

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE 2010	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Joint Force Quarterly. Issue 56, 1st Quarter 2010		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
		5b. GRANT NUMBER	
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
		5e. TASK NUMBER	
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 260 Fifth Avenue SW Bg 64 Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited			
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
14. ABSTRACT			
15. SUBJECT TERMS			
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	Same as Report (SAR)
			18. NUMBER OF PAGES 168
			19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Leadership of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council

By RICHARD M. MEINHART

Military leaders at many levels have used the advice and processes associated with strategic planning councils in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of current situations while simultaneously transforming to meet future challenges. This article broadly identifies how the last seven

Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff led the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the Nation's most senior joint military advice council, to provide recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to help enable him to meet his resource-focused responsibilities.

This resource advice, under the heading of Requirements, Programs, and Budget, is



U.S. Air Force (Adam M. Stump)



DOD




DOD (R.D. Ward)

Top row, l-r: General James E. Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2007–present), Admiral David E. Jeremiah (1990–1994), Admiral William A. Owens (1994–1996)

Bottom row, l-r: General Joseph W. Raiston (1996–2000), General Richard B. Myers (2000–2001), General Peter Pace (2001–2005), Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani (2005–2007)



DOD (R.D. Ward)



U.S. Air Force (Ann-Marie Dooley)

one of the Chairman's six main functions specified in Title 10 U.S. Code. This resource responsibility has not changed since his overall responsibilities increased as a result of the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986. Prior to this act, these resourcing responsibilities were almost exclusively within the Services' domain, but the Chairman now needed to become more of an advocate in designing, sizing, and structuring the Armed Forces to meet combatant commanders' needs.¹ The Vice Chairmen changed this council's focus and complexity during the last two decades to help enable the Chairman to meet these new responsibilities, which provide leadership and decisionmaking insights.

The JROC is a senior military council led by the Vice Chairman and consisting of the vices or deputies of the four military Services.² This council's main responsibility, specified in U.S. Code since 1996, is to provide the CJCS recommendations from a joint perspective on three main issues:

- priorities of military systems and requirements to meet the National Military Strategy
- important acquisition programs to include cost, schedule, and performance criteria and any alternatives
- prioritizing military programs such that "the assignment of such priorities conforms to and reflects resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense through defense planning guidance."³

The Chairman can either accept or decline JROC recommendations in consultation with the other Service chiefs before

formally providing his advice to the Nation's senior civilian leaders. The U.S. strategic environment, which has external threats and challenges and internal fiscal and operational realities, influences JROC focus. In total, this environment has characteristics associated with the words *volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity*.⁴

While there are CJCS operating instructions that take broad guidance from U.S. Code and DOD directives and provide specificity to JROC tasks, in practice the Vice Chairman profoundly influences how issues are addressed. Most often, the Vice Chairman has changed operating instructions after trying new ways rather than first *defining* a new way. In providing leadership insights, this article focuses on key JROC initiatives by the past six Vice Chairmen:

- Admiral David Jeremiah (1990–1994)
- Admiral William Owens (1994–1996)
- General Joseph Ralston (1996–2000)
- General Richard Myers (2000–2001)
- General Peter Pace (2001–2005)
- Admiral Edmund Giambastiani (2005–2007).

It then identifies a few key initiatives taken by the current Vice Chairman, General James Cartwright. It broadly identifies how JROC processes and lower organizational structures changed over time to become much more complex and integrated. Next, key JROC-related Vice Chairman initiatives, which can be considered part of their leadership legacy, are discussed. Finally, the article provides concluding insights on how senior leaders can best use councils or boards to respond to strategic challenges.

Leadership

Of the seven Vice Chairmen from 1990 until 2009, three were Navy, two Air Force, and two Marine. Their leadership responsibilities, which included chairing the JROC, were generally more internally focused on the many Pentagon processes and resource issues, versus those of the Chairman, who had more external advice and strategic communications responsibilities. As such, the Vice Chairman represented the Chairman on many internal Pentagon boards and councils, particularly when joint military advice was needed on resources and specific programs. His leadership of the JROC, senior leader discussions, and countless JROC-related briefings essentially prepared him to execute these management responsibilities.

most often, the Vice Chairman has changed operating instructions after trying new ways rather than first defining a new way

Overall Evolution. As required by a DOD directive, the JROC was officially established in June 1986 and consisted of the director of the Joint Staff and the four Service vices with the council's chairman rotating among the vices.⁵ Its main mission was to provide formal advice on major military requirements before they entered the DOD acquisition processes. With the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in October 1986, the Vice Chairman's position was created; and in 1987, the Chairman appointed, with the Defense Secretary's approval, the Vice Chairman as JROC chairman.⁶

The JROC formally evolved four times, so its advice and impact throughout the military Services and DOD agencies have significantly grown. The first major JROC era, from its inception until 1993, was primarily reactive to major Service programs, as the council generally met infrequently with a focus limited to acquisition programs. The second major era, from 1994 to 1996, witnessed a substantial growth period as JROC meetings significantly increased, its focus expanded to broader joint warfighting issues, and a new analytical Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process supported its proactive advice. The



U.S. Air Force (Andy Dunahey)



DOD (Charlie Trout)

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third major era, from 1996 to 2002, involved greater organization and process complexity as two formal lower level organizations were created to examine issues, more organizations and individuals were invited to provide advice or attend JROC-related meetings, and meetings decreased due to the substantial work of the lower organizations. The fourth major era, from 2003 to today, is focused on an overall capabilities approach and expanded gap analysis enabled by operating, functional, and integrating concepts associated with the Joint Capability Integrating Development System (JCIDS), with a formal Gatekeeper (the Joint Staff J8 responsibility) to decide which issues go to the JROC for decision.

These changes, while generally evolutionary in each individual instance, in total can be considered revolutionary in their broadened scope and greater complexity. Furthermore, as inputs from other Defense and interagency organizations have increased, the JROC can be considered the most integrating and influencing council within DOD on complex joint military issues. It is “influencing” because in design the Chairman ultimately decides whether to improve its recommendations, but in operation he generally accepts them. The council’s Secretary, the Joint Staff J8, codifies deliberations and decisions in various ways, and its work directly shapes the Chairman’s two annual resource advice documents to the Secretary of Defense: the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) issued in the spring and the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) issued in the fall. Furthermore, the council’s inclusive, collaborative, and analytical nature influences other Service and DOD leaders that provide input; hence, there is agreement well beyond the Council’s formal members and decisions. The following examines each Vice Chairman’s key leadership contributions in using the JROC.

Admiral David Jeremiah (1990–1994). While he served as Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet prior to becoming Vice Chairman, Admiral Jeremiah’s broad military experience included assignments on the Naval Staff and in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation.⁷ Hence, he appreciated Services’ and Defense organizations’ interests as well as intricate Pentagon processes. He focused on the internal management and direction of the Joint Staff, to include orchestrating the time-consuming, but not JROC-related, political-military issues associated with National Security

Council deputies’ meetings with the 1990 Gulf War and regional operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.⁸

Later in his tenure, Admiral Jeremiah prioritized JROC efforts in deciding which weapons and communications would best position the future military within a constrained resource environment. Hence, his focus was on weapons systems that could be produced in smaller quantities, more joint-versus single Service-oriented, and with more emphasis on technology.⁹ These later efforts in 1993 set a foundation for the council to be more proactive versus reactive in defining military requirements.¹⁰ His overall efforts as Vice Chairman were so widely recognized that he became a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992. A key leadership insight is his use of a council to react to a declining resource environment and subtle ways to envision future weapons systems.

Admiral Jeremiah prioritized JROC efforts in deciding which weapons and communications would best position the military within a constrained resource environment

Admiral William Owens (1994–1996). Admiral Owens had many prior assignments in sea operations, Navy Secretariat and Staff, and academic venues; hence, he had broad operations, staff, and intellectual perspectives.¹¹ He introduced the most significant JROC changes as processes and products became much more integrating and comprehensive. These changes included:

- quadrupling the number of council meetings and increasing tenfold the time spent by members on council issues
- aggressively encouraging combatant commanders’ input on warfighting requirements
- creating the JWCA to conduct lower level analysis on broad mission areas and integrate higher level advice
- increasing the content of the existing Chairman’s resource advice by expanding the CPA and creating the CPR.¹²

These four initiatives fundamentally changed the Chairman’s advice to the Secretary of Defense from being reactive to

Services’ and Defense agencies’ programs to more proactive with a joint warfighting focus to shape the military’s ability to respond to the strategic environment. These initiatives continue today in spirit, although their exact nature and style have changed.

The first two initiatives reflect a philosophy that a leader’s prior experiences, what he pays attention to, and whose advice he seeks will determine what ultimately will get done. Before becoming Vice Chairman, Admiral Owens was the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments. Hence, he was familiar with Pentagon processes and a need to develop consensus to help make tough weapons system tradeoffs forced by declining resources. He identified new areas the council would consider, to include functioning as an active spokesperson of combatant commanders’ requirements, reviewing warfighting deficiencies and capabilities, and considering broad interoperability and cross-Service issues.¹³ He held informal weekly breakfasts with JROC members,¹⁴ quadrupled formal JROC meetings, and held an “unprecedented series of separate off-site, all-day discussions among the JCS, the Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Commands, and the JROC members, centered on the JROC’s effort to identify joint military requirements.”¹⁵ Combatant commanders’ inputs increased as the Joint Staff established JROC liaison offices with their staffs, and the council now visited them in their areas before formal recommendations were developed. To illustrate the JROC’s importance, its members were spending roughly 15 percent of their time working on these issues, the greatest share given to any one activity.¹⁶

The third initiative, and perhaps the most important and lasting, was the Admiral’s establishment of JWCA to provide an intellectual foundation for the council’s proactive decisions. These JWCA focused on broad, joint mission areas such as strike and command and control, to name two.¹⁷ These assessment activities were placed under the management of a Joint Staff directorate. Most importantly, the JWCA included representatives of the Joint Staff, Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Defense agencies, combatant commanders, and others as needed to consider relevant share and stakeholder inputs. Within a JWCA, there would be many different issue work groups generally led by colonels. This allowed analysis of numerous

aspects of strike or command and control under a formal timeline, wherein work group leaders briefed the JROC or their Joint Staff directors. While these JWCA were chaired by a one- or two-star Joint Staff general officer for overall guidance, the lower colonel-led teams were inclusive and collaborative to gain consensus and provided the analytical rigor on which to base recommendations.

Building on these assessments, the fourth initiative increased the specificity of resource advice in the existing Chairman's Program Assessment and developed a new Chairman's Program Recommendation. The CPA was designed to assess proposed Service programs submitted within the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System before they became part of the President's budget. Prior to 1994, most of the CPAs simply acknowledged or endorsed Service programs. However, the October 1994 assessment, the first submitted from the analytical process described, challenged some Service programs, identified about \$8 billion in additional funding, and argued for shifts in \$4 billion more.¹⁸ While this was a small percentage of defense resources, it established a precedent wherein the Chairman would not just endorse Service programs. Furthermore, the CPR was designed to influence the Secretary of Defense's resource guidance to the Services and Defense agencies before it was issued. This recommendation was to "enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and better satisfy joint warfighting requirements."¹⁹

In 1995, a CPR was submitted in the spring and a CPA was submitted in the fall, which reflect this resource advice sequencing that continues today. The October 1995 assessment was much broader in scope than the previous one and recommended shifting resources from some programs to others and reducing some redundant Service capabilities, and it argued for a different recapitalization approach—"steps that, taken together, could require an adjustment of up to 12 percent of the projected defense budget over the FYDP period."²⁰

General Joseph Ralston (1996–2000).

General Ralston, who was Commander of Air Combat Command prior to becoming Vice Chairman, had multiple assignments on the Air Force's Secretary and Air Staff in requirements, acquisition, plans, and operations, all of which indicated a balance between staff and operations experiences.²¹ General Ralston, to

Marine weighs in before participating in body armor study



U.S. Marine Corps / (Herb F. Hunt)

the Chairman's Program Recommendation was designed to influence the Secretary's resource guidance to the Services and Defense agencies before it was issued

perhaps reflect his leadership style and allow time to focus on interagency issues, envisioned his JROC focus “to be ‘harmonizing’ Service positions on programs so that national security needs could be met within budgetary constraints.”²² This contrasts with the more direct and time-consuming approach taken by his predecessor. Hence, General Ralston created a JROC Review Board (JRB), led by the three-star J8 with one- or two-star Service representatives, to assist in reviewing analytical assessments, nominating topics, and shaping issues before coming to the JROC.²³ This reduced the frequency of JROC meetings to perhaps a more manageable weekly level as many issues were now considered by this review board’s focus and expanded schedule.

The JRB’s stature and responsibilities increased as it comprehensively reviewed many issues and semiannually held three all-day issue update conferences before visiting combatant commanders.²⁴ It visited commanders prior to scheduled JROC visits, which the JROC still did semiannually, but one of these trips was to a central location where a few commanders would gather. To

U.S. Navy’s newest Aegis destroyer, USS *Wayne E. Meyer*, commissioned October 10, 2009



more directly respond to the changing strategic environment, 6 of the 10 original JWCA domains changed and ultimately the number increased to 12 and then 14 as domains on interoperability, combating terrorism, reform initiative, and combat identification were created.²⁵ A leadership insight is that creating a lower board with proper responsibilities and an inclusive nature not only has the advantage of focusing a leader’s time, but it can also assist in developing future leaders and creating a joint climate. Conversely, increasing bureaucratic structure can have a negative effect in delaying or perhaps reducing the controversy associated with some issues that senior leaders need to hear as consensus is greatly valued before finally briefing these leaders.

General Richard Myers (2000–2001).

Prior to becoming Vice Chairman, General Myers served as Commander of U.S. Space Command and earlier was a special assistant to the Chairman. Hence, he experienced the JROC from a combatant commander’s perspective and appreciated the Chairman’s views. He spent the shortest time in this position, as he was the Vice Chairman for 18 months before being made Chairman in October 2001. In his April 2000 testimony to Congress, General Myers identified three key JROC areas that needed improvement: (1) shifting the council to be more strategic in requirements and integrating joint warfighting capabilities, (2) institutionalizing U.S.

Joint Vision 2010 (1996) and further described in *Joint Vision 2020* (2000) to gain full-spectrum dominance. The existing JROC Review Board was changed to the Joint Requirements Board. Also, an Enhanced Joint Requirements Board, cochaired by the Joint Staff J8 and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, was created to gain advice on selected programs from civilian perspectives. To assist the JROC and JRB, General Myers created a Joint Requirements Panel, chaired by a one-star, to focus primarily on acquisition issues and the requirements development process.

Combatant commanders as well as the Assistants to the Chairman for National Guard and Reserve matters now had a standing invitation to attend JROC meetings in an advisory capacity. Finally, General Myers created an inclusive process to identify strategic topics to better focus the JROC and lower boards’ efforts.²⁷ Key leadership insights include implementing the Chairman’s vision, establishing lower boards to enable joint climate and develop future leaders, and soliciting broader and strategic inputs to JROC meetings not only to address greater complexity but also to provide for a more informed consensus to execute decisions.

General Peter Pace (2001–2005).

Prior to becoming Vice Chairman, General Pace was the Commander of U.S. Southern Command and previously served as Commander, Marine Corps Forces and joint

combatant commanders as well as the Assistants to the Chairman for National Guard and Reserve matters had a standing invitation to attend JROC meetings in an advisory capacity

Joint Forces Command’s joint experimentation efforts and integrating with other DOD decisionmaking processes, and (3) shifting capability assessments from being narrow to far reaching.²⁶ These views, codified in a March 2001 Chairman’s instruction, reflected a sense that assessments had grown and were not strategic enough, and changes were needed in existing structure and processes.

To achieve this new focus, the overall JWCA structure significantly changed as 14 mission areas were reduced to 8 with 4 named: precision engagement, full dimensional protection, dominant maneuver, and focused logistics. These names reflected emerging operational concepts introduced in

task forces in Somalia, as well as the Joint Staff’s Director of Operations. Hence, he clearly understood the operator’s needs. He changed the names of the lower level boards to reflect the capability and transformation focus that continues as lower level boards were now Functional Capability Boards (FCBs) and the three-star-led board was now the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB). The FCBs were responsible to analytically review issues within a newly developed and complex JCIDS to identify, analyze, and prioritize joint warfighting capability needs to fill capability gaps to better respond to the changing strategic environment. The JCB assisted the JROC in executing its responsibilities by directly assessing the work of

the FCBs and the JCIDS process. Moreover, to gain civilian input, representatives from 8 OSD organizations, 10 Defense agencies, and 6 interagency organizations could participate on FCBs as needed and attend JROC-related meetings in an advisory role.²⁸ A group of Joint Staff documents, designed to shape future military capabilities out to 20 years, informed this capability focus and the JCIDS processes. Starting in 2003 with the Chairman's Joint Operations Concept, later replaced by the 2005 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, there was now a family of Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, and Joint Integrating Concepts to help promote interdependence.²⁹ Recognizing this complexity and a need to streamline decisions to focus the JROC's activities, General Pace established a Gatekeeper. This general officer in the J8 formally directed what issues needed to be elevated to the JROC and what FCBs would lead or support specific issues.³⁰ This family of concepts and the associated work created a high degree of complexity that some leaders inside and outside the military criticized and others embraced.³¹ A leadership insight is that too much complexity can be overwhelming and inhibit crisp decisionmaking.

Admiral Edmund Giambastiani (2005–2007). Prior to becoming Vice Chairman, Admiral Giambastiani was Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command for 3 years and earlier was the Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; hence, he experienced transformation from both operational and Pentagon perspectives. He inherited a complex process that he considered somewhat bureaucratic, not sufficiently focused on combatant commanders' needs, and sometimes too geared to lower level programs. However, he did embrace the overall capability approach and the need to identify those critical combatant commanders' gaps to shape future resource decisions. His JROC tasks had greatly expanded, as there were now 27 specific functions, a substantive increase over the 7 functions in 1995, and there were 21 approved Tier 1 and 240 approved Tier 2 Joint Capability Areas in 2006.³²

To solve these complexity concerns, the Admiral instituted an integrated process to gather all requirements identified to the Joint Staff from other existing processes and distilled them down to a more manageable number called the Most Pressing Military Issues. To gain more combatant commanders' inputs, he extended a standing invitation

for commanders to attend JROC meetings and used videoteleconferencing to make this a routine event as evidenced by their participation in 17 of the first 21 meetings. He was more inclusive when integrating JROC efforts with the Deputies Advisory Working Group, created to work Quadrennial Defense Review issues. Recognizing the value of civilian inputs, nearly 70 percent of the JROC meetings had senior leader representatives from OSD.³³ Overall, Admiral Giambastiani's efforts enabled the JROC to focus on higher priority items and gain greater civilian input.

General James Cartwright (2007–present). While it is too early to provide definitive insights on General Cartwright's JROC leadership legacy, the current Vice Chairman has the most prior experience dealing with the council from Joint Staff and combatant commander perspectives. General Cartwright was the Deputy Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment in the J8 from 1996 to 1999 and later served as the Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment from 2002 to 2004. He was Commander of U.S. Strategic Command from 2004 to 2007 before becoming the Nation's eighth Vice Chairman in the



MRAP vehicles are offloaded from MV *Marilyn* for training exercise in Europe

U.S. Army (Piero Filippone Courtesini)

summer of 2007. Hence, he saw JROC from many perspectives as it evolved from the early 1990s to today.

During his confirmation as Vice Chairman, General Cartwright advocated building on his predecessor's initiatives, getting the JROC ahead on strategic issues, and keeping the JROC's formal military membership along with seeking civilian leadership advice. He continues to actively seek both combatant commander advice through senior warfighter forums and civilian leadership advice, to include the inter-agency community when appropriate. He has aligned Functional Capability Boards with the DOD portfolio approach, focused more on streamlining the overall capability process, and empowered U.S. Joint Forces Command with the Command and Control Functional Capability Board.³⁴ Finally, the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, a key Chairman's guidance document that serves as the intellectual foundation for future capabilities, was significantly rewritten by U.S. Joint Forces Command before the Chairman signed it in 2009, which reflects more influence by this command for capability development.

Insights

From this examination of the Vice Chairmen's use of the JROC, there are four broad insights for senior leaders who use or are considering using councils to shape strategic decisions. These insights center on simplicity versus complexity, organizational culture, process characteristics, and decisionmaking.

Leaders need a balance between complexity and simplicity to focus their intellectual energy. If processes are too simple, decisions will be more linear and not integrating. If they are too complex, a leader's focus is not optimized and impact is diminished. Too much simplicity was likely

viewed by their successors. Hence, to create a needed balance, a process to become more strategic was introduced by General Myers, and a process to focus on the most pressing military issues was introduced by Admiral Giambastiani. Leaders need to appreciate that balance in the event they become too comfortable or are captured by their own processes. Thus, entrenched leaders need to reflect on this balance, and new leaders should access the strengths and weaknesses of processes they inherit from varied perspectives before embracing or changing them. The ongoing challenge is how best to reduce today's complexity to a manageable level but still get integrated decisionmaking.

General Cartwright advocated keeping the JROC's formal military membership along with seeking civilian leadership advice

the case during most of Admiral Jeremiah's tenure. A needed degree of complexity with a broader and more analytical focus was added by Admiral Owens. That complexity exploded during the next decade such that there was too much at the end of General Ralston's and General Pace's tenures as

Leaders can use councils and boards within an overall strategic planning system to help create a climate and embed an organizational culture. This recommendation reflects the work of all the Vice Chairmen since Goldwater-Nichols. To help create a joint climate, there has been an expansive interaction of

Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter at production facility



DOD (Cherie Cullen)

civilian and military leaders working together with a joint focus on JROC-related boards, as combatant commanders and many DOD organizations now have input on requirements and capabilities that were formerly primarily under the Services' domain. This assisted the successful transition from Service deconfliction in the early 1990s to Service interoperability in the late 1990s and early 2000s to the present emerging joint interdependence. It is this author's assessment from working within and studying the effects of the Chairman's overall strategic planning system, and the work of the JROC during these seven Vice Chairmen's tenures, that the culture of jointness envisioned by many of our nation's civilian and military leaders has found a foothold with those who support these efforts.

Leaders need to ensure that processes are integrated, inclusive, and flexible to improve effectiveness. This integrated nature is illustrated by the initial JWCA's and now the capability gap assessments briefed to the lower level boards before reaching the JROC. This inclusiveness is demonstrated by the greater representation of civilians from many organizations and their increasing contributions to the analytical assessments and to JROC-related decisions. Flexibility is demonstrated by the way various Vice Chairmen have changed the JROC focus to meet the changing strategic environment. Interviews with strategic planners indicate that using inclusive, integrated, and flexible processes helped educate them on others' perspectives, which in the end enabled them to do their own jobs better. Finally, the overall effectiveness is supported by the manner in which this council's decisions are embraced and implemented. While there have been studies that called for JROC improvements, there has been a broad recognition of its achievements.

Leaders need to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of three main types of decisionmaking to better enable success.³⁵ The rational decisionmaking process, which reflects an analytical and systematic approach to maximize efficiency, was generally used throughout to initially consider issues, access tradeoffs, and determine capability gaps. This was augmented by the participative decisionmaking process, which requires the involvement of those affected by the decisions. As the JROC evolved, combatant commanders who used the systems and OSD civilians who eventually decided which systems to resource were added to working

groups and advised the JROC when needed. The bargaining decisionmaking process, which seeks to maximize political support, was conceptually evident as considerable internal coordination efforts were pursued to gain internal support through consensus on recommendations before issues were elevated for final JROC decisions. Finally, processes were explicit on how to share JROC decisions with Congress, which has ultimate funding responsibility. JFQ

NOTES

¹ William A. Owens and James R. Baker, "Overseeing Cross Service Trade Offs," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996), 37.

² Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 181. This section specifies the formal membership of the council (Service general or admiral) and its chair, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who can delegate this responsibility only to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

³ *Ibid.*, Section 181, Para. b (3).

⁴ Stephen Shambach, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 2^d ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 13-14.

⁵ Office of the Vice Chairman, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era* (Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1996), 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

⁷ Ronald H. Cole et al., *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1995), 203-206.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 205-209.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 208-209.

¹⁰ Owens and Baker, 37; Office of the Vice Chairman, 9.

¹¹ Cole et al., 213-215.

¹² Office of the Vice Chairman, 9-12.

¹³ Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (CJCSM) MCM-14-95, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 7, 1995), 2-4.

¹⁴ Cole et al., 216.

¹⁵ Office of the Vice Chairman, 10.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* The other eight assessment areas were land and littoral; strategic mobility and sustainability; sea, air, and space superiority; deterrence/counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; information warfare; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; regional engagement/presence; and joint readiness.

¹⁸ Office of the Vice Chairman, 11-12, 22-23.

¹⁹ Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3137.01, *The Joint Warfighting Capabilities*

Assessment Process (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 2, 1996), 3.

²⁰ Office of the Vice Chairman, 23.

²¹ Cole et al., 223-227.

²² *Ibid.*, 227-228.

²³ CJCSI 5120.01, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 2, 1995), 19.

²⁴ CJCSI 3137.01A, *The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment Process* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 22, 1999), enclosures B, C, and E.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 30. This January 22, 1999, CJCSI documents the change to 12 JWCA's.

²⁶ Richard B. Myers, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, April 4, 2000, available at <<http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/2000/e000404.htm>>.

²⁷ CJCSI 5123.01A, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 8, 2001), enclosure A. The changes attributed to General Myers came from this instruction, which was a major update from the 1997 version.

²⁸ CJCSI 5123.01B, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 15, 2004), enclosure A.

²⁹ Richard B. Myers, *Capstone Concept of Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2005), 2-5. This document guides the development of future joint capabilities across the range of military operations for the period 2012-2025.

³⁰ CJCSI 5123.01B, enclosure A.

³¹ "Van Riper's E-mail to Pace, Hagee, and Schoemaker Regarding JCIDS, with Responses from Deptula and Mattis," *Inside the Navy*, January 23, 2006. This article addressed the pros and cons of the existing JCIDS complexity by email correspondence.

³² CJCSI 5123.01D, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 8, 2007), enclosure A; CJCSM MCM-14-95; and Joint Staff J7, "Joint Force Development," April 2007, briefing slide 5.

³³ Gordon R. England, "Statement of the Honorable Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, before the House Armed Services Committee 26 June 2007," available at <www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/testEngland070626.pdf>.

³⁴ "Pentagon Leaders Inch toward More Joint Management of Capabilities," *Inside the Army*, January 14, 2008; Memorandum for the JROC: Subject: *Functional Capabilities Boards Rebaseline*, March 4, 2008; and "JROC Hands JFCOM Authority for Command and Control Requirements," *Inside the Navy*, December 19, 2008.

³⁵ Donald F. Kettle and James W. Fesler, "The Politics of the Administrative Processes," in *Decision Making* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2005).