mission(s) in support of the NMS as directed in the GEF and JSCP.
<b>RA-4</b>	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude accomplishment of assigned mission(s) in support of the NMS as directed in the GEF and JSCP.

## Chapter Two

**Table 3. Three-Tiered Readiness Metric**

Three –Tier Y/Q/N Scale	Definition
Y	Unit can accomplish task to established standards and conditions.
Q	Unit can accomplish all or most of the task to standard under most conditions. The specific standards and conditions, as well as the shortfalls or issues impacting the unit’s task, must be clearly detailed in the MET assessment.
N	Unit unable to accomplish the task to prescribed standard and conditions at this time.

**Plan Assessments gauge the ability to execute key plans.**

**Plan Assessments.** JCCA Plan Assessments measure the Department’s ability to successfully execute contingency plans with the highest visibility or having the most severe consequences, as well as those most stressing to ground, maritime, air, and special operations forces. The JCCAG, through the JS J7, is responsible for proposing the Plan Assessment schedule and having it approved by the Global Force Management Board (GFMB). Plan Assessments are scheduled to be conducted quarterly but may take place out of cycle to assess their risk in execution as indicators and warnings of likely execution increase.

Plans may also be assessed in tandem with other related or supporting plans, or plans that if executed simultaneously would stress the force and pose a risk to the execution of the plan or plans in question. Force flow and associated timelines are a key metric for assessment. The expectation is selected plans will be assessed with fidelity and timeliness to allow flexibility for emerging assessment requirements due to a changing security environment without posing significant negative impact on the sourcing throughput of the Joint Force Providers (JFPs).

## Chapter Two

---

The output of Plan Assessments is an indicator of the general ability to execute a plan or group of plans. It is supported by an analysis of the impact of force sourcing and logistical shortfalls, readiness deficiencies, transportation feasibility, and military and strategic risk.

**The *RDA* assesses deficiency impact to execute the NMS.**

**Readiness Deficiency Assessment (RDA).** The RDA is submitted annually addressing the cumulative impact of COCOM and CSA reported deficiencies on DOD readiness to execute the NMS.

The RDA is structured from a strategic, operational, and statistical viewpoint. The strategic view provides an overall Joint Staff assessment of deficiencies as they impact the NMS and focuses on trends related to the Joint Capability Areas (JCAs). The operational view provides a look from the Combatant Commander and CSA perspective, highlighting issue and impact of each deficiency with respect to JSCP top priority plans, named operations and mission assignments. The statistical analysis provides a perspective of deficiencies in relation to status, functional areas, JCA/FCBs, and GEF force allocation categories.

**The *QRRC* provides political leadership with key readiness issues.**

**Input to the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC).** On a quarterly basis the JCCAG forwards a text summation of the JFRR to OSD. It includes a cumulative listing of all COCOM and CSA deficiencies for inclusion into the QRRC, and summarizes an overall readiness assessment (RA) level of the Department of Defense ability to execute the NMS.

OSD prepares and submits the QRRC, and by law sends it to Congress within 45 days following the end of each quarter. The quarterly report to Congress includes readiness assessments provided to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC),

## *Chapter Two*

---


the DOD body responsible for readiness oversight. The QRRC provides our political leaders with an overall awareness of key readiness issues and initiatives.

# Chapter Three

## Consumers of Readiness

UNCLASSIFIED

### Joint Combat Capability Assessment Process



UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 2. Joint Combat Capability Assessment (JCCA) Process

The CRS actively informs users or *consumers* of readiness outputs through the JCCA process. The outputs of the JCCA are synchronized to inform other Joint Staff and OSD strategic documents and processes with the purpose of aligning readiness, force sourcing, risk, strategy, plans, and allocation and resourcing. The process supports the NMS, Global Force Management (GFM), Chairman's Programmatic Recommendation (CPR), and sourcing decisions and CJCS risk assessments (CRA).

## Chapter Three

---

### Senior Readiness Oversight Council

**Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC).** The SROC brings senior civilian and military leadership together to review significant readiness topics. Though not technically a consumer of readiness, the SROC does review the JFRR to assist in providing advice to the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy related to readiness, as well as updates on the current readiness of the Military Services.

SROC membership includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who serves as Chair; the Under Secretaries of Defense; the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the CJCS; the Chiefs of the Services; and other senior OSD officials as required. The SROC meets at the call of the Chair.

### Force Management Community

**Global Force Management (GFM).** GFM aligns force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the NDS, joint force availability requirements, and joint force assessments. It informs the DOD assessment process by identifying sporadic or persistent shortfalls or hard to source forces or capabilities, and assists in developing the GEF. GFM key functions are to:

- Assign forces to COCOMs through the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)
- Allocate forces to COCOMs through the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP)
- Apportion forces to COCOMs for planning

GFM provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of U.S. Military forces/capabilities and provides senior decision makers a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in forces/capability assignment, apportionment, and allocation.

## Chapter Three

---

### Capabilities Community

#### **Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR).**

The CPR, produced through the Capability Gap Assessment (CGA) process, is prepared by the Joint Staff J-8, provides the Chairman’s formal input to the Secretary of Defense with regard to the Department’s resource priorities, and is the Chairman’s personal advice for capabilities and budgeting consideration to OSD. Integral to the CPR are the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) and the Functional Capabilities Boards (FCBs).

#### **Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).**

The JROC assists the Chairman in identifying and assessing joint military requirements and priorities for current and future military capabilities, forces, programs, and resources consistent with the NMS, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Defense Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG), GEF, and fiscal guidance. The JROC also assesses and prioritizes C/S/A warfighting capabilities and deficiencies and conducts other joint assessments of DOD programs, infrastructure, support functions, manpower, and quality-of-life matters as may be directed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is designated by law as the JROC chair, but delegates this function to the Vice Chairman. The Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and Army, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps provide Service representation to the JROC.

## Chapter Three

**Functional Capabilities Board (FCB).** FCBs enable the JROC to serve as the architect of the future joint force in line with the Chairman’s vision for future joint warfighting. The JCCA process focuses on current readiness to fight, with a need for continuity between current readiness -- out to 2 years -- and future military capability. The Joint Staff assesses future capability requirements through the FCB process. Both are important to the readiness of the joint force and are not mutually exclusive. A key responsibility of FCBs is to provide assessments of capability gaps through the Capability Gap Assessment (CGA), as well as JCIDS documents, in support of the JROC. JCCA deficiencies are included in the CGA. The JROC approves activation of FCBs and assigns each FCB a sponsoring organization. Each FCB and its designated sponsoring organizations are aligned with an approved Tier 1 Joint Capability Area (JCA) to support JROC efforts and processes. (See Table 4.)

**Table 4. FCB Areas, Sponsors, and Participants**

Joint Staff	Services	Cbt Cmds	OSD	DOD Agencies	Others	Participants Sponsors
						J-8
						J-2
						J-8
						J-4
						USJFCOM
						J-6
						J-8
						J-5



## Chapter Three

---


**JCCA Readiness Deficiencies and FCBs.** At its core, the CRS is about understanding and mitigating operational risk. The mitigation process is geared toward deficiency resolution that reduces risk or, when there is no viable solution, to acknowledge the risk. By working toward resolution of deficiencies and managing the associated risk, we improve the readiness of our Armed Forces.

The JCCA, through the RDA, assesses how deficiencies collectively drive risk to the NMS. Groupings of related deficiencies are combined into functional areas. Further assessment of functionally related deficiencies produces strategic impact.

As part of the JCCA process, the Joint Staff J-3 leads in-depth readiness reviews of the reported deficiencies and the associated risk analysis efforts. Joint Staff subject matter experts (SMEs), identified as an Office of Coordinating Responsibility (OCR), help to facilitate the review of deficiencies, maintaining situational and functional awareness and providing liaison with the affected organization and the appropriate FCB the deficiency falls under.

Each COCOM and CSA is required to submit nominated deficiencies in DRRS on a quarterly basis as part of the JFRR cycle. J-33 Readiness reviews each nomination and, after JCCAG review, annually submits all approved deficiencies as part of the RDA. Each approved deficiency is then binned in one of the eight FCBs for assessment as part of the annual CGA process. FCB assessment results in synthesis into larger capability gaps, which are reviewed and endorsed by the DJ-8 at the Joint Capability Board (JCB) and then sent to the JROC for approval. The JROC's decision regarding capability gaps is then captured in a JROC memorandum (JROCM) and provided to inform the C/S/As. Figure 3 provides a flow of the readiness deficiency process.

## Chapter Three



**Figure 3. Readiness Deficiency Process**

### Planning Community

**The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).** The JSPS is the primary means by which the CJCS carries out statutory responsibilities which include conducting independent assessments, providing independent advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC), and Homeland Security Council (HSC), and assisting the President and Secretary of Defense in providing unified strategic direction to the armed forces.

The Chairman's Assessments are one of the major components of the JSPS, consisting of deliberate and continuous assessment processes providing timely, targeted estimates to inform military and strategic advice. The deliberate assessment process within the JSPS is initiated by the **Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA)**. The JCCA informs the CJA as part of its initial analysis. The continuous assessment process leverages ongoing analytical processes in order to provide the best possible current picture of the ability to execute ongoing and required missions to support the NMS. This continuous process collects information from the CRS.

## *Chapter Three*

---

**The Joint Strategy Review (JSR).** The JSR process is the synthesis of CJA information and Joint Staff functional estimates. It informs the Chairman's advice development and directive activities. The JSR process is intended to inform advice development, enrich, and refine existing products and processes already being done within the J-Directorates, and to serve for follow-on Joint Staff activities.

**Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA).** The CRA, produced by the Joint Staff J-5, is informed by the full scope of the JSR process, and provides to Congress the Chairman's assessment of the nature and magnitude of strategic and military risk in executing the missions called for in the NMS. By considering the range of operational, future challenges, force management, and institutional factors, the CRA provides a holistic assessment of the ability of the Armed Forces to meet strategic requirements in the near-term.

The CRA, in conjunction with the CRS, allows senior leaders to make decisions about management of risk in accordance with the integrated DOD Risk Management Framework identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Readiness assessments are critical to risk assessment. The CRS evaluates the means available to accomplish specified strategic ends as outlined in approved strategic planning documents such as: OPLANs, CONPLANs, and TCPs.

## *Chapter Three*

---

**(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)**

## Chapter Four

---

### Future Readiness

#### Keeping the Force “Ready to Fight and Win”

*Future military capability depends upon investments in people, force enhancements, modernization, and infrastructure.*

*Readiness is and must remain a top priority of the DOD. Current and future readiness is assessed and maintained by the CRS.*

Adequate investment in long-term military capability is necessary to ensure the best people are recruited, trained, and retained; to preserve the technological edge, replace worn-out equipment, and to obtain the capabilities required to make the Armed Forces more effective. At the same time, base facilities and housing must be maintained because both are critical to long-term capability.

In the long term, the continued readiness of our forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS will depend on a strong commitment to recruit, train, and retain the best people, enhance force capabilities, and maintain facilities. By aggressively monitoring current and future readiness and ensuring readiness priorities receive attention, we can keep our joint force ready to meet tomorrow’s challenges.

*“In terms of the future fight...I think we’re going to have to be faster, more practical, more adaptable, more lethal, more precise, leave less of a footprint, and more mobile in the world that we’re living in. I think we will continue to evolve as an expeditionary force and I think you will see a lot of that happening in part because of the fight that we’re in and what we’re learning about that, and I think that will be very important part of how we view the future.”*

*~ Admiral Mike Mullen*

## Chapter Four

---

### Readiness Priorities

*Quality people are most important to the future readiness of the Armed Forces.*

**Health-of-the-Force.** Our core responsibility is to win wars while caring for our people and their families. They are the heart and soul of our formations, our fleets, our expeditionary wings, and our incredible fighting spirit. As a Nation, we have a solemn obligation to support fully, across the spectrum of need, our service men and women, standing and fallen, and their families.

### *People are the Foundation of Readiness*



## Chapter Four

---

*A critical element of future military capability is funding for recapitalization, modernization and force enhancements.*

**Enhancing Force Capabilities.** The uncertain security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century makes transformation necessary within the U.S. Armed Forces. The overarching concept that outlines the broad capabilities needed by the future joint force is the Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC). JOpsC links strategic guidance to the development and employment of future joint force capabilities and serves as the engine for transformation, ultimately leading to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and policy changes, ensuring our joint force is more deployable, lethal, capable and ready to face tomorrow's unfolding future challenges.

### *Critical Force Enhancements Strengthen our Military Capability*



## Chapter Four

---

*Future readiness depends on sustaining a satisfactory level of major equipment and facility maintenance.*

**Infrastructure.** Military installations are key enablers for power projection. If facilities deteriorate, repair costs increase. This deterioration increases the risk of unacceptable mission interruption and jeopardizes future capability.

### *Infrastructure*





# Appendix A

---

## Glossary

**Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this guide.**

capability. The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.)

combat readiness. Synonymous with operational readiness, with respect to missions or functions performed in combat.

combat ready. Synonymous with operationally ready, with respect to missions or functions performed in combat.

DRRS Enterprise. A collaboration of independent Service, joint, and OSD readiness-focused IT applications, combined with readiness-specific authoritative data, all related by a common ability to support readiness reporting and assessment requirements. This aggregation is collectively referred to as the DRRS Information Technology Enterprise Environment.

DRRS Strategic. A collection of approved hardware and software components culminating in a web-based user interface.

military capability. The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability.

a. force structure. Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, air wings.

b. modernization. Technical sophistication of forces, units weapon systems, and equipments.

c. unit readiness. The ability to provide capabilities required by the Combatant Commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed.

## Appendix A

---

d. sustainability. The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. (See also readiness.)

military objectives. The derived set of military actions to be taken to implement the President of the United States or SecDef guidance in support of national objectives. Defines the results to be achieved by the military and assigns tasks to commanders. (See also national objectives.)

military requirement. An established need justifying the timely allocation of resources to achieve a capability to accomplish approved military objectives, missions, or tasks. Also called operational requirement. (See also objective force level.)

military resources. Military and civilian personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies under control of a DOD component.

national military strategy. The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war.

national objectives. The aims, derived from national goals and interests, toward which a national policy or strategy is directed, and efforts and resources of the Nation are applied. (See also military objectives.)

objective force level. The level of military forces that needs to be attained within a finite time frame and resource level to accomplish approved military objectives, missions, or tasks. (See also military requirement.)

operationally ready.

1. As applied to a unit, ship, or weapon system -- capable of performing the missions or functions for which organized or designed. Incorporates both equipment and personnel readiness.

2. As applied to personnel -- available and qualified to perform assigned missions or functions.

operational readiness. The capability of a unit/formation, ship, weapon system, or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed. May be used in a general sense or to express a level or degree of readiness. (See also combat readiness.)

## Appendix A

---

operational requirement. See military requirement.

readiness. The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct, but interrelated levels:

a. unit readiness. The ability to provide capabilities required by the Combatant Commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed

b. joint readiness. The Combatant Commanders' ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute the assigned missions. (See also military capability; NMS).

readiness condition. See operational readiness.

readiness planning. Operational planning required for peacetime operations. Its objective is the maintenance of high states of readiness and the deterrence of potential enemies. It includes planning activities that influence day-to-day operations and the peacetime posture of forces. As such, its focus is on general capabilities and readiness rather than the specifics of a particular crisis, either actual or potential. The assignment of geographic responsibilities to Combatant Commanders, establishment of readiness standards and levels, development of peacetime deployment patterns, coordination of reconnaissance and surveillance assets and capabilities, and planning of joint exercises are examples of readiness planning. No formal joint planning system exists for readiness planning as exists for contingency and execution planning.

risk (Source: JP 3-33). Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards.

risk management (Source: JP 2-0). The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits.

# *Appendix A*

---

**(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)**

# Appendix B

---

## ACRONYMS

AMETL	Agency Mission Essential Task List
AMET	Agency Mission Essential Task
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARCCR	Annual Report on Combatant Commander Requirements
CGA	Capability Gap Assessment
CJA	Comprehensive Joint Assessment
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
COCOM	Combatant Command
CONPLAN	concept plan; operation plan in concept format
CPA	Chairman's Programmatic Assessment
CPM	Capability Portfolio Manager
CPR	Chairman's Programmatic Recommendation
CRS	Chairman's Readiness System
CRA	Chairman's Risk Assessment
CSA	Combat Support Agency
C/S/A	combatant command/Service/Combat Support Agency
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DJS	Director Joint Staff
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership And Education, Personnel, and Facilities
DRRS	Defense Readiness Reporting System
DRRS-S	Defense Readiness Reporting System-Strategic
DRRS-E	Defense Readiness Reporting System-Enterprise
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
FCB	Functional Capabilities Board
FY	fiscal year
GDF	Guidance for Development of the Force
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
GFM	Global Force Management

## Appendix B

---

GFMB	Global Force Management Board
GSORTS	Global Status of Resources and Training System
JCA	Joint Capability Area
JCCA	Joint Combat Capability Assessment
JCCAG	Joint Combat Capability Assessment Group
JCB	Joint Capabilities Board
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
J-Directorates	Directors of the Joint Staff Directorates
JFP	Joint Force Provider
JFRR	Joint Force Readiness Review
JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List
JMET	Joint Mission Essential Task
JOpsC	Joint Operations Concepts
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JROCM	Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum
JS	Joint Staff
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JSR	Joint Strategy Review
MET	Mission Essential Task
METL	Mission Essential Task List
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NMS	National Military Strategy
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
OCR	Office of Coordinating Responsibility
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

## *Appendix B*

---

POC	point of contact
POM	programmed objective memorandum
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
QRRC	Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress
RA	Readiness Assessment
RDA	Readiness Deficiency Assessment
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System
SROC	Senior Readiness Oversight Council
TCP	Theater Campaign Plan
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USC	United States Code
USAFRICOM	U.S. African Command
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USJFCOM	U.S. Joint Forces Command
USNORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command
USPACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
USSTRATCOM	U.S. Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command

---

**(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)**



# *Appendix C*

---

## *REFERENCES*

1. CJCSI 3100.01 Series, “Joint Strategic Planning System”
2. CJCSI 3401.01 Series , “Joint Combat Capability Assessment”
3. CJCSI 3401.02 Series, “Force Readiness Reporting”
4. CJCSI 3110.01 Series, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan”
5. CJCSI 3137.01 Series, “The Functional Capabilities Board (FCB)”
6. CJCSI 5123.01 Series, “Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council”
7. Defense Readiness Reporting System Concept of Operations, V 3.0, Jan 09
8. Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms”

---

**(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)**

**(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)**



