

Joint Publication 4-05.1



Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup



Revision First Draft
16 April 2006



1 **PREFACE**

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3
4 **1. Scope**

5
6 | ~~This publication~~ [JP 4-05. 1](#) provides the ~~techniques and procedures~~ [joint doctrine](#) for
7 | planning, executing, and monitoring Reserve Component mobilization and
8 | demobilization. It is the companion document to Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint ~~Doctrine for~~
9 | Mobilization Planning.”

10
11 **2. Purpose**

12
13 | This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
14 | Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine ~~and selected joint tactics, techniques, and~~
15 | ~~procedures (JTTP)~~ to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of
16 | the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for [the United States](#)
17 | military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military
18 | guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders ([CCDRs](#)) and other
19 | joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine ~~and selected tactics, techniques, and~~
20 | ~~procedures~~ for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the
21 | Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication
22 | to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and

1 executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of
2 effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3

4 **3. Application**

5

6 | a. Doctrine ~~and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures~~ and guidance
7 | established in this publication apply to the ~~commanders of combatant commands~~CCDRs,
8 | subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands.

9 These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are
10 attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support
11 forces of another Service.

12

13 | b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine ~~(or JTTP)~~
14 | will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional
15 | circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this
16 | publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence
17 | for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally
18 | in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more
19 | current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational
20 | (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and
21 | procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the
22 | United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's
23 | doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

~~DENNIS C. BLAIR~~

~~Vice Admiral, US Navy~~

Director, Joint Staff

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

National Military Strategy

“The National Military Strategy focuses the Armed Forces on winning the war on terrorism and enhancing joint warfighting while supporting actions to create a joint, network-centric, distributed force, capable of full spectrum dominance. Achieving decision superiority and generating tailored effects across the battlespace allows the Joint Force to control any situation over a range of military operations. To succeed, the Armed Forces must integrate Service capabilities in new and innovative, reduce seams between combatant commands and develop more collaborative relationships with partners at home and abroad

*While engaged in multiple worldwide operations to meet these requirements, the Armed Forces of the United States must maintain force quality, enhance joint warfighting capabilities and transform to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Executing this strategy will require a truly joint, **full spectrum force – with a seamless mix of active forces, the Reserve Component, DOD civilians, and contracted workforce** – fully grounded in a culture of innovation. It will require the highest quality people –disciplined, dedicated, professional – well trained, well educated, and well led.”*

**The National Military Strategy of the United States of America:
A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow
2004**

1. Background

a. The Total Force Policy combines active, Reserve, National Guard, military retirees, and civilian forces into an integrated implementation plan. Reserve and National Guard forces are collectively referred to as Reserve Component (RC) forces, and are not only required to help fight and win the nation’s wars, but also are integral to the accomplishment of peacetime missions and conflict prevention. RC manpower mobilization is the process of augmenting the active forces with units and individuals from the Services’ RC forces. The various organizational levels — Joint Staff (JS),

1 Services, supported and supporting ~~commanders in chief~~ combatant commanders
2 (CCDRs)(CINCs) — have a role in the manpower mobilization process either as a
3 provider or receiver of forces, or as a supporting player. The integration of mobilization
4 in the planning process will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the deployment
5 process.

6
7 b. The RC consist of **three categories: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and**
8 **Retired Reserve.**

9
10 (1) The **Ready Reserve** is comprised of military members of the Reserve and
11 National Guard, organized in units or as individuals, liable for recall to active duty to
12 augment the Active Components (ACs) in time of war or national emergency. The
13 Ready Reserve consists of three subcategories:

14
15 (a) The **Selected Reserve (SELRES)** consist of those units and individuals
16 within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by the
17 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial wartime missions that they
18 have priority over all other Reserves. The SELRES consists of additional subcategories:

19
20 1. **Drilling Reservists in Units** are trained unit members who
21 participate in unit training activities on a part-time basis.

22
23 2. **Training Pipeline** (non-deployable account) personnel are enlisted

1 members of the SELRES who have not yet completed initial active duty for training and
2 officers who are in training for professional categories or in undergraduate flying
3 training.

4
5 3. **Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)** are trained
6 individuals assigned to an AC, Selective Service System, or Federal Emergency
7 Management Agency (FEMA) organization's billet which must be filled on or shortly
8 after mobilization. IMAs participate in training activities on a part-time basis with AC
9 unit in preparation for recall in a mobilization. The CCDR determines IMA utilization.

10
11 4. **Active Guard and Reserve (AGR)** are National Guard or Reserve
12 members of the SELRES who are ordered to active duty or full-time National Guard duty
13 for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training RC units.

14
15 5. **Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)** personnel provide a manpower
16 pool comprised principally of individuals that may have training, having previously
17 served in an AC or in the SELRES, and having some period of their military Service
18 obligation remaining.

19
20 6. **Inactive National Guard (ING)** are National Guard personnel in an
21 inactive status in the Ready Reserve, not in the SELRES, attached to a specific National
22 Guard unit, who are required to muster once a year with their assigned unit but do not

1 participate in training activities. On mobilization, ING members mobilize with their
2 units.

3
4 (2) The **Standby Reserve** consists of personnel who maintain their affiliation
5 without being in the Ready Reserve, who have been designated key civilian employees,
6 or who have a temporary hardship or disability. They are not required to perform training
7 and are not part of units but create a pool of trained individuals who could be mobilized if
8 necessary to fill manpower needs in specific skills.

9
10 (a) **Active Status List** are those Standby Reservists temporarily assigned
11 for hardship or other cogent reason; those not having fulfilled their military Service
12 obligation or those retained in active status when provided for by law; or those members
13 of Congress and others identified by their employers as “key personnel” and who have
14 been removed from the Ready Reserve because they are critical to the national security in
15 their civilian employment.


16
17 (b) **Inactive Status List** are those Standby Reservists who are not required
18 by law or regulation to remain in an active program and who retain their Reserve
19 affiliation in a nonparticipating status, and those who have skills which may be of
20 possible future use.

21
22 3. The **Retired Reserve** consists of all Reserve officers and enlisted personnel
23 who receive retired pay on the basis of active duty or reserve service; all Reserve officers

1 | [and enlisted personnel who are otherwise eligible for retired pay but have not reached age](#)
2 | [60, who have not elected discharge, and are not voluntary members of the Ready or](#)
3 | [Standby Reserve; and other retired reservists under certain conditions.](#)

2. Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Process

7 | [Figure I-1 highlights](#) ~~T~~the RC manpower mobilization process [that is comprised of](#)
8 | ~~has~~ five primary subprocesses: ~~planning, decision-making, execution, monitoring and~~
9 | ~~reporting, and demobilization (See Figure I-1).~~ ~~This publication~~ [Each subprocess is](#)
10 | ~~discusses~~ [each subprocess](#) in subsequent chapters.



11 | **Figure I-1. Five Subprocesses of the Reserve Component**
12 | **Manpower Mobilization Process**

3. Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Roles and Responsibilities

16 | This section briefly ~~defines the mobilization staff officers' (MSOs') and planners'~~

1 | ~~roles. As shown in Figure I-2, the MSO must have a variety of skills. Figure I-3~~ outlines
2 | the mobilization responsibilities of the ~~Joint Staff~~[JS](#), Services, [CCDRs](#), and supported
3 | and supporting ~~CINCs~~[CCDRs](#). Many of these responsibilities overlap and require close
4 | coordination during mobilization ([See Figure I-2](#)).

ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MANPOWER MOBILIZATION	
Organization	Mobilization Responsibilities
Joint Staff	<p>Monitors the mobilization process to determine operational impacts. Ensures that mobilization system capability assessments are integrated into operational decision making:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Adjudicates resource allocations ● Determines mobilization levels ● Obtains authorities ● Seeks cross-Service efficiencies ● Educates leadership ● Tracks the status of mobilization through military manpower mobilization and accession status reports (MOBREPs) provided by the Services
Service	<p>Responsible under Title 10 to acquire, train, and equip forces and support organizations with Reserve Component (RC) requirement by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Providing trained, equipped, and ready units and individuals ● Sourcing time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) requirements ● Determining RC requirements to assist in mobilization, deployment, and/or sustainment, and providing to the supported combatant commander (CCDR) for inclusion in the operation plan (OPLAN) ● Developing mobilization and demobilization policies and plans ● Developing mobilization systems to support CCDR requirements ● Managing mobilization and/or demobilization and report status to the Joint Staff via MOBREPs
Supported CCDR	<p>The supported CCDR's primary role in the manpower mobilization process is establishing requirements for forces. These requirements are articulated in the TPFDD associated with each OPLAN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Develops time-phased list of force requirements ● Collects data from the Services for other organizations with RC requirements to deploy, backfill, assist in mobilization, deployment, and/or sustainment and move the force; and compiles data in Appendix 5, Reserve Components' Requirements Summary, Annex A, Task Organization, of the OPLAN ● Determines casualty factors and medical evacuation policies upon which to base replacement flow ● Determines host-nation support and other US force offsets ● Reports availability of units and individuals for demobilization ● Supports reception and retrograde of units and individuals ● Coordinates and reviews Service and Service component commanders' RC mobilization plans
Supporting CCDR	<p>The supporting CCDRs have two mobilization roles, one as a receiver of forces and the second as a provider of manpower and logistic support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Develops time-phased list of force requirements ● Reports availability of units and individuals for demobilization ● Provides manpower and materiel support as tasked ● Coordinates and reviews Service and Service component commanders' RC mobilization plans

Figure I-2. Organizational Roles and Responsibilities for Manpower Mobilization

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a. President Of The United States. The President directs the nation's military,

5

including RC unit and individual activations. During war or national emergency, the

1 President will normally publish an executive order (EO) that assigns emergency
2 preparedness responsibilities, including required mobilization authority, to DOD and
3 other Federal departments and agencies. The EO will outline the appropriate Title 10
4 statutes invoking the authority to activate Reserve members of the Armed Forces. The
5 action statutes invoked in the EO set the stage for follow-on actions by subordinate
6 agencies in the mobilization process.

7
8 **b. Secretary Of Defense (SecDef)** manages force activation by developing
9 guidance to the JS, Military Departments, and defense agencies to support strategic aims
10 and operational planning. DOD also captures, records, and reports cost data of
11 contingency operations, as required by law, for submission to Congress to support the
12 department's request for supplemental funding in support of the war or national
13 emergency.

14
15 **c. Under Secretary Of Defense, Personnel And Readiness** publishes or amplifies
16 the DOD policies and personnel management guidance within the authorities granted by
17 the EO and public law. This includes publishing guidance to implement RC activations
18 and deactivations, establishing related personnel management and pay polices for
19 activated Reserve members, and publishing guidance related to data collection, reporting,
20 and other related force management requirements.

21
22 **d. Joint Staff. The JS supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in**
23 integrating the mobilization plans of the Military Departments and Defense agencies.

1 The J-4 is the focal point in the JS for integrating mobilization plans and coordinating
2 mobilization execution.

3
4 ~~e. United States Atlantic Command (USACOM)~~ United States Joint Forces
5 Command (USJFCOM) functions as a joint force provider. ~~Its~~ USJFCOM's role allows
6 it to look broadly at the supported ~~CINCCDR~~ and the Service components under its
7 command, ~~who resource the CINCCDR's requirements, total forces available, and actual~~
8 ~~or potential missions to ensure optimum use of forces.~~ ~~USACOM~~ USJFCOM

9 recommends sourcing from the following organizations: Forces Command for the Army;
10 Air Combat Command for the Air Force; Atlantic Fleet for the Navy; Marine Forces

11 ~~Atlantic~~ Command for the Marine Corps; and the Department of ~~Transportation~~

12 Homeland Security (DHS) for the Coast Guard. When requested by the supported

13 ~~CINCCDR~~, ~~USACOM~~ USJFCOM integrates force requirements that more than one

14 Service is able to provide such as engineers, security, ~~and~~/or medical support.

15 ~~USACOM~~ USJFCOM assigns responsibility to its subordinate commands in coordination

16 with the Service(s) and the supported ~~CINCCDR~~. Besides integrating active duty

17 service members from all Services into its mission of transformation, USJFCOM plays an

18 active role in the mobilization of RC service members, adding them to the list of assets

19 available for the joint warfighting commander.

20
21 **f. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)** is the force provider

22 for special operations forces (SOF). USSOCOM mobilizes its forces and coordinates

23 with the Services to obtain mobilization support.

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g. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is the single manager within ~~the Department of Defense (DOD)~~ for planning and operations for ~~DOD~~ transportation for other than Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets. USTRANSCOM is responsible for providing air, sea, and land transportation for DOD users in times of both peace and war. Under DOD Directive (DODD) 5158.4, “*United States Transportation Command*,” USTRANSCOM is directed to exercise combatant command (command authority) of the [Surface Deployment and Distribution Command](#) ~~Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)~~ [\(SDDC\)](#), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Air Mobility Command (AMC). [The SDDC is responsible for planning intra- continental United States \(CONUS\) movements to support mobilization and deployment data using operation plan \(OPLAN\) time-phased force and deployment \(TPFDD\) files and intra-CONUS movement data.](#) ~~MTMC~~, MSC, [the SDDC](#), and AMC rely on the RC to meet surge lift requirements. Early access to the RC during a developing crisis is necessary to effectively meet surge lift requirements.

h. [United States Northern Command \(USNORTHCOM\)](#) has specific responsibilities for homeland defense and for assisting civil authorities. [USNORTHCOM’s mission is to conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility \(AOR\) and as directed by the President or SecDef, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.](#) [USNORTHCOM embodies the principles of unity of effort and unity of command as the](#)

1 single, responsible, designated DOD commander for overall command and control of
2 DOD support to civil authorities within the its AOR. **RC forces** are integral to the
3 accomplishment of peacetime missions and conflict prevention. They are also an
4 essential part of the homeland security operational force.

5
6 **i. Military Departments and United States Coast Guard (USCG). The Military**
7 **Departments provide forces and logistic support to the CCDRs at the SecDef**
8 direction.. In peacetime, and until transferred to the Department of the Navy in time of
9 war, the USCG serves under the control of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
10 Security (SECDHS). USCG units under DHS control may be assigned to a CCDR with
11 the approval of SECDHS. The Military Departments and the USCG **prepare detailed**
12 **mobilization plans** identifying the actual forces and support to be provided and **execute**
13 **mobilization** at the SecDef direction. The Military Departments provide support to
14 FEMA during natural disasters under the Federal Response Plan. FEMA coordinates the
15 actions and programs of the other Federal agencies in support of the DOD during regional
16 contingencies and mobilization efforts. Figure I-3 provides an example of the National
17 Guard's participation in a natural disaster response (Hurricanes KATRINA and RITA in
18 2005).

NATIONAL GUARD TITLE 32 HURRICANE KATRINA/RITA RESPONSE




Figure I-3. National Guard Title 32 Hurricane KATRINA/RITA Response

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2 g. **Supported Combatant Commanders.** Supported CCDRs are tasked in the Joint
3 Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) or by other joint operation planning authority to
4 **prepare specific plans in their respective AORs. They specify the RC capabilities**
5 **needed to support the plan; identify time-phased requirements for RC capabilities; and**
6 **identify the RC capabilities needed** for reinforcement, for deployment and movement
7 of the force, and for backfill of deployed capabilities. **This planning establishes the**
8 **capabilities required and sustaining capabilities upon which supporting**
9 **mobilization plans are based.** This planning requires extensive coordination among the
10 supported CCDR, supporting CCDRs, and the Services. Supported CCDRs **request**
11 **invocation of emergency mobilization authorities** when ordered to execute operation
12 orders (OPORDs) requiring mobilization support.

13
14 h. **Supporting Combatant Commanders.** Supporting CCDRs are tasked in the
15 JSCP or by other joint planning authority to **provide augmentation forces and other**
16 **support** to a designated supported CCDR or CCDRs. In this role, **they may also**
17 **require mobilized assets** to accomplish their respective support missions. Their
18 supporting plans include mobilization requirements when appropriate, and when needed,
19 supporting CCDRs should request invocation of mobilized assets through the supported
20 CCDR. As noted above, extensive coordination is required to ensure that all mobilization
21 requirements are identified.

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24 **4. Document Organization**

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~~— Each of the following chapters covers one of the five subprocesses of manpower mobilization. Paragraphs within each chapter identify the subordinate activities and tasks that make up these subprocesses. Responsible organizations are annotated in brackets at the end of the task discussions.~~

~~— The five appendixes contain specific reference material. Appendix A, “Mobilization Activity Summaries,” summarizes the activities and tasks associated with the five manpower mobilization subprocesses. Appendix B, “Legal Authorities for Mobilization,” reviews the legal authorities that may be used to implement mobilization. Appendix C, “Levels of Mobilization,” indicates the number of forces and the duration of active duty authorized for different requirements such as partial and full mobilization. Appendix D, “References,” lists some of the documents that may be useful in manpower mobilization. Appendix E, “Administrative Instructions,” provides document distribution and feedback change instructions.~~

1 | CHAPTER II

2 | PLANNING

3 |
4 | **1. Purpose**

5 |
6 | This chapter explains RC requirements planning. ~~As shown in Figure II-1,~~
7 | ~~accessibility to and use of the RC is critical.~~ The timely, specific, and comprehensive
8 | integration of total RC requirements into plans provides the following benefits.

9 |
10 | a. Early apportionment of RC combat, combat support (CS) and/or combat service
11 | support (CSS) forces, and the cross-leveling and redistribution of RC equipment. Per
12 | DODD, 1225.6, *Equipping the Reserve Forces*, the RC of each Military Department shall
13 | be equipped to accomplish all assigned missions and shall have an equipment
14 | procurement and distribution program that is responsive to the CCDRs' mission
15 | requirements and sustainable on those joint and other missions, including homeland
16 | defense. DOD's goal is to fill the mission equipment requirements of the RC in
17 | accordance with the Total Force Policy. Equipment priorities for the reconstitution of
18 | force capabilities after contingency operations or resetting of the force into a revised
19 | force structure to meet future mission requirements shall be in accordance with
20 | established joint priorities, regardless of component.

21 |
22 | b. Increased visibility of RC capabilities (such as logistics enabling capabilities) and
23 | specialty support (such as civil engineering, civil affairs, and medical).

1

2 c. Improved accessibility to RC forces.

3

4 d. Increased efficiencies to the force providers (Services and supporting

5 ~~CINCs~~ CCDRs).

6

7 **2. Mobilization Planning**

8

9 The following provisions of law and ~~Defense Department~~ DOD policy ensure that
10 Service mobilization plans are fully integrated with joint campaign and ~~operation plans~~
11 ~~(OPLANs)~~.

12

13 a. **Military Departments.** Title 10 United States Code (USC), “Armed Forces,”
14 clearly assigns the Secretaries of the Military Departments the responsibility and
15 authority necessary to conduct all affairs of their departments, including the functions of
16 mobilizing and demobilizing. ~~The Department of Defense (DOD)~~ and the Military
17 Departments issue policy and guidance to support functional areas of mobilization
18 planning at all levels.

19

20 b. **Combatant Commanders.**

21

22 (1) The ~~Secretary of Defense (SecDef)~~ in his 6 September 1996 memorandum,
23 “Assignment of Forces,” established as a matter of DOD policy, the authority that

1 | ~~combatant commanders~~ CCDRs may exercise over assigned RC forces when not on
2 | active duty and when on active duty for training is Training and Readiness Oversight
3 | (TRO). CCDRs will normally exercise TRO over assigned RC forces through their
4 | Service component commanders. He further established that TRO includes the authority
5 | to “coordinate and review mobilization plans (including post-mobilization training
6 | activities and deployability validation procedures) developed for assigned RC forces.”
7 | The ~~Secretary of Defense~~ SecDef directed that his annual “Forces for Unified
8 | Commands” memorandum will reflect this policy guidance.

9 |
10 | (2). Force Generation and Management. Force generation is the ability to
11 | provide ready forces with the capabilities necessary to perform the full range of joint
12 | operations. It requires the Services to organize, train, and equip the Total Force to serve
13 | as a fully integrated joint team now and in the future. Force generation involves the
14 | recruitment, training, education, and retention of highly qualified people; the planning,
15 | programming, acquisition, maintenance, and repair of equipment and infrastructure; and
16 | the development of unit organizations and doctrine suitable for joint operations. Force
17 | management involves planning the physical location of forces, the force mix, and
18 | structure at each location, associated infrastructure, and unit readiness. Force
19 | management must also consider the effects of modernization and transformation on unit
20 | availability, readiness, and integration.

21 |
22 | c. Mobilization Staff Officer (MSO). The role of the MSO is to assist DOD,
23 | Service, and joint agencies in assigning the task of developing and promulgating policies

1 and procedures required to activate and deactivate RC personnel under peacetime and
2 crisis response conditions. The MSO is a staff officer that provides subject matter
3 expertise on the sourcing and employment of Reserve forces in support of contingency
4 planning and the execution of OPLANs. The MSO may be a Reserve member activated
5 at the outset of a contingency to augment DOD, Joint, Service or combatant command
6 staff or it may be a Reserve or Active Component subject matter expert already on the
7 staff. The role of the MSO promulgates the policy and procedures required to mobilize
8 and demobilize RC personnel under peacetime and crisis response conditions. The MSO
9 holds several roles required to accomplish various mobilization tasks for the supported
10 command, JS, Services, and supporting commands to support mobilization planning,
11 monitoring, and execution requirements (See Figure II-1).



Figure II-1. The Mobilization Staff Officer Roles

12
13
14
15

1
2 | **3. ~~Deliberate~~Contingency Planning**

3
4 | a. Contingency planning is planning that occurs in non-crisis situations. A

5 | contingency is a potential or anticipated emergency that likely would involve military
6 | forces in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by
7 | foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or SecDef. In ~~deliberate~~
8 | contingency planning, the total requirement for RC forces to support the OPLAN must be
9 | ~~developed~~ identified and documented once the plan is complete. Figure II-2 depicts the
10 | basic steps of the ~~deliberate-four~~ planning process functions and one of the ~~outputs-of-that~~
11 | ~~process, products,~~ the RC requirements summary tables. These tables become Appendix
12 | 5, “Reserve Components Requirements Summary,” to Annex A, “Task Organization,” of
13 | the OPLAN. The RC requirements summary tables list the aggregate RC support
14 | necessary for the execution ~~all-phases~~ of the OPLAN, and are used as the numerical
15 | justification for requesting specific legal authorities and levels of mobilization.

16
17 | For further information see CJCSI 3110.13 (C), Mobilization Guidance for the Joint
18 | Strategic Capabilities Plan.




Figure II-2. ~~Deliberate~~Contingency Planning Process

b. The ~~Five Basic Steps of the Deliberate~~Four Functions of the Contingency Planning Process. The ~~basic steps of the deliberate~~functions of contingency planning process as depicted in Figure II-2 include the following: ~~initiation~~strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, ~~plan review~~, and ~~supporting plans~~plan refinement. Each step of the RC requirements process (in context with the ~~deliberate contingency~~ planning process) is described in subsequent subparagraphs. Process stakeholders are identified at the end of each paragraph.

(1) ~~Initiate Deliberate Planning~~Strategic Guidance. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides for the apportionment of major combat forces and

1 | selected ~~special operations forces (SOF)~~. These and other force requirements are broadly
2 | defined by the supported ~~CINC's~~CCDR's strategic concept and ~~time-phased force and~~
3 | ~~deployment data (TPFDD)~~ letter of instruction (LOI) to guide plan development. ~~During~~
4 | ~~the "Initiate Deliberate Planning" phase, the following steps are accomplished.~~Strategic
5 | guidance planning should accomplish the following:

6 |
7 | (a) Consider implications of RC use that are not limited to the strategic
8 | guidance function of contingency planning. ~~and p~~Apportioned RC combat forces and
9 | major theater CS/CSS are known but visibility of smaller RC units will only occur after
10 | sourcing is complete. Provide input or feedback on RC requirements and assumptions to
11 | the staffing of high-level guidance documents such as the JSCP; Chairman of the Joint
12 | Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.13 (C), *"Mobilization Guidance for the Joint*
13 | *Strategic Capabilities Plan;*" and the Defense Planning Guidance ~~{AH}~~.

14 |
15 | (b) Participate in the planner's development of the supported
16 | ~~CINC's~~CCDR's TPFDD LOI and related actions to ensure that RC mobilization
17 | guidance and taskings are visible and ~~fully~~ understood for apportioned RC major combat
18 | forces, SOF units, and theater level CS and CSS units ~~{AH}~~.

19 |
20 | (c) Review the LOI to ensure that a stated requirement for production of
21 | Appendix 5, "Reserve Components Requirements Summary," to Annex A, "Task
22 | Organization," based on the OPLAN TPFDD is included. ~~{Supported CINC}~~.



Once time-phased force and deployment data requirements are determined, component sourcing should be completed to accurately estimate Reserve Component units and manpower required.

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6 **(2) Concept Development.** During this phasefunction, the mobilization staff
7 officer-MSO becomes familiar with the CINCCDR's strategic concept and TPFDD LOI
8 and checks each for consistent RC planning factors such as ~~unit readiness, equipment on~~
9 ~~hand, personnel training, assumptions, and feasibility.~~ force structure available during the
10 planning cycle, scheduled conversions, activations, and inactivations. If there are
11 inconsistencies, the MSO provides immediate feedback to the supported CINCCDR.
12 The product ~~of this phase~~ created during concept development is the supported
13 CINCCDR's total force requirement ~~{AII}~~.

14

15 **(3) Plan Development.** During plan development, the process to source the
16 plan TPFDD occurs (See Figure II-2). The Services select units to meet the time-phased
17 requirements of the supported CINCCDR. When the Services source a plan TPFDD,
18 the deliberatecontingency planner, with the MSO's advice, adds an important dimension
19 to the sourcing process by considering where Service capabilities reside. These selected

1 | units may be active forces, a combination of ~~active~~[AC](#) and RC, or even combinations that
2 | include civilian and contractor support. After requirements are determined, there must be
3 | a concerted effort to identify component sourcing, either ~~active~~[AC](#) or RC, to increase the
4 | accuracy of specifying the total RC units and manpower required. At the end of this
5 | phase, the draft TPFDD is available. Normally, this provides the bulk of the RC
6 | requirement and enables the supported ~~CINCC~~[combatant command's](#) MSO to create the
7 | draft RC requirements ~~S~~[summary T](#)ables for ~~Appendix 5, to Annex A, of the associated~~
8 | ~~plan.~~ [Appendix 5, "Reserve Components Requirements Summary," Annex A, "Task](#)
9 | [Organization."](#) At this point, the TPFDD is sourced and considered final. However, the
10 | RC requirements summary tables in ~~n-Appendix 5, Annex A,~~ [Appendix 5, "Reserve](#)
11 | [Components Requirements Summary," Annex A, "Task Organization,"](#) must still be
12 | finalized by each Service using TPFDD data. The Services and supporting ~~CINCC~~[CCDRs](#)
13 | give the supported ~~CINCC~~[CCDR](#) draft data that must be compiled and included in the
14 | supporting plans to complete the RC requirement (See Figure II-3). Once a plan is
15 | completed, the original mobilization assumptions are either validated or refuted ~~{Services~~
16 | ~~and supported CINCC}~~.




Figure II-3. Operation Plan Reserve Component Requirements

1
2
3

4 ~~(4) Review of Operation Plans Refinement.~~ In ~~this phase~~ plan refinement, the
5 ~~Joint Staff JS, with the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate as the lead,~~
6 conducts a formal review of the OPLAN. The Logistics Directorate (J-4) MSO reviews
7 the RC requirements summaries and supporting data.

8

9 ~~(5) Develop Support Plans. During this phase, The~~ supporting ~~CINCs~~ CCDRs
10 and Services finalize requirements in several areas: movement of the force, mobilization
11 and deployment support, sustainment operations, and backfill capabilities. ~~These~~
12 ~~requirements are reduced to TPFDD data. The TPFDD data is used to identify specific~~
13 ~~RC units to be mobilized to support the deployment and sustainment of forces.~~
14 ~~[Supporting CINCs, Services, supported CINC].~~ CONUS-based and other forces
15 supporting the deployment are not included on the TPFDD but the requirements are
16 identified and planned for. During execution planning each requirement is justified, the
17 RC unit is selected, and called to active duty.

1

2 c. RC Requirements Summary Tables. The summary tables identify RC forces and

3 support forces required to accomplish the following: deploy to the ~~CINCCDR~~'s ~~area of~~
4 ~~responsibility (AOR)~~; move the force; assist in mobilization, deployment, and
5 sustainment; and backfill departing ~~Active Component (AC)~~ units and individuals.

6 ~~Decision makers need CINCCDR and Service estimates of total RC requirements at the~~
7 ~~beginning of a crisis.~~ Too often, war planners are unaware of the total RC requirement to
8 support the OPLAN under development. The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual

9 (CJCSM) 3122.03A, ~~“Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II:~~
10 ~~(Planning Formats and Guidance),”~~ JSCP; and CJCSI 3110.13(C), ~~“Mobilization~~

11 ~~Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,”~~ require completion of Appendix 5,

12 ~~“Reserve Component Requirements Summary,”~~ to Annex A, ~~“Task Organization,”~~ to

13 OPLANs. The RC requirements summary depicts these total RC requirements.

14 Appendix 5, ~~“Reserve Component Requirements Summary,”~~ to Annex A, ~~“Task~~

15 ~~Organization,”~~ should contain the number of RC requirement summaries necessary to

16 support requests for mobilization legal authorities. For instance, if the flexible deterrent

17 option (FDO) phase of the plan requires Presidential ~~Selected~~ Reserve Callup ~~Authority~~

18 (~~PSRC~~) and a subsequent phase requires partial mobilization, separate RC requirements

19 summaries must be prepared for each of these phases to support the requests for ~~PSRC~~

20 and subsequently for partial mobilization. It is not necessary to prepare a separate RC

21 requirement summary for each ~~OPLAN~~ FDO ~~in the OPLAN~~. Mobilization planners

22 analyze FDOs in the aggregate to determine the point at which ~~PSRC~~ becomes necessary

23 and prepare one summary to support the request. These summaries provide senior

1 leadership with the data required to determine the level of mobilization necessary to
 2 execute various ~~phases~~functions during planning of the plan. Figure II-4 is an example of
 3 a ~~CINCCDR~~'s RC requirements summary to support an FDO associated with an
 4 OPLAN. This summary would be used by the MSO to justify a recommendation to
 5 request a ~~PSRC~~. Figure II-5 is an example of a ~~CINCCDR's~~ RC requirement
 6 summary to support ~~the OPLAN~~ execution ~~of the entire OPLAN~~. The total RC
 7 requirement is over -200,000- reservists, indicating that partial mobilization authority is
 8 necessary ~~to execute this OPLAN~~for OPLAN execution.

EXAMPLE: RESERVE COMPONENTS REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY (Appendix 5, Annex A) (Flexible Deterrent Option Execution)								
OPLAN <u>1234</u>		X	FDO(s) <u>RC26</u>		PLAN EXECUTION			
S V C	RC IN AOR	MOVE THE FORCE	ASSIST MOB/ DEPLOY/SUSTAIN		BACKFILL		TOTAL RC PERSONNEL BY SERVICE	
			IMA	IRR/SELRES	CONUS	OCONUS		
USA	0	1,200	310	900	700	350	3,460	
USN	0	300	33	1,200	600	220	2,353	
USAF	0	1,300	140	1,550	990	20	4,010	
USMC	0	25	60	90	270	150	595	
USCG	0	0	3	15	0	10	28	
TOTALS		0	2,825	546	3,755	2,560	750	10,436
AOR - area of responsibility; CONUS - continental United States; FDO - flexible deterrent option; IMA - individual mobilization augmentee; IRR - Individual Ready Reserve; MOB - mobilization; OCONUS - outside the continental United States; OPLAN - operation plan; RC - Reserve Component; SELRES - Selected Reserve; SVC - Service; USA - United States Army; USAF - United States Air Force; USCG - United States Coast Guard; USMC - United States Marine Corps; USN - United States Navy								

Figure II-4. Example: Reserve Components Requirements Summary
(Appendix 5, Annex A) (Flexible Deterrent Option Execution)

10
11
12
13

EXAMPLE: RESERVE COMPONENTS REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY (Appendix 5, Annex A) (Complete Operation Plan Execution)							
OPLAN <u>1234</u>		FDO(s) _____			X PLAN EXECUTION		
S V C	RC IN AOR	MOVE THE FORCE	ASSIST MOB/ DEPLOY/SUSTAIN		BACKFILL		TOTAL RC PERSONNEL BY SERVICE
			IMA	IRR/SELRES	CONUS	OCONUS	
USA	174,300	550	2,350	5,300	1,100	1,350	184,950
USN	21,400	3,200	83	2,200	6,200	1,220	34,303
USAF	5,300	31,300	840	1,550	990	205	40,185
USMC	11,600	5	120	210	770	3,150	15,855
USCG	1,430	180	0	25	0	0	1,635
TOTALS	214,030	35,235	3,393	9,285	9,060	5,925	276,928

AOR - area of responsibility; **CONUS** - continental United States; **FDO** - flexible deterrent option; **IMA** - individual mobilization augmentee; **IRR** - Individual Ready Reserve; **MOB** - mobilization; **OCONUS** - outside the continental United States; **OPLAN** - operation plan; **RC** - Reserve Component; **SELRES** - Selected Reserve; **SVC** - Service; **USA** - United States Army; **USAF** - United States Air Force; **USCG** - United States Coast Guard; **USMC** - United States Marine Corps; **USN** - United States Navy

Figure II-5. Example: Reserve Components Requirements Summary
(Appendix 5, Annex A) (Complete Operation Plan Execution)

1
2
3
4

5 **(1) Flexible Deterrent Option.** FDO execution may require PSRC. Provide
6 RC requirements summaries as required in CJCSM 3122.03, *“Joint Operation Planning*
7 *and Execution System Volume II: (Planning Formats and Guidance),”* for FDO(s)
8 determined most likely to require sourcing of RC forces ~~from the RC~~.

9

10 **(a) FDO Determination.** The role of the MSO is to assist DOD, Service,
11 and joint agencies to which assigned in developing and promulgating policies and
12 procedures required to activate and deactivate RC personnel under peacetime and crisis
13 response conditions. The MSO is a staff officer that provides subject matter expertise on
14 the sourcing and employment of Reserve forces in support of contingency planning and
15 the execution of OPLANs. It may be a Reserve member activated at the outset of a
16 contingency to augment DOD, Joint, or Service staff or it may be a Reserve or Active
17 Component subject matter experts already on the staff. The supported ~~CINCCDR~~
18 coordinates with the Services, supporting ~~CINCs~~ CCDRs, and other agencies to

1 determine which FDO or combinations of FDOs within a plan have RC requirements.

2 Even though the ~~CINCCDR~~'s concept for deploying forces as part of an FDO may
3 include active forces only, RC forces still may be required to support ~~continental United~~
4 ~~States (CONUS)~~-based operations such as transportation support and lines of
5 communications openings ~~[AII]~~.

6
7 **~~(b)~~ FDO RC Requirements Summary.** Based on the FDO(s) selected,
8 the ~~MSO compiles~~ RC requirements ~~and completes the table~~ are developed in the same
9 manner as is done for complete plan execution ~~[AII]~~.

10
11 **~~(2)~~ Operation Plans.** Appendix 5, “Reserve Component Requirements
12 Summary,” to Annex A, “Task Organization,” of OPLANs will explain the underlying
13 assumptions of each RC requirements summary (i.e., RC requirements for FDO
14 execution are additive or inclusive).

15
16 **~~(a)~~ RC in AOR.** During the plan development, ~~phase~~ (following
17 ~~CINCCDR~~ submission of total force requirements and development of a draft TPFDD),
18 the Services calculate and provide the supported ~~CINC~~-~~CCDR~~ with two sets of data (RC
19 unit and RC non-unit personnel in the TPFDD) that produce the RC manpower numbers
20 in the “RC in AOR” column: ~~(1) RC unit personnel in TPFDD. Self-explanatory~~
21 ~~[Services, supported CINC]; and (2) RC non-unit personnel in TPFDD.~~ This number is
22 calculated to provide the best estimate of the RC portion of TPFDD non-unit personnel.
23 This includes planned fillers and replacements, who may not all come from the AC,

1 | particularly if planning the second of two ~~major theater wars (MTWs)~~major operations or
2 | campaigns. For example, if 10,000 fillers and replacements are planned for deploying
3 | units, a planner might estimate that 2,000 of these would be RC. This could be based on
4 | pre-determined assumptions such as physical location of active or RC forces; time to
5 | callup and deploy RC forces; duration of decisive force in plan execution; or
6 | requirements to consider another ~~MTW~~major operation or campaign. Even though the
7 | plan and the TPFDD may not specify ~~active~~AC or RC for fillers and replacements, the
8 | MSO provides the planner with assistance to define the RC portion of this requirement to
9 | complete the table ~~{Services, supported CINC}~~.

10 |
11 | **~~**~~(b) Move the Force, Assist Mobilization, Deployment, and/or**
12 | **Sustainment, and Backfill.** During ~~the supporting plans phase~~plan refinement, the
13 | Services, supporting ~~CINCs~~CCDRs, USTRANSCOM, and other agencies define their
14 | non-TPFDD requirements to support complete plan execution. The Services coordinate
15 | with these organizations to identify actual RC forces needed to meet these requirements.

16 |
17 | **1. Move the Force.** Enter the RC units and individuals required to
18 | support the strategic operations of ~~MTMC~~the SDDC, MSC, AMC, and USTRANSCOM
19 | ~~{AH}~~.

20 |
21 | **2. Assist Mobilization, Deployment, and/or Sustainment.**

1 ~~a. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs).~~ Enter the number
2 of IMAs required to support the Services, DOD agencies, the ~~Joint Staff JS,~~ and
3 ~~CINCCDR~~ staffs~~[AII]~~.

4
5 ~~b. Other~~ IRR/SELRES Unit. Enter the RC units required to
6 mobilize, deploy, ~~and~~ or sustain the force, such as medical, dental, security, and
7 mobilization processing site staffs; air ~~and~~ or sea departure control groups;
8 maintenance support activities; and Coast Guard port safety and security units forces.
9 Aggregate the estimates of the RC portion of any non-unit personnel — fillers and
10 replacements — for the “Move the Force” and “Assist Mobilization, Deployment,
11 ~~and/or~~ Sustainment” categories required to support CONUS organizations ~~[Services]~~.

12
13 c. Backfill. Enter RC units and individuals required to replace
14 deploying units ~~and~~ or individuals in both CONUS and outside the continental
15 United States (OCONUS) categories (For example, Army RC medics needed to
16 deploy to Europe to fill unit and individual billets vacated by active duty medics sent
17 to an AOR in Asia) ~~[AII]~~.

18



In order to move the force effectively, decision makers need Service estimates of total Reserve Component requirements at the beginning of a crisis.

4. Crisis Action Planning

"In military practice one must plan quickly and carry on without delay, so as to give the enemy no time to collect himself."

"I work in minutes, not in hours."

**Field Marshal Prince
Aleksandr V. Suvotov
1729 - 1800**

a. Crises frequently occur for which there is no plan; therefore, there is no developed

Appendix 5, ["Reserve Component Requirement Summary,"](#) Annex A, ["Task Organization."](#) Virtually all of these crises require at least voluntary RC support and some may require an RC callup. [Decision makers need CCDR and Service estimates of total RC requirements at the beginning of a crisis.](#) ~~Early MSO involvement~~ [Early consideration of RC employment planning factors](#) is essential during crisis action planning (CAP) due to the compressed timeframes and the lead times involved in executing callup. Political events may dictate that the authority to involuntarily recall the RC; may not be given before [the day on which the deployment operation begins](#)

1 | (~~C-D~~day). ~~CINCCDR~~s and Services should budget and plan to access select RC early
2 | deploying individuals and units via voluntary recall procedures. The planning
3 | consequences of failing to plan RC augmentation are shown in Figure II-6.

4



5
6
7

Figure II-6. Planning Consequences

8 | b. Figure II-7 depicts the steps of CAP. Once a ~~course of action (COA)~~ plan is
9 | ~~selected~~ approved, the supported ~~CINCCDR~~'s total force requirement begins to take
10 | shape. As in ~~deliberate~~ contingency planning, the Services source the ~~CINCCDR~~'s
11 | requirements, determining which requirements will be sourced with RC assets.




Figure II-7. Reserve Component Role in Crisis Action Planning

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4 | c. The same information required for a deliberate contingency OPLAN must be
5 | determined for RC support of CAP. The main difference is that the process happens
6 | much more quickly and the estimates for RC requirements may be broad rather than
7 | precise. The Services use force requirements developed by supported and supporting
8 | ~~CINCCDRs~~ to source the RC in the AOR, move the force, provide mobilization
9 | support, and backfill. The supported ~~CINCCDR~~ assembles this data ~~{AH}~~.

10
11 | d. During CAP, C-day and even D-day may precede the development of final force
12 | requirements. Requirements may increase if unforeseen tasks emerge or the civilian
13 | leadership assigns additional missions to the military. ~~MSOs, p~~Planners, and decision
14 | makers should not define the RC requirement too precisely or narrowly in the early stages
15 | of a crisis. Experience has shown that the requirement will grow. A tradeoff exists

1 | between accuracy and speed. Strategic speed and flexibility demand that the ~~MSO gain~~
2 | ~~timely approval of the callup request~~ supported commander be provided timely approval
3 | of the authority to recall Reserve forces through DOD, the JS, and the Services so that
4 | units and individuals can be alerted, assembled, trained, validated, and deployed to meet
5 | the ~~CINCCDR~~'s operational timelines. Using lessons learned from past experiences,
6 | ~~MSOs~~ operational planners must be able to make rapid estimates of requirements ~~in order~~
7 | to make timely decisions. ~~MSOs must be able to articulate the strategic costs of~~
8 | ~~spending limited time to further refine the requirement numbers [All].~~

9 |
10 | ~~e. Security and MSO Access. MSOs should be read into and briefed on the~~
11 | ~~operation at the first consideration of RC utilization. Utilization of the RC force requires~~
12 | ~~the same or greater consideration and planning as use of active forces. Security~~
13 | ~~classification and compartmentation are not reasons to exclude the MSO from planning.~~
14 | ~~The special capabilities resident in the RC make MSO involvement critical to ensure~~
15 | ~~proper planning [All].~~

CHAPTER III

RESERVE COMPONENT CALLUP DECISION MAKING

"Wars are paid for by the possession of reserves."

Thucydides
Peloponnesian Wars
404 BC

1. Purpose

This chapter describes the **activities that influence the decision** to call RC forces to active duty. It discusses the specific actions required to produce and coordinate the RC callup decision package, and highlights other mobilization-related events ~~where the MSO can contribute to the decision-making process~~ involving the activation and employment of Reserve forces.

a. The success of the nation's defense depends on the participation of highly trained members of the RC. The impact of a Reserve member's civilian career on his or her military duties is a key factor that influences the member's ability to make long-term contributions as an active member of the Ready Reserve. Joint commands, Services, and other DOD Agencies involved in the recall, administration, and employment of activated Reserve forces must be familiar with the National Committee of Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) and the role it plays in supporting Reserve members.

b. DOD has assigned the NCESGR the responsibility of promoting both public

1 and private understanding of the National Guard and Reserve to gain US employer
2 and community support. This is accomplished through programs, personnel
3 policies, and practices that encourage employee and citizen participation in the
4 National Guard and Reserve programs. NCESGR's mission is to obtain employer and
5 community support to ensure the availability and readiness of reserve/guard forces.
6 Among their many responsibilities, the NCESGR assists in preventing, resolving, or
7 reducing employer and employee problems and misunderstandings that result from
8 National Guard or Reserve membership, training, and duty requirements. This is
9 accomplished through information services and informal mediation as well as assisting in
10 the education of National Guard and Reserve members with respect to their obligations
11 and responsibilities to employers. This resource is available to military leaders,
12 employers, and reservists in resolving issues impeding rapid and effective mobilization.

14 **2. Background**

16 ~~Joint Pub~~JP 5-03.1, "Joint Operation ~~Planning-Planning and Execution System Vol I:~~
17 ~~(Planning Policies and Procedures),"~~ defines the process for both ~~deliberate~~ contingency
18 and crisis action planning. This chapter discusses, in general terms, the various staff
19 responsibilities of ~~the MSO,~~ joint agencies in activating the RC, with special emphasis on
20 preparation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) RC Callup Decision
21 Package. DOD, joint, and Service agencies involved in the process of activating and
22 employing Reserve units and individuals in support of a contingency should ensure that
23 an officer or officers with RC expertise are used to consider the unique aspects of

1 | [employing Reserve forces in all planning functions.](#) RC callup decision-making
2 | activities are discussed in the sequence in which they may occur during a crisis; however,
3 | the potential exists for simultaneous actions. Annex B, [“Chapter III, Activity Summary:
4 | Reserve Component Callup Decision Making.”](#) ~~o~~fto Appendix A, ~~“Chapter III, Activity
5 | Summary: RC Callup Decision Making.”~~ [“Mobilization Activity Summaries,”](#) identifies
6 | the key tasks for each involved organization.
7 |



8 |
9 | *The [Mobilization Staff Officer](#) obtains information to monitor and report
10 | on the [Reserve Component](#) callup status.*
11 |

12 | **3. ~~Conduct~~ Pre-Mobilization Review and Coordination**

13 |

14 | a. Though a specific request for mobilization may not exist, the MSO must keep
15 | abreast of developments and be aware of potential mobilization scenarios. This is a
16 | continuous, informal process that may or may not result in a decision to mobilize RC
17 | assets. ~~During the situation development and crisis assessment phases of CAP, the MSO
18 | should be made available and involved, but only to the point that the likely questions and
19 | requirements are known.~~ During this period, the ~~MSO~~[mobilization planners who may be](#)

1 | tasked with incorporating Reserve forces into a planning scenario should confirms ~~the~~
2 | mobilization points of contact (POCs) network; evaluates ~~s~~ assumptions pertaining to use
3 | of RC in appropriate plans; reviews lessons learned from similar operations; develops
4 | answers to “what if” questions; and reviews projected RC requirements.

5 |
6 | b. The following are conducted at the outset of contingency planning to ensure
7 | Reserve forces can be rapidly assimilated into operational planning scenarios to address
8 | ~~MSO’s routine tasks are conducted with a sense of urgency due to the~~ potential crisis
9 | (See Figure III-1).



Figure III-1. Mobilization Planning Tasks


10
11
12

13 | (1) Understand the Procedural and Statutory Requirements. ~~In-preparing~~

1 ~~to brief leaders on procedural and statutory requirements for RC callup, the MSO reviews~~
2 ~~Title 10 USC; the Services' mobilization plans; and lessons learned from previous~~
3 ~~operations (Appendix D, "References," also lists useful reference documents on~~
4 ~~manpower mobilization). The statutes applicable to RC callup are complex. The review~~
5 ~~of applicable legal authorities must be conducted with the assistance of legal counsel~~
6 ~~[Joint Staff and/or Services].~~In considering the use of RC forces in contingency planning,
7 the operational planner should become familiar with the procedural and statutory
8 requirements involved in an RC callup. Familiarity with this process should include a
9 review of title 10 USC; DOD Instructions, Service mobilization plans; and lessons
10 learned from previous operations. Appendix D, "References," also lists useful documents
11 on manpower mobilization. The statutes applicable to an RC call-up are complex. The
12 review of applicable legal authorities must be conducted with the assistance of legal
13 counsel by all agencies involved in the activation of Reserve forces. Appendix B, "Legal
14 Authorities and the Department of Defense Policy for Mobilization," contains a summary
15 of legal authorities applicable in activating Reserve forces.

16
17 **(2) Review and Update Projected RC Requirements.** As the planning and
18 operations communities develop information on the requirement for RC forces, the
19 supported ~~CINCCDR~~ (along with the Services) updates the planning information in
20 Appendix 5, "Reserve Component Requirements Summary," to Annex A, "Task
21 Organization," of the anticipated plan, if available. A request for RC callup should
22 contain as a minimum: RC requirements in CJCSM 3122.03A, *"Joint Operation*
23 *Planning and Execution System Volume II: (Planning Formats and Guidance),"*

1 Appendix 5, [“Reserve Component Requirements Summary,”](#) to Annex A, [“Task](#)
 2 [Organization,”](#) format; a recommendation for the level of force mobilization (i.e., PSRC
 3 or full or partial mobilization); and the expected duration of the proposed callup [~~Joint~~
 4 ~~Staff, supported CINC, and/or Services~~]. [Figure III-2 depicts the RC contributions to](#)
 5 [various US military operations and the duration of RC duty days.](#)



6 [Figure III-2. Reserve Component Contributions](#)

7
 8
 9 **(3) Coordinate Reporting Requirements.** As the crisis escalates, the MSO
 10 obtains information to be able to monitor and report on the RC callup status. MSOs also
 11 coordinate with the Services’ POCs to ensure that accurate information is available for
 12 senior-level manpower mobilization reports. Chapter V, “Monitoring and Reporting,”
 13 covers the details on reporting mobilization ~~activities~~ [~~Joint Staff, Services, and/or~~

1 | ~~supporting CINCJ.~~

2

3 | **(4) Review SecDef, CJCS, and Service Secretaries' Guidance for RC**

4 | **Callup.** The MSO coordinates mobilization guidance ~~[AII]~~.

5

6 | **(5) Review Lessons Learned and Remedial Action Programs.** Joint

7 | ~~Universal Lessons Learned System~~ from previous operations and Service remedial
8 | action programs provide historical mobilization challenges valuable to MSOs as do after-
9 | actions reviews for missions involving prior mobilizations. ~~[Joint Staff, Services, and/or~~
10 | ~~CINCJ].~~

11

12 | **(6) Determine Sources of Immediate Manpower Augmentation.** Early in a

13 | crisis, many organizations need manpower augmentation. The MSO contributes to the
14 | augmentation decision by knowing the authorities for each alternative and the assets
15 | available, and providing the pros and cons of the various alternatives. Some manpower
16 | alternatives are as follows:

17

18 | **(a)** Volunteers including voluntary tours of active duty for special work

19 | ~~(Title 10 USC, "Armed Forces," Section 12301, "Reserve Component Generally.")~~

20 | ~~[Services];~~

21

22 | **(b)** Fifteen-day involuntary callup authority (includes unit members and

23 | IMAs). ~~(Title 10 USC, "Armed Forces," Section 12301, "Reserve Component~~

1 | Generally.”~~[b)] [Services].~~

2 |
3 | (c) Involuntary callup of retirees. (Title 10 USC, Armed Forces,” Section
4 | 688, “Retired Members: authority to call to order to active duty; duties.”)~~[Services]; and~~

5 |
6 | (d) PSRC. ~~Recent experience with the use of PSRC shows that authority~~
7 | ~~was granted in a timely manner that allowed for effective mission accomplishment;~~
8 | ~~however, this occurs only when PSRC requests could be fully justified and included~~
9 | ~~detailed RC requirements [All]. NOTE: Section 511, FY98 National Defense~~
10 | ~~Authorization Act (NDAA) amends 10 USC 12304 (Presidential Selected Reserve Callup~~
11 | ~~Authority) to allow involuntary activation of up to 30,000 members (within the 200,000~~
12 | ~~authority) of a new sub-category of Individual Ready Reserve, as defined by FY98~~
13 | ~~NDAA change to 10 USC 10144.~~ Recent experience shows that when detailed Reserve
14 | requirements are fully justified during operational planning, authority for a PRC can be
15 | granted in a timely manner that facilitates use of the Reserves in effective mission
16 | accomplishment. PRC authority allows for the involuntary activation of up to 200,000
17 | members of the SELRES. Of this 200,000 member ceiling, up to 30,000 members of the
18 | IRR may be recalled under this authority. The total number of members recalled under
19 | any mobilization authority may be further restricted by the SecDef in follow-on policy
20 | guidance.

1 | **4. ~~Inform Senior Leadership on~~ Reserve Component ~~Potential~~ Capabilities and**
2 | **Availability**

3 |
4 | *"When one has a good reserve, one does not fear one's enemies."*
5 |
6 | **Richard I, King of England**
7 | **Histoire de Guillaume le Marechal**
8 | **1220**
9 |

10 | a. Early in the operation, **MSOs need to inform the senior leaders on the**
11 | **mobilization requirements and procedures.** MSOs should provide information on
12 | forces available, mobilization requirements, lead times, and the procedures for obtaining
13 | a Reserve callup, should one prove necessary. Senior leaders need to be briefed on the
14 | policies and laws governing RC activation.

15 |
16 | b. **The MSO performs the following actions** in preparing the leadership to address
17 | mobilization issues.

18 |
19 | **(1) Review Mobilization Plans, Policies, and Procedures.** ~~Some useful~~
20 | ~~mobilization reference publications are listed in Appendix D, "References."~~ As a
21 | minimum, the MSO needs to review the following publications ~~[AII]~~.

22 |
23 | ~~_____ (a) Joint Pub~~ JP 4-05, "Joint ~~Doctrine for~~ Mobilization Planning."

24 |
25 | ~~_____ (b) Joint Pub~~ JP 5-03.1, "Joint Operation ~~Planning~~ Joint Operation
26 | ~~Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).~~"

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(c) CJCSI 3110.13, (C), Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (U)

(d) Appropriate Service mobilization plans (for example, Army Mobilization and Operation Planning and Execution System, ~~the~~ Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan, ~~the~~ Air Force War and Mobilization Plan, Coast Guard Manpower Mobilization and Support Plan, and ~~the~~ Marine Corps ~~Mobilization Management Plan~~ Total Force Mobilization, Activation, Integration and Deactivation Plan). Service ~~Reserve forces employment preferences are~~ mobility policy preference is shown in Figure III-23.

~~————— DODD 1235.10, “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserves.”~~

~~————— •• DOD Instruction (DODI) 1235.12, “Accessing the Ready Reserves.”~~

~~————— •• DODI 1100.19G, “Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning Policies and Procedures.”~~

(e) DOD 3020.36-P, Master Mobilization Plan.

(f) DODD 1215.6, Uniform Reserve, Training, and Retirement Categories.

1 | [\(g\) DODD 1235.9, *Management and Mobilization of the Standby Reserve.*](#)

2 |

3 | [\(h\) DODD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the*](#)

4 | [*Ready Reserve.*](#)

5 |

6 | [\(i\) DODD 1235.11, *Management of Individual Mobilization Augmentees.*](#)

7 |

8 | [\(j\) DODD 1235.13, *Management of the Individual Ready Reserve and the*](#)

9 | [*Inactive National Guard.*](#)

10 |

SERVICE MOBILIZATION POLICY

Army:

- Heavy reliance on reserves for combat service support
- Involuntary callup to ensure access to units and to maintain unit integrity

Air Force:

- Extensive peacetime use of reserves (especially strategic lift)
- Uses volunteers to fill missions

Marine Corps:

- Uses volunteers to augment
- Reserves not required for initial operations

Navy:

- Prefers involuntary callup for unit integrity and visibility
- Able to meet requirements with volunteers

Coast Guard:

- Extensive use of peacetime reserves to augment active duty units
- Port Security Units are reserve units that are required for initial operations

1
2 | **Figure III-3. Service ~~Reserve Forces Employment Preferences~~ Mobilization Policy**
3

4 | **(2) Review Legal Authorities.** Appendix B, “Legal Authorities [and the](#)
5 | [Department of Defense Policy](#) for Mobilization,” gives the MSO a ready reference to the
6 | appropriate legal authorities that are invoked to execute mobilization actions. Appendix
7 | C, “Levels of Mobilization,” shows the levels of mobilization to support various
8 | operations. MSOs must consult with their Judge Advocate [General office](#) to confirm the
9 | interpretation and application of these legal authorities ~~[AII]~~.

10
11 | **(3) Review Civilian Mobilization Plans and Policies.** The MSO needs to be

1 familiar with the legal authorities and procedures for the mobilization of civilians. The
2 following documents provide necessary guidance.

3

4 (a) DODD 1400.31, “~~DoD~~DOD Civilian Work Force Contingency and
5 Emergency Planning and Execution” ~~-[AII]~~.

6

7 (b) DODD 1400.32, “~~DoD~~DOD Civilian Work Force Contingency and
8 Emergency Planning Guidelines and Procedures” ~~-[Services]~~.

9

10 (c) DODD 1404.10, “Emergency-Essential (E-E) DOD US Citizen Civilian
11 Employee.

12


13 **5. Interpret Policies for Use of Reserve Components**

14

15 As shown in Figure III-~~34~~, RC mobilization and deployment policies may need
16 modification to satisfy the requirements of a crisis. An available asset may not be
17 appropriate for the crisis; for example: (1) individuals assigned to a unit apportioned to
18 an OPLAN TPFDD, or who are not physically qualified, or who have documented
19 personal hardships; (2) ~~only~~ Ready Reserve which includes Selected Reserve and ~~certain~~
20 ~~Individual Ready Reserve Volunteers~~ IRRs are accessible under PSRC ~~and only Ready~~
21 ~~Reserve are accessible~~ under partial mobilization; (-3) generally RC personnel assigned
22 to units should be mobilized and demobilized as a unit (see 10 USC 12301 [c]); and (4)
23 Governor’s consent is required to mobilize National Guardsmen volunteering for active

1 | duty or ordered to active duty for short tour (15 days or less) (see [Title 10 USC 12301](#) [b]
2 | or [d]). ~~[Services].~~

3



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Figure III-4. Level of Military Commitment

7 **6. Prepare Decision Packages**

8

9 a. The formal callup process begins with a request (normally by the supported

10 ~~CINCCDR~~, but that may be made by a Service, supporting ~~CINCCDR~~, or the ~~Joint~~
11 ~~StaffJS~~) to callup RC forces. If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agrees that
12 mobilization is required, the Chairman tasks the ~~Joint Staff MSOJS J-4~~ to prepare the RC
13 Callup Decision Support Package. Figure III-45 depicts the actions. ~~Figure III-5 shows~~
14 ~~the reasoning for RC during the Iraq crisis of Feb 98.~~

15




Figure III-5. Reserve Component Decision Making Process


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4 b. The following tasks describe the sequence of events that produce the completed
5 package.

6

7 (1) **Prepare Decision Package.** The ~~Joint Staff~~ MSOJS J-4 in coordination
8 with the JS J-3 coordinates and integrates Service mobilization requirements. Based
9 upon the consolidated requests, the ~~MSOJS J-4~~ MSOJS J-4 prepares the mobilization decision
10 package for the ~~Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff~~ CJCS, who recommends a COA to
11 the President through the ~~Secretary of Defense~~ SecDef. Figure III-6 lists the documents

1 required in the decision package. The Services apportion RC assets, according to
2 Appendix 5, [“Reserve Component Requirements Summary,”](#) to Annex A, [“Task](#)
3 [Organization,”](#) requirements to the [CINCCDR](#)’s OPLAN ~~Joint Staff and/or Services~~.
4



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Figure III-6. Documents of a Reserve Component CallUp Decision [Package](#)

9 [\(2\) Staff Decision Package.](#) The ~~Joint Staff MSO-JS J-4~~ [in coordination with](#)
10 [J-3](#) sends the decision package to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), ~~Joint~~
11 ~~Staff-JS~~ Directorates, supported and supporting [CINCCDR](#)s, USTRANSCOM,
12 ~~USACOM~~[USJFCOM](#), USSOCOM, [USNORTHCOM](#), the Services, and the ~~Secretary of~~
13 ~~Transportation~~[Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security](#) for Coast Guard, for
14 validation. This coordination develops consensus on the level of mobilization and avoids
15 multiple requests for additional callup authorities ~~Joint Staff~~.

1

2 **(3) Forward Coordinated Decision Package to the Chairman of the Joint**

3 **Chiefs of Staff.** The MSO forwards the coordinated decision package, through the
4 Director of the ~~Joint Staff~~ JS, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman
5 then presents the request to the ~~Secretary of Defense~~ SecDef with the recommendation to
6 forward it to the President ~~{Joint Staff}~~.

7

8 **(4) Prepare Decision Package for Additional or Subsequent Callup.** After

9 the initial approval of the RC callup, there may be additional RC requirements later in the
10 operation. Also, an extended operation which exceeds the legal limits of 270 days for
11 PSRC or 24 months for partial mobilization may require an RC forces' rotation. The
12 callup ceilings may have to be adjusted to accommodate the rotation. If the ~~National~~
13 ~~Command Authorities (NCA)~~ President places a limit (for example, less than the 200,000
14 maximum in the case of a PSRC) on the callup authority, ~~the NCA~~ then only the
15 President must approve any requests for increases. A similar principle applies to the
16 1,000,000 Service member limit under a partial mobilization. Figure III-7 shows the
17 progression of a subsequent callup request and to move from a PSRC to a partial
18 mobilization. The coordination of the decision package for a subsequent callup is the
19 same as the initial one ~~{Joint Staff}~~.

20




Figure III-7. Reserve Component Decision Making Process (Subsequent Callup or Transition from Presidential ~~Selected~~-Reserve Callup to Partial Mobilization)

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5 (5) Prepare Decision Package for Transition from PSRC to Partial Mobilization.

6 The PSRC authority, title 10 USC 12304, may be used to provide initial RC support
7 requirements for a potentially larger or longer war; or contingency operation; ~~or military~~

8 ~~operations other than war (MOOTW)~~. PSRC is intended to assist during the period in

9 which the situation evolves into either a larger operation or is resolved.

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~~(a) Figure III-7 shows the decision package progression for execution of partial mobilization when PSRC already has been approved.~~ Partial mobilization requires a Presidential or Congressional declaration of national emergency. If a national emergency has not been declared by the time of the partial mobilization request, the MSO, ~~—~~ coordinating with the legal advisors, ~~—~~ includes the draft declaration in the decision package.

(b) When partial mobilization is declared, decision makers need to determine whether to include PSRC into the partial mobilization. Including PSRC does the following:

1. Limits total callup to one million, rather than 1.2 million;
2. Restarts the clock, for 24 months, for any members of the Selected and Individual Ready Reserve serving on active duty under PSRC; ~~and~~
3. Enables worldwide redeployment of Reserves and National Guard, serving under PSRC, which limits support to a specific contingency. This is significant if the PSRC is in support of ~~MOOTW~~ stability operations and the action requiring partial mobilization occurs in another theater.

~~Figure III-8 shows the timelines for PSRC authority approval during Iraq the crisis of~~

1 | ~~February 1998. Figure III-9 shows the lessons learned from the crisis.~~
2

CHAPTER IV

~~EXECUTION~~MOBILIZATION

“Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the continental United States (CONUS) or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home theater.”

Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*

1. Purpose

This chapter describes the roles and activities during the execution of manpower mobilization.

2. Background

Execution is the implementation of the best plans and decisions available to the leadership at the time. Execution is decentralized. The Services issue orders to units ~~and/~~or individuals within the guidance issued by the ~~Secretary of Defense~~SecDef. Most of the actual mobilization activity takes place at units, mobilization~~s~~ stations, and transportation centers. The MSOs monitor the mobilization process, make recommendations for improvement, and seek to optimize the use of human and materiel resources. From the MSO perspective, manpower mobilization execution involves two centers of activity. The first includes actions necessary to order RC units and individuals to active duty, such as distribution of executive orders, delegation of authorities, and

1 notification procedures. Congressional delegations and oversight committees must be
2 notified of the units to be mobilized and their locations. Units and individuals must be
3 notified of their mobilization and public affairs announcements must be made. The
4 sequence and timing of these announcements are of paramount importance to senior
5 leadership. Close coordination at all levels is necessary to prevent misinformation and
6 confusion during execution. The second ~~group~~center of activity represents actions
7 necessary to effective management of the mobilization process and includes responding
8 to changing requirements and actual performance of the mobilization.

9

10 **3. Execution**

11

12 a. CJCS recommends to SecDef the assets that are to be called up and their
13 planned use when RC forces are to be mobilized to augment the AC. In preparing a
14 mobilization recommendation to the President, the following should be considered:

15

16 (1) Assessments of the Services, CCDRs, and Service component commanders.

17

18 (2) Input from the Joint Staff.

19

20 (3) Technical advice, legal opinions, and policy considerations from OSD.

21

22 b. The top portion of Figure IV-1 represents the first center of activity. It is
23 triggered by the product of the decision-making process, the Decision Support Package.

1 After the President’s decision to initiate mobilization, SecDef directs the Military
 2 Departments to proceed. The Services publish mobilization orders in accordance with
 3 their respective procedures. OSD may issue implementation instructions and provide
 4 additional policy guidance, if required. The output in Figure IV-1 is the Services’
 5 execution of OSD guidance in support of the **CINECCDR**, and represents the other center
 6 of activity for the MSO: the management of the mobilization process.

7




Figure IV-1. Manpower Mobilization Execution Process

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
11 c. Some mobilization actions require the President or SecDef to notify the
 12 Congress. For example, some legal authorities require reports at specific intervals.

1 Others require specific information on how the authority is being used and how long it
2 will be needed. Reports on expenditures related to the crisis are also required. The CJCS
3 and the DOD Comptroller are normally responsible for preparing these reports, which
4 require continuous coordination throughout the joint planning and execution community.
5

6 **4. Functional View**

7

8 Figure IV-2 is the MSO's functional view of mobilization execution. The
9 mobilization community already has planned, implemented, and adjusted the
10 mobilization system prior to the issuance of the Presidential Executive Order to callup the
11 RC. ~~Figure IV-3 shows which commands requested PSRC and subsequent approval~~
12 ~~status during the last contingencies.~~



13 Figure IV-2. Functional View of Mobilization Process
14
15

16 a. During execution, MSOs provide technical advice and assistance to those with
17 functional responsibilities; monitor the implementation of decisions; and make periodic
18 reports to the leadership on the performance of the mobilization process. MSOs also

1 recommend further adjustments to RC policies as dictated by mobilization events. The
2 uncertainties of plan execution preclude a detailed list of tasks, but experience suggests
3 the following.

4

5 | (1) Ensure that TPFDD is updated as ~~CINCCDR~~ requirements change. Under
6 | CAP, TPFDDs may not pre-exist. ~~{CINCCDR/Services}~~.

7

8 | (2) Coordinate with the appropriate public affairs officer, legal counsel, and
9 | legislative affairs advisor. Keep them informed throughout the execution of
10 | mobilization. ~~{Joint Staff, CINC, and/or Services}~~.

11

12 | (3) Ensure that theater-unique requirements are known to the supporting
13 | combatant commands and Services. ~~{CINCs/and Services}~~.

14

15 | (4) Continue to coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance. ~~{Joint
16 | Staff and/or Services}~~.

17

18 | (5) Monitor and adjust the callup procedures for units and individuals. The
19 | President may invoke “Stop Loss” during any period reservists are serving on active duty
20 | under title 10 USC 12301, 12302, or 12304. The President may suspend any provision of
21 | law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation of any active or reserve member who
22 | is determined to be essential to national security. ~~{Services}~~.

23

(6) Manage the callup against Service ceilings. ~~Services~~. Figure IV-3 depicts the RC callup mobilization efforts and approved ceilings during various military and civil operations.

MOBILIZATION EFFORTS			
MOBILIZATION EVENT	AUTHORITY	APPROVED CEILING	# OF RESERVE COMPONENT MOBILIZED
<u>World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks</u>	<u>Partial Mobilization</u>	<u>106,100</u>	<u>60,203</u>
<u>Southwest Asia</u>	<u>Presidential Reserve Callup</u>	<u>9,930</u>	<u>952</u>
<u>Bosnia</u>	<u>Presidential Reserve Callup</u>	<u>6,700</u>	<u>2,504</u>
<u>Kosovo</u>	<u>Presidential Reserve Callup</u>	<u>33,102</u>	<u>532</u>


Figure IV-3. Mobilization Efforts

b. Figure IV-4 shows continuous utilization ~~the number~~ of RC personnel ~~called up~~ over time, ~~compared to the mobilization authority imposed ceiling (the stepped line on the chart).~~ ~~Also, there may be self imposed time limitations on the callup period, less than those authorized.~~ ~~The President, the Secretary of Defense, or Service Secretaries may impose those limitations to manage the callup effectively~~ during Operation NOBLE EAGLE, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

RESERVE FORCE MOBILIZATION STATISTICS

Current Selected Reserve Members Ever Mobilized for ONE/OEF/OIF

Mobilized – 46.0% Selected Reserve Force (829,005) Not Mobilized – 54.0%



- Data as of: September 30, 2005
- Data does not include IRR members
- Total RC members called up since 9/11/01: 474,649 (464,720 SelfRes; 9,929 IRR)

Members Who Served More than Once in ONE/OEF/OIF

IRR	Individual Ready Reserve	829,005
OEF	Operation ENDURING FREEDOM	381,005
OIF	Operation IRAQI FREEDOM	313,164
ONE	Operation NOBLE EAGLE	67,841
RC	Reserve Component	448,000
SelfRes	Select Reserves	

Total Members currently serving in the SelfRes		829,005
Total members mobilized for ONE/OEF/OIF		381,005
Total members who have served once in ONE/OEF/OIF		313,164
Total members who have served more than once in ONE/OEF/OIF		67,841
Total members not mobilized for ONE/OEF/OIF		448,000
		46.0%
		37.8%
		8.2%
		54.0%

Figure IV-4. Reserve Force Mobilization Statistics

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2

3 | ~~e. Figure IV-5 shows the Operation Joint Guard PSRC execution timeline.~~

CHAPTER V

MONITORING AND REPORTING

“When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is very difficult to organize an army.”

Napoleon
Maxims of War
1831

1. Purpose

This chapter describes the monitoring and reporting activities in the manpower mobilization process. It discusses the joint community interfaces and the reports required to report on the status of units and individuals.

2. Background

a. Monitoring and reporting is an integral part of manpower mobilization ~~(See Figure V-1)~~. The timely and accurate collection, analysis, and transmission of information is important to ensure effective and efficient mobilization operations. Accurate and timely reporting is also necessary because of high levels of public and political interest in the involuntary order to active duty of [National](#) Guard and Reserve members.

b. The ~~Joint Staff~~[JS](#), Services, and ~~CINCs~~[CCDRs](#) comprise the communication interfaces for ~~the monitoring and reporting phase~~. This chapter discusses some of the

1 information flow challenges and denotes the organizations responsible for working
2 issues. The origin of information flow within any particular organization is not described
3 in detail.

4



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To ensure effective and efficient mobilization operations, the timely and accurate collection, analysis, and transmittal of information is important.

10 c. Figure V-1 shows the inter-organizational information flow. Most of the
11 mobilization information flow supporting operations is directly between the supported
12 | [CINCCDR](#) and the Services. As the joint force provider, [USACOMUSJFCOM](#)
13 | intervenes in the process if joint Service problems arise and need to be resolved. For
14 | [SOFspecial operation forces](#), USSOCOM essentially plays the same mobilization role as
15 | the Services do for other types of forces.




Figure V-1. Inter-Organizational Information Flow

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3. Monitoring

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a. Monitoring involves gathering and analyzing data to determine the status of forces and of the mobilization operation. To manage the mobilization system, the MSO monitors various facets of manpower mobilization, such as source determination, for filling requirements, arranging for the mobilized forces' deployment and/or redeployment and demobilizing the units or individuals. These monitoring efforts improve the MSO's ability to manage the manpower mobilization system.

12

b. MSOs have numerous reports and information systems available to monitor operations. Some of these are as follows.

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(1) The Services submit the **military manpower mobilization and accession status report (MOBREP)** to the Joint Staff, Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1). This message format contains tabular data on the pre-mobilization strength of the ~~a~~Armed ~~f~~Forces, categories of RC personnel who have been notified to report, and those who have reported for active duty.

(2) The Services give the ~~Joint Staff MSO~~ JS J-4 MSO **input to prepare the report to Congress as required by Title 10 USC, “Armed Forces,”** under partial mobilization. The report covers the units mobilized, their location, mission, and performance, the necessity of such unit(s) mobilized, and such other information as the President may require. This report is filed on the first day of the second fiscal year quarter after the quarter in which the first unit is ordered to active duty under the partial mobilization, and on the first day of each succeeding six-month period thereafter for so long as the unit or units are on active duty.


~~(3) The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is our nation’s conventional, joint, automated command and control (C2) system. GCCS supports the Joint Planning and Execution Community via the use of an integrated set of analytic tools, flexible data transfer, and robust communications capabilities. Although developed initially as a C2 system and not tailored to~~ The Federal Government relies primarily upon commercial providers for the communications required for national defense and crisis response. For this reason, the Communications Act of 1934 provides the President

1 with substantial authority during the entire range of military operations to regulate
2 and control virtually every form of telecommunications resource at the national and local
3 levels. Included within this authority are devices and stations for wire, radio, and
4 microwave transmissions. The Department of Homeland Security, the manager of the
5 National Communications System (NCS), monitors situations that could develop into
6 emergencies, provides recommendations for the use of resources, and maintains liaison
7 with commercial providers. In time of national emergency or war, the President may
8 invoke special war powers under Section 706 of the Communications Act (47 USC 606).
9 These powers **allow the President to take immediate measures to ensure the**
10 **continuous operation and security of telecommunications services** without
11 negotiations or the consent of those who are affected. Global Information Grid (GIG)
12 assets support the DOD. Other NCS assets support other departments and agencies of the
13 Federal Government. These other assets may be made available to DOD in crises and
14 war when the GIG capacity is exceeded. GIG supports the Joint Operation Planning and
15 Execution System that contains valuable information such as the TPFDD. The
16 mobilization planner may use this system to search for specific mobilization-related
17 information.~~the MSO's needs as a "planner's tool", the Joint Operation Planning and~~
18 ~~Execution System (JOPES) provides access to valuable information such as JOPES~~
19 ~~TPFDDs, the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), and unit structure data.~~
20 ~~GCCS has several report generation capabilities, including an ad hoc query feature, that~~
21 ~~the MSO can use to search for specific information needs. The GCCS links C2 from the~~
22 ~~NCA down to the joint task force and component commanders.~~

23

1 (4) The MSO monitors **situation reports (SITREPs) and other message**
2 **traffic** for actions or information with mobilization implications. Service MSOs have
3 information systems that they are able to review for the status of forces, mobilization,
4 deployment, redeployment, and demobilization.

5
6 c. Figure V-2 depicts ~~A~~ areas that are monitored. ~~monitored—force requirements,~~
7 ~~sourcing, mobilization execution, information and reporting requirements, and~~
8 ~~demobilization schedules (See Figure V-2)~~ These areas are discussed in the
9 ~~following~~preceding paragraphs.



11
12 **Figure V-2. Monitored Areas**
13

14 (1) **Monitor Force Requirements.** Since manpower requirements change

1 throughout the operation, force definition is a dynamic process that impacts the
2 mobilization system. The TPFDD transmits the supported ~~CINC's~~CCDR's requirements;
3 however, the supporting ~~CINC's~~CCDR's requirements go directly to the Services and are
4 not immediately available to the joint community. Service and ~~Joint Staff~~JS MSOs
5 monitor changes to assess the impact on mobilization and the influence on the sourcing
6 process. MSOs coordinate with ~~deliberate~~contingency planners in peacetime and with
7 operations personnel during a crisis to help identify requirements.

8


9 **(2) Monitor Sourcing.** MSOs monitor force assignments against requirements
10 to look for indications of mobilization problems such as difficulties with policies, unit
11 readiness, and unit structure that may hamper meeting the required delivery date. To help
12 identify these situations, MSOs use the ~~GCCS~~GIG to review unit TPFDD and the Status
13 of Resources and Training System (SORTS) data.

14

15 **(3) Monitor Mobilization Execution Status.** During execution, the MSO
16 monitors the mobilization process, identifies problems, and participates in their
17 resolution. Interfacing with mobilization community members, the MSO monitors and
18 manages the flow of personnel through the pipeline. The MSO compares mobilization
19 activities against the legal authorities invoked and monitors the duration of active duty,
20 the size of the callup, and the RC mix. Figure V-3 depicts a ~~way~~method to display and
21 analyze some of the data. The MSO works unresolved problems with
22 ~~USACOM~~USJFCOM, the requester, or the supporting ~~CINC~~CCDR. The ~~Joint Staff~~JS
23 MSO reviews the MOBREP submitted by the Services and SITREPs submitted by the

1 supported ~~CINCCDR~~ to identify manpower concerns, including mobilization
 2 requirements, shortfalls, and other callup contingencies.

3



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7 **(4) Determine Information Requirements and Assign Reporting**

8 **Requirements.** To obtain the right information, the ~~Joint Staff JS~~ MSO informs the
 9 ~~CINCCDRs~~, Services, and other ~~Joint Staff JS~~ sections of the format and frequency of
 10 special information requirements. The MSO coordinates with the following
 11 organizations.

12
 13 **(a)** Joint Staff ~~and/or~~ J-4 for RC logistics enabling capabilities, engineering
 14 support, medical professionals, and the status of -RC units that support USTRANSCOM.

1 | [USNORTHCOM](#), and ~~USACOM~~[USJFCOM](#). Coordination with the Services may also
2 | be required to determine the status of personnel mobilization in these skills. Services
3 | should also keep ~~CINCs~~[CCDRs](#) informed as to the status of their identified personnel
4 | mobilization requirements.

5 |
6 | [\(b\)](#) Other Joint Staff directorates such as J-1 for IMAs; Intelligence
7 | Directorate for RC intelligence; Operations Directorate (J-3) for RC special operations,
8 | civil affairs, and psychological operations; ~~Command, Control, Communications, and~~
9 | ~~Computer Systems Directorate~~[Communications Systems Directorate \(J-6\)](#) for RC
10 | communications capabilities.

11 |
12 | [\(c\)](#) Other governmental agencies with national security responsibilities
13 | such as the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Selective Service
14 | System, and ~~Federal Emergency Management Agency~~[FEMA](#).

15 |
16 | [\(5\)](#) Monitor Unit and Individual Demobilization Schedules. The Services are
17 | primarily responsible for establishing and tracking the RC forces' demobilization
18 | schedules. Service MSOs need to provide demobilization information to all affected
19 | commands for adequate planning and release of units. At all levels, MSOs should
20 | maintain their own schedules and monitor the Services to ensure consistency. The MSOs
21 | coordinate with operations personnel to provide adequate support for ongoing operations.
22 | Chapter VI, "Demobilization," covers the activities involved with demobilization.

23

1 **4. Reporting**

2

3 a. Reporting involves extracting information that is obtained from monitoring
4 activities; then, providing the data to appropriate organizations that are involved with
5 mobilization and demobilization. The MSO responds to formal and informal reporting
6 requirements. The formal requirements are those specified in statutes or directives such
7 as reporting to Congress, the ~~JS~~Joint Staff, or the Services. The following three formal
8 reports are generated: Appendix 5, [“Reserve Component Requirements Summary.”](#) to
9 Annex A, [“Task Organization.”](#) of each OPLAN which lists the total RC requirements;
10 the MOBREP; and during partial mobilization, the President’s report to Congress. Figure
11 V-4 illustrates the information flow for these reports. Informal or special case reporting
12 may be required in response to Congressional requests and queries. Future rotation plans,
13 mobilization capability or status requests, limitations on reservists, seasonal or personal
14 information, and redeployment and demobilization plans may be required to fulfill
15 informal or special case reporting requirements.

16




Figure V-4. Mobilization Reporting Information Flows

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b. Once the Services begin to order RC units and individuals to active duty, the joint reporting process, ~~described in Joint Pub 1-03, "Joint Reporting Structure (JRS)-General Instructions,"~~ begins. Joint reporting entails reporting on people and units. The MOBREP shows people available and/or mobilized. After direction from the Joint Staff, the Services daily (or as otherwise directed) submit the MOBREP to the Joint Staff, J-1, as described in CJCSM 3150.13(A), ~~"Joint Reporting Structure (JRS)- Personnel~~

1 | ~~Manual.~~ (formally Joint Pub 1-03.17). Units update the SORTS data base which is
2 | available for review through ~~GCCS~~GIG.

3 |
4 | c. The following four areas require reporting.

5 |
6 | **(1) Problems in Providing Forces.** The Services must notify the requester and
7 | the ~~Joint Staff~~JS if they are unable to provide RC forces by the specified dates. Then,
8 | the ~~Joint Staff~~JS can attempt to resolve the problem. This is not a formal report, but is
9 | required promptly to ensure expeditious resolution.

10 |
11 | **(2) RC Forces No Longer Required.** All organizations monitor their missions
12 | to determine when RC capabilities are no longer required or if it is feasible to provide
13 | other means of support. Organizations with releasable RC forces inform the appropriate
14 | Service; in turn, the Service coordinates with ~~USACOM~~USJFCOM/USSOCOM to
15 | ensure that the forces are not needed elsewhere.

16 |
17 | **(3) Mobilization Information to J-3 Director of Operations As Required.**
18 | The JS J-4 MSO coordinates with the J-3 briefing team to ascertain the information
19 | needed. The following types of information may be requested.

20 |
21 | **(a)** The total number of RC personnel mobilized and deployed for each
22 | ~~operation order~~OPORD being executed.

23 |



The Mobilization Staff Officers coordinate with operations personnel to provide adequate support for ongoing operations.

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5 **(b)** The number of RC personnel who are moving the force, assisting in
6 mobilization, deployment, and sustainment, and those backfilling positions split out by
7 CONUS ~~and~~/or OCONUS.

8

9 **(c)** A time-phased line graph that shows the status of RC mobilization,
10 which includes the SecDef ceilings and the number actually mobilized in relation to a ~~an~~
11 ~~unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins (C-D day).~~

12

13 **(4)** Demobilization Schedules. The Services are primarily responsible for the
14 execution of demobilization. According to the supported ~~CINCPAC~~ CCDR's priorities, the
15 Services will notify the organizations, who have RC forces assigned, of the planned
16 demobilization dates and the time the forces must be released for outprocessing and
17 transportation.

18

19 d. Presidential Reports to Congress

1

2 | (1) PSRC. Whenever the President authorizes the ~~Secretary of Defense~~ SecDef
3 | or the ~~Secretary of the Department of Transportation~~ SEC DHS to order any units or
4 | members of the selected and individual ready reserve to active duty under PSRC, a
5 | written report shall, within 24 hours after exercising such authority, be submitted to
6 | Congress setting forth the circumstances necessitating the action taken and describing the
7 | anticipated use of these units or members. This report will be drafted by the Joint Staff.
8 | The- Services and ~~CINCs~~ CCDRs will provide information as requested from the Joint
9 | Staff to aid in compiling this report.

10

11 | (2) Partial Mobilization. Title 10 USC, “Armed Forces,” Section 12302,
12 | “Ready Reserve,” (d), requires that once the President declares a national emergency and
13 | authorizes partial mobilization, this report must be submitted to Congress on the first day
14 | of the second fiscal year quarter in which the first unit is ordered to active duty, and on
15 | the first day of each 6-month period as long as the unit or units are on active duty. Figure
16 | V-5 shows the information required in the report.

17

INFORMATION REQUIRED BY CONGRESS FOR PARTIAL MOBILIZATION	
Information	Responsible Agency
Necessity to order or retain units on active duty	Supporting and supported CCDRs and the Services for Reserve Component units remaining under their control
A statement of the mission of the unit	Support CCDR
An evaluation of the unit's performance of that mission	CCDR and/or Services
Where each such unit is deployed at the time of the report. List areas to which deployed, such as CONUS or CCDR AOR.	CCDR and/or Services
Other information the President deems appropriate	As specified by the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
Legend AOR - area of responsibility, CCDR - combatant commander, CONUS - continental United States	

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Figure V-5. Information Required by Congress for Partial Mobilization

(a) **Provide Input For Report to Congress.** The Joint Staff J-3 tasks the Services to provide input data for this report. The tasking specifies the suspense dates, establishes the format, and includes requirements for any additional information that the President or ~~Secretary of Defense~~ SecDef wants to give to Congress. The Services and other organizations submit the information to the Joint Staff, J-4 MSO, who prepares the report.

(b) **Prepare the President's Report to Congress.** The ~~Joint Staff~~ JS, J-4 MSO staffs the report for the ~~Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff~~ CJCS. If delegated authority by the ~~Secretary of Defense~~ SecDef, the report shall be signed by the ~~Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff~~ CJCS. The report includes the following information:

1. CJCS memo to ~~Secretary of Defense~~ SecDef with enclosures (include copy of †Title 10 USC 12302 and any SecDef memo that delegated that

1 | authority);

2 | 2. Memo for the President;

3 |

4 | 3. Letter for the Speaker of the House;

5 |

6 | 4. Letter for the President of the Senate; ~~and~~

7 |

8 | 5. ~~CINCCDR~~, Military Departments and Coast Guard inputs (See

9 | Figure V-5).

CHAPTER VI

DEMOBILIZATION

“Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard stores at West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of a captain.”

Resolution of the Continental Congress
Disbanding the Continental Army,
2 June 1784

1. Purpose

This chapter describes the **MSO’s role in the demobilization process**. Only the manpower portion of the demobilization process is discussed. Chapter ~~IV~~VI of ~~Joint Pub~~JP 4-05, *“~~Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning,~~”* describes all facets of the demobilization process.

2. Background

a. RC units and individuals are released from active duty under the demobilization process. Although not as time-sensitive as mobilization, **demobilization is a complex operation that requires detailed planning and execution.**

b. Often considered only at the end of an operation, **demobilization may occur during an operation** for the following reasons — expiration of authorized service time;

1 changes in the forces required; or political emphasis to demobilize forces. Mobilization
2 and demobilization may occur simultaneously. Consequently, **each Service must ensure**
3 **that demobilization plans are flexible, consistent, responsive, and sufficiently**
4 **comprehensive to meet all contingencies.** From a joint military perspective,
5 demobilization plans should reflect the post-conflict missions of supported
6 commanders and be synchronized with plans for recovery, reconstitution, and
7 redeployment operations. DOD policies for the release of reservists and RC units
8 ordered to active duty should first reflect military requirements and then
9 considerations of equity and fairness for military personnel and their families.

10
11 c. Poorly planned and executed demobilization operations will have two major
12 impacts: **degradation to supported operations and reduced support for the RC**
13 **program.** Demobilization needs to be integrated into the redeployment. ~~Joint Pub~~JP 4-
14 05, ~~“Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning,”~~ states that “From a joint military
15 perspective, demobilization plans should reflect the postconflict missions of supported
16 commanders and be synchronized with plans for battlefield recovery and redeployment
17 operations.”

18
19 d. **Figure VI-1 shows the three primary groups of demobilization activities** —
20 preliminary actions, planning, and execution. Planning is divided further into plan
21 demobilization force and plan demobilization support. The remainder of the chapter
22 discusses these three activities.




Figure VI-1. Demobilization Activities

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e. A summary of these activities and the specific tasks the MSO accomplishes is found in Annex E, [“Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization,”](#) ~~efo~~ Appendix A, [“Mobilization Activity Summaries.”](#) This summary is a reference of the tasks that must be accomplished at each organizational level to avoid poorly planned and executed demobilization operations.

3. Preliminary Actions

Preliminary actions set the stage for planning and executing a successful demobilization. Primarily, it involves **establishing and disseminating broad guidance** that the mobilization community incorporates into mobilization plans.


a. **Establish Demobilization Concepts and Policies.** MSOs assist in selecting units for demobilization, defining the process, and integrating demobilization into the operation planning and execution system. **DODD 1235.10, “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserves,”** establishes demobilization policy. This directive states that “members of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty without their consent shall be retained on active duty no longer than absolutely necessary. They shall receive priority for redeployment from the area of operations over active component units, and be released from active duty as expeditiously as possible, consistent with operational requirements.” This directive includes the following additional policies:

1 | (1) Units activated as a unit should be demobilized as a unit;

2 |
3 | (2) Medically cleared personnel should be demobilized with their unit; and

4 |
5 | (3) To the extent feasible and consistent with operational requirements, follow-
6 | on missions should be assigned to active component forces rather than callup of
7 | demobilized RC units.

8 |
9 | Figure VI-2 gives examples of demobilization policy issues and Appendix D,
10 | “References,” lists other documents that provide mobilization guidance.




12 |
13 | **Figure VI-2. Demobilization Policy Issues**
14 |

15 | b. **Provide Input to the JSCP on RC Forces’ Demobilization.** MSOs address
16 | issues such as demobilization support requirements, assumptions on release of forces, RC
17 | support of redeployment operations, and times necessary to conduct demobilization.

1 Broad references to demobilization may be appropriate for inclusion in the JSCP while
2 more detailed assumptions and guidance should be included in [the classified document](#),
3 CJCSI 3110.13 [\(C\)](#), “*Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*
4 [\(U\)](#),” published subsequent to each JSCP.

6 4. Planning

8 **Demobilization planning** involves **reviewing policies** and **establishing procedures**
9 to demobilize. During this phase, planners determine operational support requirements
10 and identify the forces to demobilize and those to support the demobilization operations.
11 The planning function is divided into **two subactivities**: Plan Demobilization Force and
12 Plan Demobilization Support (See Figure VI-3).



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Figure VI-3. Demobilization Planning Functions

17 a. **Plan Demobilization Force.** This activity establishes the **criteria for selecting**

1 | **forces** for demobilization, selecting units, and developing a time-phased schedule. This
2 | is essentially the same thought process followed during execution. **Tasks in planning**
3 | **the demobilization force include the following.**

4 |
5 | **(1) Provide Guidance.** The supported [CINCCDR](#), supporting [CINCsCCDRs](#),
6 | and Services make the decision to release units and individuals for demobilization.
7 | Coordinating with the Services, the MSOs develop recommendations and publish
8 | guidance for selecting and approving units for release. Current DOD policy gives
9 | priority to RC units for redeployment based upon operational constraints. However, each
10 | situation is different and decisions must be made to ensure equity.

11 |
12 | **(2) Determine Redeployment and Demobilization Strategy.** The Services
13 | develop broad concepts for demobilization that are the basis for subsequent detailed
14 | planning. These areas include ports, demobilization stations, equipment return policies,
15 | medical processing and follow-up, personnel support requirements, and equipment
16 | disposition.

17 |
18 | **(a) MSOs must consider carefully those functional areas where most, if**
19 | **not all, of the capability is in the RC.** If additional units must be mobilized, shortages
20 | of the capability could exist. For example, units may not be available to provide a
21 | rotational base in the functional area; in that case, with the onset of another operation, the
22 | RC may not be able to support both contingencies.

23 |

1 | **(b) Equipment retrograde has manpower implications.** Equipment may be
2 | returned from the mission location directly to the unit or may be sent to a processing
3 | center for refurbishment. Sometimes equipment may remain in the theater or be
4 | transferred to other nations. These considerations may cause personnel from
5 | demobilizing units to stay behind to process the equipment. The MSOs must incorporate
6 | these decisions into demobilization plans.

7 |
8 | **(c) Recovery activities must also be planned along with demobilization.**
9 | These include activities for restoring force readiness (reset/reconstitution) and controlling
10 | the rate of industrial base conversion to avoid disrupting the national economy. As
11 | manpower is being released from the Services and industrial production is being cut back,
12 | the Services must retain or replace skilled manpower required to restore readiness and
13 | replenish war reserves and other stocks to be prepared for the next crisis. Recovery
14 | planning includes such activities as:

15 |
16 | 1. Rebuilding of major equipment items.

17 |
18 | 2. Restoring personnel strength and training readiness to required wartime
19 | levels for future contingencies.

20 |
21 | 3. Restoring war reserve stocks to acceptable levels.

22 |
23 | 4. Maintaining essential industrial surge and expansion capabilities.

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5. Finalizing recovery of redeployed equipment returned to CONUS or addressing shortage created by stay behind equipment requirements.

6. Terminating war-related contracts for the convenience of the government.

7. Reestablishing contracts at garrison or home base as troops return.



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Equipment retrograde considerations may cause personnel from demobilizing units to stay behind to process the equipment.

1 | **(3) Develop Tentative Demobilization Schedule.** The Services create a
2 | tentative demobilization schedule based on the assumed level of mobilization. This
3 | schedule is used to develop more detailed plans and to estimate resource requirements.
4 | Likewise, the commands where the RC forces will be assigned develop schedules to
5 | determine support requirements and to ensure the continuation of specific capabilities.
6 | MSOs must ascertain if replacement units are required; if they are, the MSOs then
7 | coordinate with force planners to schedule the overlap with the replacement units.

8 |

9 | **b. Plan Demobilization Support.** In this second subactivity the MSOs consider the
10 | specific forces, such as medical, logistics, and transportation, needed to **support**
11 | **demobilization**; also, they develop more detailed demobilization procedures. During this
12 | effort, the MSOs must address the following support issues: backfill, ports,
13 | demobilization stations, equipment retrograde, processing, and redistribution,
14 | outprocessing procedures, and leave policies. **The demobilization support tasks are as**
15 | **follows.**

16 |

17 | **(1) Determine Redeployment Support Requirements.** Having determined
18 | the RC forces required to support the redeployment of units and individuals, supported
19 | ~~CINCs~~ CCDRs coordinate with force planners to incorporate these additional
20 | requirements into the TPFDD. Other organizations coordinate their requirements with
21 | the Services.

22 |

1 | **(2) Determine Required Outprocessing.** The Service MSOs allot the time
2 | and resources necessary for personnel, finance, and medical processing accomplished at
3 | the transportation hubs and demobilization stations. They ensure that these factors are
4 | integrated into planned movement schedules and that organizations with RC forces are
5 | given the information. The Service MSOs also plan for the homecoming support and
6 | ceremonies.

7 |
8 | **(3) Determine, Source, and Approve Forces Needed to Support**
9 | **Demobilization.** The Services and ~~CINCs~~CCDRs develop and source the additional
10 | manpower needed to support the redeployment; to backfill for departing units; and to
11 | support homecoming activities within CONUS. After the Services approve the additional
12 | requirements, these must be integrated with all other mobilization resources to ensure that
13 | ceilings are not violated.

14 |
15 | **5. Execution**

16 |
17 | a. Before demobilization is executed, **MSOs must ensure that a unit or**
18 | **individual will not be needed for the operation.** Politically, recall of units once
19 | demobilized will be difficult to justify; therefore, **the Services should be conservative in**
20 | **releasing forces**, especially if they involve unique units or skills. In assessing the
21 | continuing need for the RC forces, the MSOs must consider the entire DOD response,
22 | since a RC unit not needed by one component may be useful to another organization.

23 |

1 | b. During execution, **MSOs constantly tailor the demobilization operation**
2 | **envisioned in the plan to the evolving situation.** They staff recommendations and
3 | obtain decisions regarding units and individuals to be demobilized and adapt the
4 | demobilization support structure.

6 | c. **MSOs participate in the following execution tasks.**

8 | **(1) Educate the Leadership.** Provide the decision makers with information on
9 | demobilization plans and policies, including the schedule of units to be demobilized and
10 | those already demobilized. When staffing demobilization recommendations, the MSOs
11 | ensure that both public and congressional affairs are included in the actions. The MSOs
12 | should alert their leadership that RC callups may continue through all phases of an
13 | operation to provide an evolving logistics operations support system which must continue
14 | after the combat or crisis phase is complete. It is particularly important to ensure that the
15 | leadership does not prematurely recommend to end the emergency which may provide
16 | the legal basis for the mobilization of needed RC forces.

17



The Services are primarily responsible for the execution of demobilization.

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(2) Review and Modify Demobilization Concepts and Support Plans. The MSOs need to update the existing demobilization plan, created in the planning environment, to ensure that the demobilization concepts, policies, and supporting plans are accurate and reflect actual circumstances. They staff the demobilization plans with the appropriate organizations to verify that the users understand the demobilization concept and to enable them to modify their plans and operations.



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The supported combatant commander must notify the Services, Joint Staff, and supporting combatant commanders when units or individuals are no longer required.

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(3) Monitor Changing Requirements and Theater Backfill Requirements. Since demobilization is a fluid situation, the MSOs continue to review changing operational requirements which may result in units being demobilized or extended. The supported [CINCCDR](#) must notify the Services, [Joint Staff JS](#), and supporting [CINCs](#) [CCDRs](#) when units or individuals are no longer required or when it is feasible to use alternative manpower sources. If the requirement continues to exist, the appropriate

1 Services, supported ~~CINCCDR~~, and supporting ~~CINCs~~CCDRs must request authority
2 to extend the active duty period or obtain rotational units for replacement.

3
4 **(4) Seek Demobilization Approval.** The supported ~~CINCCDR~~ identifies
5 units and individuals no longer required to support operations in the redeployment plan.
6 Based on the redeployment plan, each Service will develop a demobilization list which is
7 then disseminated within the Service for action. Authority to approve the demobilization
8 list will depend on the Service and the particular operation that may be delegated.

9
10 **(5) Develop Demobilization Schedule.** Working closely with the affected
11 organizations and USTRANSCOM, the Services create a demobilization schedule. The
12 schedule includes forces to be demobilized, specific demobilization times, and projected
13 release dates from theater, ports, and demobilization stations. When the schedule is
14 complete, the Services ensure that organizations with RC forces review the schedule and
15 update their supporting plans.

16
17 **(6) Monitor RC Mobilizations and Demobilizations.** The MSOs start
18 monitoring and reporting on RC units from the beginning of mobilization and these
19 activities continue through demobilization. This tracking is necessary to obtain
20 information to keep the leadership and Congress apprised of RC actions during the
21 operation. Chapter V, "Monitoring and Reporting," covers this function in detail ~~Joint~~
22 ~~Staff, Services~~.

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1 | **(7) Highlight Critical Support Issues in SITREPs and Other Forums.**

2 | Using the SITREPs, other JOPES reports, and special functional reports or news groups,
3 | the MSO presents conflicts and critical issues to the leadership and the appropriate
4 | organization. The MSOs' early action enables the responsible individuals and commands
5 | to resolve issues expeditiously before they become roadblocks to further activities.

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7 | **(8) Terminate Legal Authorities.** Once RC forces are no longer on active

8 | duty in support of the operation, the ~~Joint Staff~~ JS informs the SecDef that there is no
9 | longer a need for RC forces in support of the operation. The ~~Secretary of Defense~~
10 | SecDef may terminate the authorization to order RC forces to active duty (if such
11 | authorization was granted or delegated to the ~~Secretary of Defense~~ SecDef), direct the
12 | Services to terminate the order to activate RC forces, or inform the President so that the
13 | Presidential authorization may be withdrawn. This authority automatically is terminated
14 | if the President or Congress retracts the original declaration of national emergency. The
15 | same legislation that authorizes mobilization implements certain emergency authorities
16 | and capabilities. These depend upon the original mobilization authority continuing for
17 | their enforcement. Examples of this legislation include those which suspend certain laws
18 | pertaining to the promotion, separation, and retirement of active duty personnel (stop
19 | loss) and the suspension of Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations.
20 | Until the need for supporting or related authorities is eliminated, planners should urge the
21 | ~~Secretary of Defense~~ SecDef, through the ~~Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff~~ CJCS, not
22 | to rescind the order or declaration authorizing the callup.

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APPENDIX A

MOBILIZATION ACTIVITY SUMMARIES

- Annex A Chapter II Activity Summary: Planning
- [Annex B](#) Chapter III Activity Summary: [Reserve Component](#) Callup
Decision Making
- [Annex C](#) Chapter IV Activity Summary: ~~Execution~~[Mobilization](#)
- [Annex D](#) Chapter V Activity Summary: Monitoring and Reporting
- [Annex E](#) Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization

MOBILIZATION ACTIVITY SUMMARIES

This appendix contains annexes with activity summaries corresponding to related chapters in the guide. These summaries show subordinate activities, tasks, and responsible organizations for the mobilization subprocess discussed in that chapter. Use these summaries to review required tasks. ~~Refer to the specific chapter for details on how to accomplish the tasks. The annexes are:~~

~~• Chapter II Activity Summary: Planning (Annex A);~~

~~• Chapter III Activity Summary: RC Callup Decision Making (Annex B);~~

~~• Chapter IV Activity Summary: Execution (Annex C);~~

~~• Chapter V Activity Summary: Monitoring and Reporting (Annex D); and~~

~~• Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization (Annex E).~~

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A

CHAPTER II ACTIVITY SUMMARY: PLANNING

CHAPTER II ACTIVITY SUMMARY: PLANNING				
Mobilization Planning Community	Develop Concept	Develop Plan	Develop Supporting Plan	Analyses
Common Activities (For all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provide pre-planning input ● Provide CCDR strategic concept feedback ● Plan participation 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Determine levels of mobilization necessary to support projected RC force requirements ● Answer questions on the justification of RC callups ● Validate or refute defense planning guidance and/or JSCP planning assumptions
Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Confirm tasking for RC requirements summary 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Review completed Appendix 5, Annex A for complete operation plan and most probable FDO
Service		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Source specific RC units 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Requirements for complete operation plan and most probable FDO: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● RC in AOR ● RC unit personnel in TPFDD ● RC non-unit personnel in TPFDD ● Move the Force, Assist Mobilization, Deployment, and/or Sustainment ● Backfill 	
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Draft, coordinate and issue the TPFDD LOI 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Comply with requirement for completion of Appendix 5, Annex A to operation plan ● FDO determination 	
Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components JTF			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Requirements for complete operation plan and most probable FDO: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Move the Force ● Assist Mobilization, Deployment, and/or Sustainment ● Backfill 	
<p>Appendix 5 - Reserve Component Requirements Summary, Annex A - Task Organization, CCDR - combatant commander, FDO - flexible deterrent option, JSCP - Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, JTF - joint task force, LOI - letter of instruction, OPLAN - operation plan, RC - Reserve Component, TPFDD - time-phased force and deployment data, USTRANSCOM - United States Transportation Command</p>				

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Figure A-A-1. Chapter II Activity Summary: Planning

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A

CHAPTER III ACTIVITY SUMMARY:

RESERVE COMPONENT CALLUP DECISION MAKING

CHAPTER III ACTIVITY SUMMARY: RESERVE COMPONENT CALL-UP DECISION MAKING							
Mobilization Planning Community	Pre-Mobilization Review and Coordination	Educate Senior Leadership on RC Potential	Interpret Policies for Use of Reserve Components	Confirm Pre-planned Mobilization Capabilities	Recommend Changes in Peacetime Budgeting Priorities	Modify Demobilization Policy to Suit Contingency	Prepare Decision Packages
Common Activities (For all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify POC network Convene preliminary meetings focused on “what if” questions using current information Analyze lessons learned from similar crises Consider potential supporting requirements Manage media relations and coordinate with public affairs officer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct meetings and/or briefings on RC mobilization policies: availability, mobilization and deployment criteria, callup procedures, and the different categories of RC and their potential use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review and modify callup instructions and procedures Recommend modifications and exceptions to policy Coordinate with legal counsel Review JAG policies and/or procedures for “conscientious objectors” and Soldiers and Sailors Act 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Estimate ability of mobilization activities to meet plan schedule Identify capability shortfalls 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review unfunded mobilization requirements Coordinate with resource area proponents for adjustments to internal funding priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initiate planning for the return of RC to civilian status 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Respond to information requests as appropriate
Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Become familiar with RC Callup procedures Review Appendix 5, Annex A, of operation plan Be prepared to recommend level of callup 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review legal authorities in 10 USC Review mobilization plans, policies, and procedures Brief leadership on callup authorities and specific qualities of Reserve Components 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify opportunities for joint use of Service mobilization assets Monitor the development of RC deployment criteria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Confirm monitoring and reporting systems: coordinate reporting requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seek opportunities for cross-Service utilization of RC assets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seek opportunities for cross-Service utilization of RC demobilization facilities and assets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare Draft Decision Package Staff Draft Decision Package with Services Forward Package to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

JAG - Judge Advocate General, POC - point of contract, USC - United States Code, Appendix 5 - Reserve Component Requirements Summary, Annex A - Task Organization

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Figure A-B-1. Chapter III Activity Summary: Reserve Component Callup Decision Making

CHAPTER III ACTIVITY SUMMARY: RESERVE COMPONENT CALL-UP DECISION MAKING (cont'd)							
Mobilization Planning Community	Pre-Mobilization Review and Coordination	Educate Senior Leadership on RC Potential	Interpret Policies for Use of Reserve Components	Confirm Pre-planned Mobilization Capabilities	Recommend Changes in Peacetime Budgeting Priorities	Modify Demobilization Policy to Suit Contingency	Prepare Decision Packages
Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review monitoring and reporting requirements Consider sources of immediate manpower augmentation Start planning for demobilization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review Service mobilization doctrine for unit and individual callup Review civilian mobilization plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop deployment criteria consistent with the needs of the CCDR Review Service Readiness Processing policies Validate policies for use of civilians, contractors, and other non-DOD agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Validate projected RC requirements in Appendix 5, Annex A, of OPLAN within DOD guidance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate with program assessment and budget office to raise visibility of unfunded mobilization requirements Recommend changes to eliminate shortages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine redeployment criteria for RC unit equipment and personnel Coordinate with National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate on Draft Decision Package
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure RC OPLAN support requirements are projected 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure theater-unique requirements are known to force providers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review mobilization doctrine and policy Brief command on RC capabilities and limitations to support plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Validate projected RC requirements in Appendix 5, Annex A, of OPLAN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support efforts to adjust funding priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop redeployment priorities and schedule 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate on Draft Decision Package
Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components Joint Task Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review RC requirements projected by CCDR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review RC requirements to move force, backfill displaced units, and assist in the mobilization and deployment process Brief leadership on RC mobilization doctrine 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review mobilization doctrine and policy Brief command on RC capabilities and limitations to support plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Validate projected RC requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support efforts to adjust funding priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review demobilization doctrine Support redeployment and/or demobilization operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate on Draft Decision Package Begin to evaluate need for subsequent RC augmentation

CCDR - combatant commander, DOD - Department of Defense, OPLAN - operation plan, RC - Reserve Component, USTRANSCOM - United Transportation Command, Appendix 5 - Reserve Component Requirements Summary, Annex A - Task Organization

Figure A-B-1. Chapter III Activity Summary: Reserve Component Callup Decision Making (cont'd)

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ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A

CHAPTER IV ACTIVITY SUMMARY: ~~EXECUTION~~ MOBILIZATION

CHAPTER IV ACTIVITY SUMMARY: MOBILIZATION	
Mobilization Planning Community	Execution
Common Activities (For all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Coordinate with public affairs officer ● Monitor unit and individual mobilization schedules ● Review missions needed to be supported to ensure all requirements have been met
Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Monitor force requirements ● Coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance
Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance ● Monitor and adjust callup procedures for individuals ● Manage the callup against ceilings ● Ensure that TPFDD is updated as combatant commander requirements change ● Notify Congressional Delegations for callup prior to public affairs announcement
Supported Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Ensure theater-unique requirements that impact upon the Reserve Component (RC) are known to force providers ● Ensure that TPFDD is updated as requirements change
Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components Joint Task Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Ensure that TPFDD is updated as requirements change ● Ensure unique requirements that impact upon the RC are known to force providers
USTRANSCOM - <i>United States Transportation Command</i> , TPFDD - <i>time-phased force and deployment data</i>	

Figure A-C-1. Chapter IV Activity Summary: Mobilization

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ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A

CHAPTER V ACTIVITY SUMMARY: MONITORING AND REPORTING

CHAPTER V ACTIVITY SUMMARY: MONITORING AND REPORTING		
Mobilization Planning Community	Monitoring	Reporting
Common Activities (For all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Monitor the status of mobilization ● Monitor unit and individual demobilization schedules 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Gather information to respond to various requests ● Report Reserve Component (RC) forces no longer needed
Joint Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Monitor force requirements ● Determine any special information requirements and assign reporting requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Direct Services provide input for Report to Congress (partial mobilization) ● Prepare Report to Congress ● Provide mobilization information as required ● Review military manpower mobilization and accession status report (MOBREP)
Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Monitor force requirements ● Monitor sourcing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Enter data into RC Apportionment tables ● Submit MOBREP to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ● Report on problems in providing forces ● Submit input data to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Presidential Report to Congress
Supported Command		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Enter data into RC Apportionment tables
Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components Joint Task Force		
USTRANSCOM - United States Transportation Command		

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Figure A-D-1. Chapter V Activity Summary: Monitoring and Reporting

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ANNEX E TO APPENDIX A

CHAPTER VI ACTIVITY SUMMARY: DEMOBILIZATION

CHAPTER VI ACTIVITY SUMMARY: DEMOBILIZATION				
Mobilization Planning Community	Preliminary Actions	Planning		Execution
		Plan Demobilization Force	Plan Demobilization Support	
Common Activities (For all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish demobilization concepts and policies Provide input to the JSCP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide guidance 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Educate the leadership Review and modify demobilization concepts and support plans
Joint Staff				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor RC mobilizations and demobilizations Validate support and rotational requirements Resolve any conflicts in resource alignment Propose that the SecDef rescind legal authorities
Service		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine redeployment and demobilization strategy Develop demobilization schedule 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine required outprocessing Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor RC mobilizations and demobilizations Monitor changing requirements and theater backfill requirements Execute demobilization schedule Estimate and source support and rotational requirements Seek demobilization approval Solve or adjudicate conflicting resource claims
Supported Command		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop tentative demobilization schedule 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine redeployment support requirements Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Offer candidates for demobilization Estimate and source support and rotational requirements Highlight critical support issues in SITREPs
Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands USTRANSCOM Components Joint Task Force		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop tentative demobilization schedule 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine redeployment support requirements Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Offer candidates for demobilization Estimate and source support and rotational requirements Highlight critical support issues in SITREPs
<p>JSCP - Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, SecDef - Secretary of Defense, RC - Reserve Component, SecDef - Secretary of Defense, SITREP - situation report, USTRANSCOM - United States Transportation Command</p>				

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Figure A-E-1. Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization

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APPENDIX B

LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY FOR MOBILIZATION

Figure B-1 describes the legal authorities that are available for execution of mobilization actions. ~~Selective mobilization, Volunteer order to active duty~~ Presidential ~~Selected~~ Reserve Callup, partial mobilization authority, ~~and full or total~~ mobilization authority, active duty retiree recall, Retired Reserve recall, recall of Standby Reserve, call to active duty of delayed entry program personnel, and stop-loss authority, are described and the ~~actions required to obtain them, and the~~ authority to obtain them is identified.

<u>LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY FOR MOBILIZATION</u>		
<u>ACTIVATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>
<u>Voluntary Order to Active Duty (AD)</u>	<p><u>The Service Secretaries may order any member of the Reserve Component (RC), under their jurisdiction, to AD duty with the consent of the member also requires consent of the State Governor) at any time.</u></p> <p><u>Funding is the limiting factor for the use of this authority. Tours exceeding 179 days are accountable against AD end strength. By DOD policy, AD for special work tours, normally are limited to 139 days, or less, in one fiscal year. Exceptions to the 139-day limit may be granted on an individual basis for specific mission requirements.</u></p>	<p><u>Title 32</u> <u>10 United States Code (USC)</u> <u>12301(d)</u></p> <p><u>10 USC 115</u></p>

Figure B-1. Legal Authorities and Department of Defense Policy for Mobilization

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<u>LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY FOR MOBILIZATION (cont'd)</u>		
<u>ACTIVATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>
<u>Voluntary Order to Active Duty (AD) (cont'd)</u>	<u>Short breaks in tours (i.e., 30 days or less) to circumvent the 179-day limit are not authorized. The Service Secretaries have issued additional Service-specific guidance in the implementation of this policy.</u>	<u>DODD 1215.6</u>
<u>Presidential Reserve Callup</u>	<u>The President may activate up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve without their consent (of whom not more than 30,000 may be IRR) for periods of up to 270 days when it is determined necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission.</u> <u>With the passage of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 this section was amended to authorize the use of Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members for operations other than war or national emergency.</u>	<u>10 USC 12304</u> <u>50 USC 2302(1) Public Law 107-312, 2 December 2002,</u>
<u>Partial Mobilization Authority</u>	<u>Following a Presidential declaration of national emergency, the President may order to AD (other than for training) up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve, without their consent, for a period not to exceed 24 consecutive months.</u>	<u>10 USC 12302</u>
<u>Full Mobilization Authority</u>	<u>The President, upon a congressional declaration of national emergency or war may authorize the Service Secretaries, or their designees, to order to AD any member of the RC, without their consent, for the duration of the emergency or war plus six months. Members in inactive or retired status are not recallable under this provision without the approval of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).</u>	<u>10 USC 12301(a)</u>

Figure B-1. Legal Authorities and Department of Defense Policy for Mobilization (cont'd)

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<u>LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY FOR MOBILIZATION (cont'd)</u>		
<u>ACTIVATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>
<u>Active Duty Retiree Recall</u>	<u>The Service Secretaries are authorized, at any time, to recall (without their consent) retired members of the AD, members of the Retired Reserve who were retired under 10 USC or members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Reserve (this includes reserve members who retired from AD with less than 20 years under Temporary Early Retirement Authority). This authorization does not require a declaration of national emergency or war.</u>	<u>AD</u> <u>10 USC 688</u> <u>RC</u> <u>10 USC 1293</u> <u>10 USC, 3911</u> <u>10 USC 3914</u> <u>10 USC 6323</u> <u>10 USC 8911</u> <u>10 USC 8914</u>
<u>Retired Reserve Recall</u>	<u>Reserve members in a retired status (other than those who fall under the provisions of AD Retiree Recall described above) may be recalled involuntarily to AD only in time of war or national emergency as declared by the Congress. This authority requires that the Service Secretaries, with the approval of SecDef, first determine that there are not enough qualified reservists, available in the required categories, to fill the required billets.</u>	<u>10 USC 12301(a)</u>
<u>Recall of the Standby Reserve</u>	<u>Units and members in the Standby Reserve may be ordered to AD (other than for training) only as provided in 10 USC 12301(a) and 12306. In addition, this authority requires that the Service Secretaries first determine that there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve in the required categories who are readily available.</u>	<u>10 USC 12301(a)</u> <u>10 USC 12306</u>
<u>Call to Active Duty of Delayed Entry Program Personnel</u>	<u>Qualified personnel with no prior military service may be enlisted as untrained members of the IRR for up to 365 days before reporting for AD. All such persons may be ordered to AD under all provisions of the law and regulations applying to the IRR.</u>	<u>10 USC 513</u>

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Figure B-1. Legal Authorities and Department of Defense Policy for Mobilization (cont'd)

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<u>LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY FOR MOBILIZATION (cont'd)</u>		
<u>ACTIVATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>
<u>Stop-Loss Authority</u>	<u>This authority stops normal attrition of experienced military personnel through expiration of enlistments, retirements, and other routine releases from AD. With this authority, during any period RC members have been involuntarily ordered to AD, the President may suspend any provision of law relating to retirement, promotion, separation of military personnel determined to be essential to the national security.</u>	<u>10 USC 12305</u>

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Figure B-1. Legal Authorities and Department of Defense Policy for Mobilization (cont'd)

APPENDIX C

LEVELS OF MOBILIZATION

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1. This appendix addresses the levels of mobilization available to support operations. Figure C-1 summarizes the levels, the number of forces authorized for mobilization, the duration of active duty, and the applicable sections of the US Code.

2. The level of mobilization required to support an operation depends on a number of the following factors:

a. Size of the operation;

b. Duration of the operation;

c. AC and/or RC mix of required forces;

d. Quantity of forces required from the RC; and

e. Location of forces in the RC.




Figure C-1. Levels of Mobilization

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APPENDIX D

REFERENCES

The development of Joint Pub 4-05.1 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Legal Authorities

a. The Constitution of the United States of America.

b. United States Code:

(1) Title 3, *“The President.”*

(2) Title 10, *“Armed Forces.”*

(3) Title 14, *“Coast Guard.”*

(4) Title 32, *“National Guard.”*

(5) Title 37, *“Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services.”*

(6) Title 42, Chapter 6A, *Public Health Services.*

1 | (7) Title 50, *“War and National Defense.”*
2 |

3 | **2. ~~DOD~~ Department of Defense Directives and Instructions**
4 |

5 | a. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
6 |

7 | b. DOD 3020.36-P, *“Master Mobilization Plan.”*
8 |

9 | c. DODD 1215.6, *Uniform Reserve Training and Retirement Categories.*
10 |

11 | d. DODD 1235.9, *Management and Mobilization of the Standby Reserve.*
12 |

13 | e. DODD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready*
14 | *Reserves.”*

15 |

16 | f. DODD 1235.11, *Management of Individual Mobilization Augmentees.*
17 |

18 | g. DODD 1235.13, *Management of Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive*
19 | *National Guard.*
20 |

21 | h. DODD 1250.1, *National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and*
22 | *Reserves (NCESGR)*
23 |

1 ~~· DODD 1400.31, “DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency~~
2 ~~Planning and Execution.”~~

3 ~~— e. DODD 1400.32, “DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency~~
4 ~~Planning Guidelines and Procedures.”~~

6 i. DODD 5158.4, “United States Transportation Command.”

8 h. DODI 1100.19G, “Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning Policies and
9 Procedures.”

11 h. DODI 1235.12, “Accessing the Ready Reserves.”

13 **3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions**

15 ~~— a. Contingency Planning Guidance.~~

17 ~~— b. CJCSI 3110.03, “Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”~~

19 ~~— c. CJCSI 3110.06, “Special Operations Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities~~
20 ~~Plan.”~~

22 ~~— d. CJCSI 3110.11B, “Mobility Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”~~

1 ~~e. CJCSI 3110.12, “Civil Affairs Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities~~
2 ~~Plan.”~~

3
4 a. CJCSI 3100.01A, Joint Strategic planning System.

5
6 b. CJCSI 3110.13, (C), “Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities
7 ~~Plan.” (U).~~

8
9 **4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals.**

10 a. CJCSM 3122.02C, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)
11 Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and
12 Deployment Execution).”

13
14 b. CJCSM 3122.03A, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II,
15 ~~(Planning Formats and Guidance).”~~

16
17 c. CJCSM 3150.13, “Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) Personnel Manual,” (formerly
18 ~~Joint Pub 1-03.17).~~

19
20 **5. Joint Publications**

21
22 ~~j. Joint Pub 1-03, “Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions.”~~
23

1 | [a.](#) Joint Pub 3-05, *“~~Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.~~”*

2

3 | [b.](#) Joint Pub 3-57, *“~~Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.~~”*

4

5 | [c.](#) Joint Pub 4-0, *“~~Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.~~”*

6

7 | ~~Joint Pub 4-01.1, “*Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to*~~
8 | ~~*Joint Operations.*”~~

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10 | [d.](#) Joint Pub 4-01.2, ~~“*Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for*~~ *Sealift Support*
11 | *to Joint Operations.*”

12

13 | ~~Joint Pub 4-01.3, “*Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement*~~
14 | ~~*Control.*”~~ Joint Pub 4-02, ~~“*Doctrine for*~~ *Health Service Support in Joint Operations.*”

15

16 | [f.](#) Joint Pub 4-05, ~~“*Joint Doctrine for*~~ *Joint Mobilization Planning.*”

17

18 | ~~Joint Pub 5-00.2~~ [JP 3-33](#), ~~“*Joint Task Force*~~ *Planning Guidance and*
19 | ~~*Procedures*~~ [Headquarters.](#)”

20

21 | ~~Joint Pub 5-03.1, “*Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I:*~~
22 | ~~*(Planning Policies and Procedures)*~~ [JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning.*”](#)

23

1 | **6. Other Joint and National Publications**

2

3 | a. *Joint Military Net Assessment.*

4

5 | b. *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.*

6

7 | c. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America.*

8

9 | **6. Service Publications**

10

11 | a. *Air Force War and Mobilization Plan.*

12

13 | b. *Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System.*

14

15 | c. Army, FM 100-17, *“Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.”*

16

17 | d. *Coast Guard Manpower Mobilization and Support Plan.*

18

19 | e. ~~*Marine Corps Capabilities Plan.*~~ MCO, 19, *United States Marine Corps Total*

20 | *Force Mobilization, Activation, Integration and Deactivation Plan..*

21

22 | g. *Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan.*

APPENDIX E

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

~~Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the United States Atlantic Command Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.~~

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4), [Joint Staff](#).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 4-05.1, 11 November 1998, “Manpower

1 | [Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component \(RC\) Callup.](#)

2

3 | **4. Change Recommendations**

4

5 | a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

6

7 | TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4/

8 | INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDET//

9

10 | Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting
11 | Center, Doctrine Group and info the Director for Operational Plans and ~~Interoperability~~
12 | Joint Force Development (J-7), JDDJ-7/JEDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington,
13 | ~~DC 20318-7000~~ via the CJCS JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>.

14

15 | b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint
16 | Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this
17 | publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an
18 | enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested
19 | to notify the ~~Director, Joint Staff/J-7, Joint Staff,~~ when changes to source documents
20 | reflected in this publication are initiated.

21

22 | c. Record of Changes:

23

1	CHANGE	COPY	DATE OF	DATE	POSTED	
2	NUMBER	NUMBER	CHANGE	ENTERED	BY	REMARKS
3						
4						
5						
6						

8 | **5. Distribution of Printed Publications**

- 9
- 10 | a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication
- 11 | centers [listed below \(initial contact\) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint](#)
- 12 | [publication is not available from the Service.](#)
- 13
- 14 | b. ~~Only approved pub~~[joint publications and test pub](#)~~spublications are releasable outside~~
- 15 | ~~the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint~~
- 16 | ~~publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the~~
- 17 | ~~local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSSPO-FL,~~
- 18 | ~~Room 1A6741E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. Individuals~~
- 19 | [and agencies outside the combatant commands, Services, Joint Staff, and combat support](#)
- 20 | [agencies are authorized to receive only approved joint publications and joint test](#)
- 21 | [publications. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign](#)
- 22 | [nationals must be requested through the local embassy \(Defense Attaché Office\) to DIA](#)
- 23 | [Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC](#)
- 24 | [20301-7400.](#)
- 25

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c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1988~~1999~~, *“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”*

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL
1655 Woodson Road
Attn: Joint Publications
St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

~~Navy:—Distribution of unclassified new and newly revised joint publications will be limited to providing to US Navy commands the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) CD-ROM and download from the Joint Doctrine Internet Homepage (e.g., www.dtic.mil/doctrine). (Individual commands will then be able to print copies as needed for training and operations. Hardcopy distribution of classified joint pubs will continue.)~~

1 Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point

2 700 Robbins Avenue

3 Bldg 1, Customer Service

4 Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

5

6 Marine Corps: ~~Marine Corps Logistics Base~~ Commander (Attn: Publications)

7 814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321

8 Albany, GA 31704-5000

9

10 Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD), US Coast Guard

11 2100 2nd Street, SW

12 Washington, DC 20593-0001

13

14 Commander

15 USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102

16 Joint Doctrine Group (Publication Distribution)

17 116 Lake View Parkway

18 Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

19

20 d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is

21 unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint

22 publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security

23 Program.

1 **6. Distribution of Electronic Publications**

2
3 a. The Joint Staff will not print copies of electronic joint publications for distribution.

4 Electronic versions are available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET), or

5 <http://nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/dj9j7ead/doctrine/> (SIPRNET).

6
7 b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the

8 combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint

9 publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the

10 local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room

11 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

12

13

GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

1		
2		
3		
4	AC	Active eComponent
5	<u>AD</u>	<u>active duty</u>
6	<u>AGR</u>	<u>Active Guard and Reserve</u>
7	AMC	Air Mobility Command
8	AOR	area of responsibility
9		
10	C2	command and control
11	CAP	crisis action planning
12	<u>CCDR</u>	<u>combatant commander</u>
13	CINC	commander in chief
14	CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
15	CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
16	CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
17	COA	course of action
18	CONUS	continental United States
19	<u>CS</u>	<u>combat support</u>
20	<u>CSS</u>	<u>combat service support</u>
21		
22	<u>DHS</u>	<u>Department of Homeland Security</u>
23	DOD	Department of Defense

1	DODD	Department of Defense Directive
2	DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
3		
4	EO	executive order
5		
6	FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
7	FDO	flexible deterrent option
8	GIG	Global Information Grid
9	GCCS	Global Command and Control System
10		
11	IMA	individual mobilization augmentee
12	ING	Inactive National Guard
13	IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
14		
15	J-1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a joint staff
16	J-3	Operations Directorate of a joint staff
17	J-4	Logistics Directorate of a joint staff
18	JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
19	JP	joint publication
20	JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
21		
22	LOI	letter of instruction
23		

1	MOBREP	military manpower mobilization and accession status report
2	MOOTW	military operations other than war
3	MSC	Military Sealift Command
4	MSO	mobilization staff officer
5	MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
6	MTW	major theater war
7		
8	NCA	National Command Authorities
9	<u>NCESGR</u>	<u>National Committee of Employer Support for the Guard and</u>
10		<u>Reserve</u>
11	NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
12		
13	OCONUS	outside the continental United States
14	<u>OEF</u>	<u>Operation ENDURING FREEDOM</u>
15	<u>OIF</u>	<u>Operation IRAQI FREEDOM</u>
16	<u>ONE</u>	<u>Operation NOBLE EAGLE</u>
17	OPLAN	operation plan
18	<u>OPORD</u>	<u>operation order</u>
19	OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
20		
21	POC	point of contact
22	PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority
23		

1	RC	Reserve Component
2	<u>REFRAD</u>	<u>release from active duty</u>
3		
4	<u>SECDHS</u>	<u>Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security</u>
5	SecDef	Secretary of Defense
6	SITREP	situation report
7	SOF	special operations forces
8	<u>SORTS</u>	<u>Status of Resources and Training System</u>
9		
10	TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
11	TRO	Training and Readiness Oversight
12		
13	USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
14	USC	United States Code
15	<u>USCG</u>	<u>United States Coast Guard</u>
16	<u>USJFCOM</u>	<u>United States Joint Forces Command</u>
17	<u>USNORTHCOM</u>	<u>United States Northern Command</u>
18	USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
19	USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1
2
3 **activation.** Order to active duty (other than for training) in the federal service. See also
4 active duty; federal service. (JP 4-05)

5
6 **active duty.** Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. This
7 includes members of the Reserve Components serving on active duty or full-time
8 training duty, but does not include full-time National Guard duty. Also called **AD**.
9 (JP 1-02)

10
11 **active duty for special work.** A tour of active duty for reserve personnel authorized
12 from military and reserve personnel appropriations for work on active or reserve
13 component programs. This includes annual screening, training camp operations,
14 training ship operations, and unit conversion to new weapon systems when such duties
15 are essential. Active duty for special work may also be authorized to support study
16 groups, training sites and exercises, short-term projects, and doing administrative or
17 support functions. By policy, active duty for special work tours are normally limited to
18 179 days or less in one fiscal year. Tours exceeding 180 days are accountable against
19 active duty end strength. (Joint Pub 1-02)

20
21 **area of responsibility.** 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command
22 within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2.
23 In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are

1 responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by
2 observation. Also called **AOR**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

3

4 **backfill**. RC units and individuals recalled to replace deploying active units and/or
5 individuals in the continental United States and outside the continental United States.

6 (~~This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ Joint Pub
7 1-02.)

8

9 **c-day**. See times. (Joint Pub 1-02)

10

11 **command and control**. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
12 commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

13 Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel,

14 equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in

15 planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the

16 accomplishment of the mission. Also called **C2**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

17

18 **concept plan**. An operation plan in concept format. Also called **CONPLAN**. (Joint Pub
19 1-02)

20

21 [contingency planning](#). The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planning
22 activities that occur in non-crisis situations. The JPEC uses **contingency planning** to
23 develop OPLANs for a broad range of contingencies based on requirements identified

1 [in the Contingency Planning Guidance \(CPG\), JSCP, or other planning directive.](#)
2 [Contingency planning underpins and facilitates the transition to CAP. \(Upon approval](#)
3 [of JP 5-0, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition](#)
4 [and will be included in JP 1-02.\)](#)

5
6
7 **crisis action planning.** ~~1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process~~
8 ~~involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in~~
9 ~~response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action~~
10 ~~procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame~~
11 ~~permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment,~~
12 ~~employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that~~
13 ~~occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis~~
14 ~~action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning~~
15 ~~occurs. Also called CAP. (Joint Pub 1-02) [The Joint Operation Planning and](#)~~
16 [Execution System planning activities associated with the time-sensitive development of](#)
17 [joint operation plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and](#)
18 [sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to a situation](#)
19 [that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planning is based on the](#)
20 [actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. See also](#)
21 [contingency planning, joint operation planning, Joint Operation Planning and](#)
22 [Execution System. \(Upon approval of JP 5-0, this term and its definition will modify](#)
23 [the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.\)](#)

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d-day. See times. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Defense Planning Guidance. This document, issued by the Secretary of Defense, provides firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandum by the Military Department and Defense agencies. Also called **DPG**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

~~**deliberate planning.** 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (Joint Pub 1-02)~~

demobilization. The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. (Joint Pub 1-02)

1 | **Flexible Deterrent Option.** A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision by
2 | laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented
3 | options carefully tailored to send the right signal. The Flexible Deterrent Option is the
4 | means by which the various deterrent options available to a commander (such as
5 | economic, diplomatic, political and military measures) are implemented into the
6 | planning process. Also called **FDO**. (This term and its definition are approved for
7 | inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

8 |
9 | **full mobilization.** See mobilization. (Joint Pub 1-02)

10 |
11 | ~~Global Command and Control System. Highly mobile, deployable command and control~~
12 | ~~system supporting forces for joint and multinational operations across the range of~~
13 | ~~military operations, any time and anywhere in the world with compatible, interoperable,~~
14 | ~~and integrated command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems.~~
15 | ~~Also called GCCS. (Joint Pub 1-02)~~ Global Information Grid. The globally
16 | interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and
17 | personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on
18 | demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The global information
19 | grid (GIG) includes all owned and leased communications and computing systems and
20 | services, software (including applications), data, security services and other associated
21 | services necessary to achieve information superiority. It also includes National Security
22 | Systems as defined in section 5142 of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. The GIG supports
23 | all Department of Defense, National Security, and related Intelligence Community

1 missions and functions (strategic, operational, tactical and business), in war and in peace.
2 The GIG provides capabilities from all operating locations (bases, posts, camps, stations,
3 facilities, mobile platforms and deployed sites). The GIG provides interfaces to
4 multinational and non-DOD users and systems. The GIG includes any system,
5 equipment, software, or service that meets one or more of the following criteria: (1)
6 Transmits information to, receives information from, routes information among, or
7 interchanges information among other equipment, software and services. (2) Provides
8 retention, organization, visualization, information assurance, or disposition of data,
9 information and/or knowledge received from or transmitted to other equipment, software
10 and services. (3) Processes data or information for use by other equipment, software and
11 services. Non GIG information technology (IT) is stand-alone, self-contained, or
12 embedded IT that is not or will not be connected to the enterprise network. Also called
13 GIG. (Upon approval of JP 6-0, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

14
15 **individual mobilization augmentee.** An individual reservist attending drills who
16 receives training and is preassigned to an active component organization, a Selective
17 Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled
18 on, or shortly after, mobilization. Individual mobilization augmentees train on a part-
19 time basis with these organizations to prepare for mobilization. Inactive duty training
20 for individual mobilization augmentees is decided by component policy and can vary
21 from 0 to 48 drills a year. (Joint Pub 1-02)

22
23 **Individual Ready Reserve.** A manpower pool consisting of individuals who have had

1 some training and who have served previously in the Active Component or in the
2 Selected Reserve and [may](#) have some period of their military service obligation
3 remaining. Members may voluntarily participate in training for retirement points and
4 promotion with or without pay. Also called **IRR**. [See also Selected Reserve. \(JP 4-](#)
5 [05\)](#)~~(Joint Pub 1-02)~~

6
7 **joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified
8 commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command
9 (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint
10 Pub 1-02)

11
12 **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.** A continuously evolving system
13 that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and
14 execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It
15 provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and
16 theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information
17 needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and
18 Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and
19 reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing
20 systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment,
21 employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. Also called
22 **JOPES.** (Joint Pub 1-02)

1 | **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.** The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) contains
2 | guidance to the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs for accomplishing military
3 | tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. These assignments take into
4 | account the capabilities of available forces, intelligence information, and guidance
5 | issued by the Secretary of Defense. The JSCP directs the development of contingency
6 | plans to support national security objectives by assigning planning tasks and
7 | apportioning major combat forces and strategic lift capability to the combatant
8 | commanders. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition
9 | of Joint Pub 1-02.)

10 |
11 | ~~joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. The actions and methods which implement~~
12 | ~~joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will~~
13 | ~~be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the~~
14 | ~~combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Also called JTTP. (Joint Pub 1-02)~~

15 |
16 | **mobilization.** 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support
17 | national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. See also industrial
18 | mobilization. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought
19 | to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all
20 | or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organizing personnel,
21 | supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to
22 | the following categories: a. selective mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed
23 | Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve

1 Component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support
2 to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy
3 attack. b. partial mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from
4 action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than
5 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve

6 Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to
7 meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat
8 to the national security. c. full mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces
9 resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component
10 units and individuals in the existing approved force structure, ~~all individual reservists,~~as
11 well as retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the
12 requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the
13 national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of
14 the emergency plus six months. d. total mobilization — Expansion of the active
15 Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or
16 generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the
17 resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other
18 national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (JP 4-
19 05). ~~(Joint Pub 1-02)~~

20
21 **mobilization base.** The total of all resources available, or which can be made available,
22 to meet foreseeable wartime needs. Such resources include the manpower and material
23 resources and services required for the support of essential military, civilian, and

1 survival activities, as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such as (but
2 not limited to) the following: manning levels, state of training, modernization of
3 equipment, mobilization materiel reserves and facilities, continuity of government, civil
4 defense plans and preparedness measures, psychological preparedness of the people,
5 international agreements, planning with industry, dispersion, and standby legislation
6 and controls. (Joint Pub 1-02)

7

8 | **mobilization site.** The designated location where a Reserve Component unit or
9 individual mobilizes or moves after mobilization for further processing, training, and
10 employment. This differs from a mobilization station in that it is not necessarily a
11 military installation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

12

13 | **mobilization staff officer.** The action officer assigned the principle responsibility or
14 additional duties related to RC mobilization actions. (This term and its definition are
15 approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

16

17 | **mobilization station.** The designated military installation to which a Reserve
18 Component unit or individual is moved for further processing, organizing, equipping,
19 training, and employment and from which the unit or individual may move to an aerial
20 port of embarkation or seaport of embarkation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

21

22 | **national emergency.** A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue of
23 powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be

1 undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may include partial, full, or total
2 mobilization of national resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

3
4 ~~operation plan. Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the~~
5 ~~conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in~~
6 ~~response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and~~
7 ~~by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the~~
8 ~~establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete~~
9 ~~format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published~~
10 ~~with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. a. OPLAN—~~
11 ~~An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for~~
12 ~~development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and~~
13 ~~supplies required to execute the CINC's Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of~~
14 ~~these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in~~
15 ~~TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is~~
16 ~~prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in~~
17 ~~the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning~~
18 ~~policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN—An~~
19 ~~operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or~~
20 ~~alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's~~
21 ~~Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the~~
22 ~~combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements~~
23 ~~are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. Also called CONPLAN. c.~~

1 | ~~CONPLAN with TPFDD—A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN~~
2 | ~~except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. (Joint~~
3 | ~~Pub 1-02)~~

4 |
5 | **partial mobilization.** See mobilization, [Part 2](#). (Joint Pub 1-02)

6 |
7 | **Presidential ~~Selected Reserve Callup~~ Authority.** Provision of a public law (Title 10,
8 | US Code Section 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a
9 | declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected
10 | Reserve [and the Individual Ready Reserve \(of whom not more than 30,000 may be](#)
11 | [members of the Individual Ready Reserve\)](#) for not more than 270 days to meet the
12 | support requirements of any operational mission. Members called under this provision
13 | may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has
14 | particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or
15 | international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces
16 | available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or
17 | operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization.

18 | Also called ~~PSRC~~[PRC](#). (~~Joint Pub 1-02~~)[\(JP 4-05\)](#).

19 |
20 | **Ready Reserve.** The Selected Reserve, Individual [Ready](#) Reserve, and Inactive National
21 | Guard liable for active duty as prescribed by law (US Code, title 10 (DOD), sections
22 | 10142, 12301, and 12302). (~~Joint Pub 1-02~~)[\(JP 4-05\)](#)

1 | **required delivery date.** A date, relative to C-day, when a unit must arrive at its
2 | destination and complete offloading to properly support the concept of operations.

3 | Also called **RDD**. (Joint Pub 1-02)
4 |

5 | **reserve.** 2. Members of the Military Services who are not in active service but who are
6 | subject to call to active duty. (Joint Pub 1-02)
7 |

8 | **Reserve Components.** Reserve Components of the Armed Forces of the United States
9 | are: a. the Army National Guard of the United States; b. the Army Reserve; c. the
10 | Naval Reserve; d. the Marine Corps Reserve; e. the Air National Guard of the
11 | United States; f. the Air Force Reserve; and g. the Coast Guard Reserve. Also called

12 | ~~**RC.** (This term and its definition modify the current term and definition and are~~
13 | ~~approved for inclusion in the next edition of~~ (Joint Pub 1-02.)
14 |

15 | **Selected Reserve.** Those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by
16 | their respective Services and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to
17 | initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. ~~All Selected~~
18 | ~~Reservists are in an active status~~ Selected Reservists actively participate in a Reserve
19 | Component training program. The Selected Reserve also includes persons performing
20 | initial active duty for training. See also Ready Reserve. ~~(Joint Pub 1-02)~~ (JP 4-05)
21 |

22 | **selective mobilization.** See mobilization Part 2. (Joint Pub 1-02)
23 |

1 special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military
2 Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained,
3 and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)
4

5 stability operations. An overarching term encompassing specific types of developmental
6 or coercive security cooperation and deterrence activities, small-scale operations and/or
7 missions that promote local or regional normalcy and protect US interests abroad.
8 Stability operations may be conducted in all operational environments and during all
9 phases of a campaign or major operation. (Upon approval of JP 3-0, this term and its
10 definition will be included in JP 1-02.)
11

12 Standby Reserve. Those units and members of the Reserve Components (other than
13 those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve) who are liable for active duty only, as
14 provided in title 10 , US Code, sections 10151, 12301, and 12306. See also active duty;
15 Ready Reserve; Reserve Components; Retired Reserve. (Upon approval of this
16 revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and
17 will be included in JP 1-02.)
18

19 supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects
20 of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation
21 planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the
22 commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to
23 requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support

1 command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another
2 commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the
3 supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02)

4
5 supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other
6 support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the
7 designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the
8 context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects,
9 complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for
10 providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

11
12 **time-phased force and deployment data.** The Joint Operation Planning and Execution
13 System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-
14 unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan,
15 including: a. In-place units. b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with
16 a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation. c.
17 Routing of forces to be deployed. d. Movement data associated with deploying forces.
18 e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted
19 concurrently with the deployment of forces. f. Estimate of transportation requirements
20 that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that
21 can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called **TPFDD**.
22 (Joint Pub 1-02)

23

1 ~~times. (C, D, M days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (zulu time) and are assumed to~~
2 ~~be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally~~
3 ~~coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and~~
4 ~~specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C day. L hour will be~~
5 ~~established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and~~
6 ~~surface movements. Normally, L hour will be established to allow C day to be a~~
7 ~~24 hour day. a. C day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation~~
8 ~~commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo,~~
9 ~~weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport.~~
10 ~~The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or~~
11 ~~headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning~~
12 ~~of C day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly~~
13 ~~responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the~~
14 ~~planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or~~
15 ~~headquarters coordinating the planning. b. D day. The unnamed day on which a~~
16 ~~particular operation commences or is to commence. c. F hour. The effective time of~~
17 ~~announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to~~
18 ~~mobilize Reserve units. d. H hour. The specific hour on D day at which a particular~~
19 ~~operation commences. e. L hour. The specific hour on C day at which a deployment~~
20 ~~operation commences or is to commence. f. M day. The term used to designate the~~
21 ~~unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. g.~~
22 ~~N day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or~~
23 ~~redeployment. h. R day. Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of~~

1 ~~major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an~~
2 ~~operation. . S-day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve callup (not~~
3 ~~more than 200,000). . T-day. The effective day coincident with Presidential~~
4 ~~declaration of National Emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more~~
5 ~~than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup). . W-day. Declared by the~~
6 ~~National Command Authorities, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to~~
7 ~~prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning). (Joint Pub 1-02)~~

8 times — (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (Zulu time) and are assumed
9 to be hours long for planning). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally
10 coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and
11 specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be
12 established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and
13 surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-
14 hour day. a. **C-day.** The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences
15 or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon
16 systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The
17 letter “C” will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or
18 headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning
19 of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly
20 responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the
21 planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or
22 headquarters coordinating the planning. b. **D-day.** The unnamed day on which a
23 particular operation commences or is to commence. c. **F-hour.** The effective time of

1 announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to
2 mobilize Reserve units. d. **H-hour.** The specific hour on D-day at which a particular
3 operation commences. e. **H-hour (amphibious operations).** For amphibious
4 operations, the time the first assault elements are scheduled to touch down on the
5 beach, or a landing zone, and in some cases the commencement of countermine
6 breaching operations. f. **L-hour.** The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment
7 operation commences or is to commence. g. **L-hour (amphibious operations).** In
8 amphibious operations, the time at which the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne
9 assault wave touches down in the landing zone. h. **M-day.** The term used to designate
10 the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. i.
11 **REFRAD.** Released from active duty. The unnamed day a unit or individual active
12 duty service stops. j. **N-day.** The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for
13 deployment or redeployment. k. **R-day.** Redeployment day. The day on which
14 redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces
15 begins in an operation. l. **S-day.** The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve
16 callup (not more than 200,000). m. **T-day.** The effective day coincident with
17 Presidential declaration of national emergency and authorization of partial mobilization
18 (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup). n.. **W-day.**
19 Declared by the President, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare
20 for war (unambiguous strategic warning). (Upon approval of this revision, this term
21 and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in
22 [JP 1-02.](#))

23

1 | **total mobilization.** See mobilization. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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