



2008 Iraq Readiness Assessment



Inspector General of the
Marine Corps
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Executive Summary

Background. Under Title 10, United States Code, the Commandant is responsible for manning, training and equipping Marine Corps forces. In order to ensure these responsibilities are being met, the Inspector General of the Marine Corps (IGMC) periodically conducts readiness assessments in the Continental United States (CONUS) and abroad.

In January 2008, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps directed the IGMC to conduct a readiness assessment of equipment deployed to the Iraq Area of Operation (AO), currently operating under Multi-National Force West (MNF-W). This report follows similar IGMC readiness assessments conducted in 2005 and 2006.

Scope and Methodology. Official guidance for the 2008 IGMC Readiness Assessment included several broad issues that formed the basis of the analysis. In particular, senior leadership wanted to determine:

1. If ground equipment readiness is adequate to support operational requirements;
2. If in-place equipment support structures are adequate to provide repairs and replacements resulting from normal use and combat losses;
3. If equipment readiness is reported accurately and provides appropriate information for Service-level decisions;
4. If equipment accountability procedures are adequate;
5. If the 2005 and 2006 findings/recommendations had been implemented.

The IGMC assembled an Assessment Team that included three members of the Office of the IGMC and nine subject matter experts representing Installations and Logistics (I&L), Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O), Programs and Resources (P&R), Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4), and Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC). The team visited Marine Corps and other supporting units based in Kuwait and Iraq over a 16-day period.

Team members conducted in-depth discussions with commodity experts and commanders throughout MNF-W in order to assess the accuracy of readiness reporting and the effectiveness of existing procedures. This included visits to all Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) and the MNF-W headquarters.

In-theater observations and interviews led the team to refine the assessment to focus on five key areas that could potentially impact the Commandant's ability to meet his Title 10 responsibility to equip Marine forces:

- **Excess Assets**
- **Fielding New Equipment**
- **Equipment Rotation**
- **SORTS Reporting**
- **The Theater Open Purchase System (Warrior Open Purchase Request Router - WOPRR)**

All five areas directly or indirectly impact equipment readiness, support missions, and future contingencies. Field analysis was complemented with detailed research by the team before departing and after returning CONUS.

Findings

1. The Equipment Density List (EDL) update process is not responsive to the needs of the Marine Corps.
2. Poor accounting procedures have led to inaccurate and incomplete supply and maintenance management data. Inexperience and poor training in proper supply procedures are factors that contribute to this problem.
3. Anticipating future demands, units and supply managers have invested in materiel, specifically construction supplies and repair parts, which are now in excess of requirements.
4. Higher headquarters has a continuing role to be an advocate in asset management in MNF-W. This includes asset realignment, rotation, transfer and donation programs, and disposal.
5. Equipment rotation is working, but some equipment may require special consideration for rotation in 2008 and 2009.

6. The UUNS process has improved. However, UUNS DOTMLPF assessments have not been applied well.
7. SORTS reporting does not provide an accurate picture of equipment readiness.
8. There two separate and distinct Purchasing and Contracting systems used by Marine units deployed to Iraq. In garrison they use the Marine Corps' PR Builder program and in Iraq they use the WOPRR. One has no relationship with the other.

Recommendations

Excess Assets

1. Review the existing EDL validation and updating processes to ensure they meet the needs of units in the MNF-W AO. **(MNF-W/MARCENT)**
2. Submit Table of Organization and Equipment Change Request (TOECR) to adjust EDL allowances for equipment that has been rotated out of MNF-W as well as new and additional equipment that has been added to the MNF-W's EDL. **(MNF-W/MARCENT)**
3. Ensure that commanders maintain accurate and timely records of all equipment allowances and on hand quantities. **(MNF-W)**
4. Ensure that each unit deploying into the MNF-W AO has a library of all published procedures governing the appropriate disposition of serviceable and unserviceable assets. **(MNF-W/MARCENT)**
5. Improve oversight to ensure units are complying with established orders, directives, and instructions governing supply accountability. **(MNF-W/MARCENT/I&L)**
6. Conduct an IGMC Readiness Assessment of home station equipment shortages, supply accountability procedures and readiness. Identify near, mid, and far-term measures to improve data management and equipment readiness reporting. **(IGMC/I&L/PP&O)**

7. Assess the utility of establishing additional Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) facilities at Al Taqaddum and Fallujah. **(MNF-W/MARCENT/I&L)**
8. Ensure that DRMS/DRMO understands Marine Corps policies and regulations for disposing of PEI and MARES reportable equipment. Request DRMS/DRMO support in ensuring that units do not turn in PEI without proper disposition instructions. **(I&L/MARCENT/MNF-W)**
9. Assess the utility of a theater ground preposition plan to hold contingency equipment for near-term requirements within the CENTCOM AOR. **(PP&O/I&L/LOGCOM/MARCENT)**
10. Create and implement a comprehensive plan to transfer excess and theater specific equipment to the Iraqi government through FMS or other appropriate donation or transfer programs. **(MCSC/LOGCOM/PP&O)**

Fielding Of New Equipment

11. Review procedures to ensure UUNS items are fully supportable in theater. Ensure the DOTMLPF assessments are conducted and followed through in support of fielding the new equipment. **(MCCDC/MCSC/LOGCOM)**
12. Ensure that directed disposition instructions are provided upon fielding of all SEI. **(MCCDC/MCSC/LOGCOM)**
13. Establish procedures for commands to provide feedback on all UUNS equipment utilizing the "Gaining Command Fielding Evaluation Report." **(MCCDC/MCSC/MARCENT/MNF-W)**
14. Ensure New Equipment Training (NET), Field Service Representative (FSR) and Contracted Logistics Support (CLS) support is sufficient to meet all unit requirements in MNF-W AO and incorporate procedures to evaluate operator and maintenance proficiency. **(MCSC/MCCDC)**

Equipment Rotation

15. Reevaluate the 33 percent of equipment outstanding from the 2007 PEI Rotation Plan to determine its remaining service life and the value of rotating it in 2008. **(MNF-W/MARCENT/LOGCOM/PP&O)**

16. Reevaluate the 2008 and subsequent PEI Rotation Plans to include other equipment that was not included in the original rotation plan. This includes equipment newly fielded since 2005. **(MNF-W/MARCENT/LOGCOM/PP&O)**

SORTS REPORTING

17. Provide standardized training for Marines involved in SORTS reporting at all levels of command. Institute pre-deployment SORTS training. **(PP&O/MSC)**
18. Establish a clear policy identifying SORTS reporting procedures for units deployed into MNF-W AO. **(PP&O/MNF-W/MARCENT)**
19. Establish an oversight process to ensure commanders use accurate data to report SORTS readiness levels for forward and remain behind elements. **(PP&O)**

WOPRR

20. Determine if PR Builder program can be used directly with the accounting system in MNF-W and if linking these systems is worthwhile and technically feasible. **(P&R/I&L)**
21. Develop a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for using and updating the WOPRR. **(MNF-W)**
22. Improve WOPRR software to include in-transit visibility and prioritization of requests. **(MNF-W)**

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Chapter 1 - Excess Assets

Background. Overall readiness for Marine Corps Readiness Evaluation System (MARES) reportable equipment is high, likely because there are excess assets in Multinational Force West (MNF-W) area of operation. Excess gear can be defined in several different forms: equipment on-hand without EDL allowances, equipment excess to current mission requirements, equipment excess to operational and maintenance capabilities, equipment on-hand but obsolete, Class IX on-hand without authorization and Pre-expended Bin (PEB) without usage requirements. This chapter will address these excesses as well as funding excesses.

The EDL. After the initial deployment of forces to Iraq it was determined that the deployed equipment set would remain in theater rather than rotating it in and out with rotating forces. Marine Corps agencies determined that the EDL would reflect established allowances for MNF-W. These allowances were derived from the LOGCOM Marine Corps War Reserve Material Requirement (WRMR). MNF-W allowances were to be loaded into the Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS) as VII MEF and WRMR allowances were moved from LOGCOM. Allowance changes to the EDL are now required to be submitted by a TOECR via Marine Corps Central Command (MARCENT). However, as of the date of this report, there have been no adjustments to the VII MEF EDL allowances.

Allowances for equipment that has been retrograded should be removed from VII MEF's EDL and moved to the Marine Corps WRMR held by Logistics Command (LOGCOM). However, due to the lack of sufficient guidance, allowances are not adjusted to reflect equipment that has been retrograded from MNF-W.

The EDL should change to reflect anticipated mission requirements, current force levels, and the conditions of the operating environment. Allowances for subordinate units are apportioned by MNF-W. The EDL allowances and quantity of the equipment on-hand do not match. In addition, the process of validating the EDL is time consuming. Equipment that may be determined as excess due to lack of an allowance on the EDL may not be excess for the unit's mission. Each incoming commander must consider if equipment on-hand is excess to the unit's mission after a relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA). What

one commander may consider excess may not be excess to the incoming commander.

Commanders at each level have 60 days to validate their portion of the current EDL. Because small unit commanders are on seven month rotations, the validation process will be delayed if the identification of excess equipment is left for the incoming commander's evaluation, as the IGMC assessment team observed. The process by which the EDL is approved is shown in Figure 1.

Process for Approving and Validating EDLs




Figure 1.

The amount and type of equipment required by MNF-W is changing as the Marine Corps' mission in Iraq changes. An incidental build-up of equipment seems to be inherent in the current RIP process. Units that are planning to deploy or are already in theater often require equipment beyond that included in their EDL. When units deploy with equipment that was not on the original EDL, in many cases that equipment remains in place for subsequent theater use unless the commander is given permission by MARCENT to return the equipment to the home station. This cycle

continues resulting in on-hand quantities growing over and above the EDL.

Commanders are reluctant to identify equipment as excess since mission requirements frequently change. Also, equipment may be used for unintended functions as with the High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). Obsolete to the Marine Corps, it is used strictly for in-and-around the Forward Operating Base (FOB) as a non-tactical vehicle. VII MEF's Support Activity Supply System (SASSY) allowance for the HMMWV is 543 with a MARES allowance of 531. Figure 2 shows additional examples of excess PEI.



Sample Excess PEI

TAMCN	NAME	QTY O/H	REMARKS
A1957	MRC-145 Radio Sets	288	Replaced by A2068
A2164	VRC-83 Radio Sets	31	Replaced by A2068
A8100	OK-648/U RCU	452	Not Being Used
B0891	MEP003A/803A	31	Not Being Used/Scheduled PMs Conducted
B0953	MEP005A/805A/B	27	Not Being Used/Scheduled PMs Conducted
B1021	MEP006A/806A	20	Not Being Used/Scheduled PMs Conducted
B0475	Portable Mine Detecting Set AN/PSS12	53	Not Being Used
D0026	MRAP Buffalo	ESB/CEB	Not Conducting Route Clearing

Figure 2.

Equipment Accountability. Most of the units visited during this IGMC Readiness Assessment have inaccurate supply accounting records, a trend that is not uncommon throughout the Marine Corps. It is hard to determine actual readiness of all MARES reportable PEI because of the improper supply accounting procedures. Although all records reviewed at both the MNF-W and unit level indicate that readiness for all commodities of equipment is high, those same records indicate that it is difficult to determine if all Marine Corps equipment is accounted properly. In reviewing the supply accounting records of thirteen units visited, each unit showed improper accountability for PEI and other

equipment. In one unit, equipment on-hand was being maintained by receipt document in a folder. The fear was that if the equipment was placed on supply records, the equipment would be identified as excess and the unit would be forced to relinquish the excess equipment.

Disparities in unit record keeping show non-compliance with proper supply accounting procedures and Marine Corps orders and directives. Further analyses utilizing formal accounting SASSY data revealed that all deployed units assessed are not inducting the appropriate transactions for accurate equipment accountability. Figure 3 shows a sampling of nine Delta TAMCNs for twelve units assigned to MNF-W.

TAMCN	NOMENCLATURE	TOTAL MAL OH	TOTAL CMR OH
D0001	Truck Utility, Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) M1114	404	358
D0003	Truck, Armored, 7 ton Cargo, AMK23	288	234
D0004	Truck, Armored, 7 Ton Cargo w/ Winch, AMK25	73	53
D0006	Truck, Armored, 7 Ton Ext L WHLB w/ Winch, AMK28	23	36
D0023	MRAP Cougar, 6X6	4	4
D0025	MRAP JERRV, 4X4	292	296
D0026	MRAP Buffalo	5	0
D0027	MRAP JERRV, 6X6	160	204
D1001	Truck, Ambulance, 4 Litter, Armored, 1 1/4-Ton, HMMWV, M997	29	42

Figure 3.

All units showed improper use of the "Command Adjust" allowance. Allowances were being adjusted without authorization or knowledge of the effects of changing the "Command Adjust" allowance. The Consolidated Memorandum Receipt (CMR) and Mechanized Allowance List (MAL) on-hand quantities did not match.

The equipment accountability problems encountered throughout MNF-W units are not unique to Iraq. These problems are systemic throughout the Marine Corps. Units are bringing poor habits from their home units. Several commanders noted that pre and post deployment events take away time for other training. So, Marines develop bad

habits and practices that they take on deployment. Supply Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCO) who are coming out of "B" billets are often thrust into deploying units without attending Advance Courses. With the amount of deployments over the past 5 years, expertise of proper supply accounting procedures is dwindling. Junior Officers and Enlisted Marines who are accustomed to relying on experienced SNCOs are now making it up as they go. There is no stringent oversight to ensure that units are following proper supply accounting procedures or to determine if they need assistance.

Insufficient Number of Trained Operators or Maintainers.

Although some equipment has been retrograded, there is still more equipment than there are operators or maintainers due to the reduction of forces. This is exacerbated by the fact that there is more equipment being brought into theater by owning units and by the continuous introduction of new equipment. As a result, equipment may sit idle for extended periods, be used as a pool for internal rotation, and/or be used inappropriately. For example, Communications Battalion reports on-hand quantities of 89 vehicle platforms. However, the unit has only six licensed motor vehicle operators. The Motor Transport Officer is reluctant to identify any of the equipment as excess, hedging against future mission requirements.

Excess Class IX (Repair Parts). The 2005 and 2006 IGMC Readiness Assessments determined that units possessed an excessive amount of Class IX. The 2008 IGMC Readiness Assessment team determined that this situation still exists. In 2005, units stockpiled Class IX to hedge against shortages. This was a reflection of their lack of confidence in the supply system. Although units now enjoy a more mature supply chain which has proven to be very responsive, they too are distrustful of the overall supply system. Successive managers, both supply and maintenance, have over-ordered repair parts.

In many cases commanders have failed to conduct a complete inventory of Class IX, leading to larger footprints than required and funding tied up in inventory with no use in the foreseeable future.



Marine Corps orders and directives govern the authorization of Class IX known as Pre-expended Bins (PEB). The Commanding Officer must approve PEBs based on usage data and cost per item. In many of the units visited, there were no allowances established, no recorded inventories, and no commander's approval. Some parts being held were for obsolete equipment and/or equipment the unit no longer possessed. Where there is a commander's approval, there often no justification for holding the quantity of assets on hand. In some cases, parts are being stored out in the elements and in time will become unserviceable.

Numerous twenty-foot containers were pointed out containing approved PEB and Class IX called PEBs. All were in excess of unit requirements and their ability to maintain. Few units are keeping accurate inventory so there is little information on how much funding is tied up in unused parts. Also, there may be parts that can be used by another unit in theater with an immediate need. A complete inventory of all Class IX being held by individual units would enable the Supply Management Unit (SMU) or MNF-W to effect a redistribution of parts as necessary.

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), as the wholesale agency, doesn't have visibility of the MNF-W overstock to effect redistribution to other units in theater.

Disposition of Excesses. MNF-W units' options for disposition of excesses have been addressed in three separate messages published by Headquarters Marine Corps Installations and Logistics (I&L) 031000Z Nov 05 and 290032Z Jun 06 and PP&O 071450Z Apr 06. These messages address all classes of serviceable and unserviceable supplies and equipment. Marine Corps orders and directives address the disposition of these items as well.

LOGCOM stood up a forward element to support retrograde, equipment rotation, and recoverable item returns and replacements. It also supports the retrograde of excess Class IX as a method of relieving MNF-W units of the burden of disposing of serviceable consumables when they are not required by the SMU or other units in theater.

Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO).

Currently DRMO is available in MNF-W AO to dispose of unserviceable assets only. However, the only DRMO facility available to MNF-W units is in Al Asad. The *DRMO AL-Asad*

Unserviceable Property Turn-In Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), published in February 2006 by DRMO, outlines the procedures for turn-in and indicates that DRMO is performing a disposal mission only. The SOP states that serviceable property will not be accepted. However, during the conduct of this IGMC Readiness Assessment, the Al Asad DRMO manager stated that the site will accept both serviceable and unserviceable assets.

Marine units are disposing of both serviceable and unserviceable items that are no longer needed. The Assessment Team found PEI, sensitive items (highly pilferable, special handling equipment), and Special Equipment Items (SEI) without proper disposition instructions from LOGCOM. This was also noted in the previous IGMC Readiness Assessments. Some units are turning in serviceable excess Class IX as well.



Marine Corps policies for the disposition of SEI are vague and conflict with local instructions. The Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS) process does not support the theater requirement to dispose of assets as they become unserviceable or are no longer needed. Several units have containers of items that they can't identify or know how they are to be used. In one case, a piece of SEI gear was sitting at DRMO when the team walked through. It was just turned in by a unit with a hand-written DD Form 1348-1 without proper disposition instructions.

An example of assets that are not easily disposed of by the owning units is excess printer cartridges. These cartridges have accumulated over time due to the numerous types of printers that were being used throughout MNF-W. Recent standardization of printers caused the accumulation and storage of a large amount of cartridges for printers that units no longer possess. These cartridges are being stored in twenty foot containers because of the number of them and they are unused, serviceable assets for which there are no disposal or disposition instructions. DRMO will not accept them because they are serviceable and not considered hazardous waste. DRMO will accept hazardous waste if packaged properly in United Nations approved containers per instructions provided on the DRMO Al Asad Website. The units find themselves between a rock and a

hard place; they can't use the cartridges because they no longer have the printer and they can't turn them into DRMO because they are serviceable.

Some geographically-dispersed units outside of Al Asad FOB reported difficulties in disposing of assets through DRMO. The consensus from commanders is that they do not want to place Marines at risk hauling materiel and excess consumables across high-risk Main Supply Routes (MSR) to the centralized Al Asad DRMO site. In addition to the danger, they don't want to waste the operator time, vehicle operating hours, and fuel to move what is essentially garbage.

Retrograde and Excess Gear. The retrograde of excess equipment is dependent upon the current owning unit's desire to release it and MNF-W's desire to decrease the footprint of the force. Following the 2006 IGMC Readiness Assessment, LOGCOM provided guidance for returning equipment through retrograde. Although there have been over 15,200 pieces of equipment turned in by units, there still remains a pool of equipment that is considered excess. Prior to the arrival of the IGMC team, MNF-W published a FRAGO requiring each unit to decrease their assets based on MNF-W's determination of excesses in theater. So far, the units are not meeting those percentages. As long as units amass and maintain so much extra equipment, maintenance costs will increase and the overall footprint of Marine Corps force will continue to grow.

Enhanced Supervised Utilization Program (ESUP) Vehicles Require Disposition. MNF-W is maintaining accountability for over 500 obsolete Marine Armor Kit (MAK) HMMWVs. 350 of these vehicles have been promised to be temporarily loaned to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) as part of the ESUP. During the time of the IGMC Readiness Assessment Team visit, nearly all of them had actually been turned over. An extension of the temp loan had been submitted by the previous MNF-W Commander and has since been approved by the Secretary of Defense extending the loan period until September 2008. Returning these vehicles to CONUS for needed repairs for resale will be extremely costly.



They are not being cared for in the same manor as they would if they were still in the hands of the Marine Corps. They have become burdensome to account for and manage. MNF-W has terminated the conduct of maintenance on the vehicles that are currently temp loaned. MNF-W, Marine Corps System Command (MCSC) Program Manager, and the International Program Team Leader are not against inducting these vehicles into the Foreign Military Sales program. However, the vehicles are still required by ISF in the MNF-W area of operations (AO).

Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Funding Used for Excess Supplies. During the end of Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07), the surge strategy resulted in an increase in the Marine Corps' footprint throughout the MNF-W AO. This included the stand-up of FOBs in outlying locations within Al Anbar Province, which increased costs in FY07. In addition to the surge, a plan to expand company-level FOBs in the future increased cost estimates. In a review of upcoming costs and support to deployed units, the Marine Corps provided GWOT funding at the end of FY07 to the SMU. These funds were used to purchase several million dollars' worth of Class IV (construction) stocks to support upcoming MNF-W building requirements. Almost concurrently, the Naval Construction Battalion (NCB) placed an order at the SMU to support the new strategy as well. In the end, the SMU placed orders for over two hundred fifty million dollars' worth of construction material. It was also noted that Marine Corps GWOT funding was provided to purchase Class IX during this same time, adding to the excessive amount of Class IX already being held by using units.

The success of the surge led to a reduction of forces and reduced requirements for Class IV. Unfortunately, massive amounts of ordered material are now being shipped to Iraq from CONUS. After it was determined that the requirement no longer existed, the SMU, with the support of the MLG, was able to halt the remaining shipments in Kuwait. Millions of dollars' worth of material was received and is now being stored outside and exposed to the elements. This has become known as the "Pine Mountain." Much of this material will become unserviceable over time, especially the wood and rubber items. This material may be a candidate for FMS, donation to ISF, or intra-theater redistribution.



Summary. Since the first IGMC Assessment, Marine units within MNF-W have held large amounts of excess PEI and Class IX. The only difference in this IGMC Readiness Assessment is the addition of Class IV. Much has been done by the institution to decrease the Marine Corps' footprint; however, it is an uphill battle. The fidelity of supply accountability data must be improved. It is clear that the EDL process needs to be revised and that there should be careful oversight to ensure that allowances are updated to reflect actual VII MEF equipment requirements. There should be some alternative to units holding equipment on-hand for unexpected future missions.

Efforts should be made to decrease the amount of excess Class IX that all units hold. With the responsive supply system at the SMU, there should be no need for individual units to hold more than a small amount of low density parts. Material donation and transfer programs are just now being developed at the MNF-I level. However, the successful outcome of these programs is yet to be determined.

Retrograde of equipment and DRMO have been keys to decreasing the amount of excess, but DRMO has to understand Marine Corps requirements for disposal of equipment and materiel. FMS and equipment donation and transfer programs may also be appropriate for the disposal of excess Classes IV and IX.

Although readiness of equipment is high, it is hard to determine if this is the result of LOGCOM equipment rotation programs, availability of excess Class IX in theater and at the unit level, and/or the ability of the units to rotate equipment internally due to excess on hand PEI. Removing or reducing any of these may cause readiness to drop. However, all of these factors are problematic in of themselves and degrade the Marine Corps' ability to

conduct other missions. In order to determine a solution to the problem, accountability of equipment and supplies must be improved immediately.

Chapter 2 - Fielding of New Equipment

Background. The Assessment Team identified several areas of concern regarding new equipment used in Iraq. Pre-deployment training, contracted logistic support (CLS) and the UUNS process consistently surfaced as areas that could be improved as new equipment is introduced to the operating forces. The UUNS process, in particular, continues to pose logistical, doctrinal and accounting challenges.

New Equipment Training (NET). In many cases Marines are not receiving proper training on newly fielded equipment prior to the equipment or the Marines arriving in Iraq. NET does occur on an occasional basis, but is far from standardized. Because many of the items in question are purchased and delivered through the UUNS process, they frequently fail to include traditional training support frameworks that accompany long-term Programs of Record (POR).

This is particularly true in the case of pre-deployment training. At the time of this IGMC Readiness Assessment, only four MRAPs were available at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) for use with MOJAVE VIPER and none were available at Yuma for DESERT TALON. As a result, very few drivers have been able to train on the vehicle and fewer still are able to obtain an MRAP driver's license prior to deployment. When these Marines arrive in Iraq, they must receive speedy and sometimes sub-optimal training before they and their units can operate with MRAPs. This was evident with several pieces of new equipment currently being used in theater.

Field Service Representatives (FSR)/Contracted Logistics Support (CLS). Some equipment purchased through either the UUNS process or a Program of Record (POR) is initially supported by contracted maintenance. FSR and CLS provide training and sustainment on much of this equipment. Unfortunately, most of the units visited agreed that current FSRs and CLS were inadequate to meet the needs of the geographically dispersed units.

FSRs are administratively controlled by MCSC but operationally controlled by MNF-W. It is difficult for MNF-W to have daily accountability and command and control over these FSRs because of the number of contracts being supported and the number and dispersion of FSR in the MNF-W

AO. In many cases, FSRs are inexperienced or untrained mechanics. Additionally, there are too few FSRs in theater, requiring many Marines to do the work of the FSRs, particularly in those areas where units are widely dispersed. Lastly, many CLS contracts in Iraq are beginning to expire, forcing Marines to learn how to repair equipment through on-the-job training (OJT).


New Theater-specific and Contracted Equipment in Iraq. As a result of the protracted deployment to Iraq, Marine units are increasingly operating from established FOBs. Standard Marine Corps equipment is increasingly being replaced by Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) equipment. Marines are then required to operate and maintain COTS equipment in theater that they normally would not train on in garrison. For example, computer equipment normally operated by Navy Marine Corps Communications Intranet (NMCI) personnel in CONUS has been replaced with non-NMCI hardware and is now operated by Marines. Communications network and power generation equipment are other examples.

In addition, non-ground combat units performing FOB security duties indicated that they received little to no training with MRAPs and systems like the Rifle Combat Optic (RCO), E1791, or the Laser Illuminator, E1798/E1779 (mounted on the M16 and M4 rifles). Other deployed units reported that they received no training with the Command Post of the Future (CPOF), which is now replacing the Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) in some areas. These personnel were trained on C2PC just prior to arriving in country.

Administrative officers encounter new systems that are unfamiliar as well. The Deployed Theater Accountability Software (DTAS) is being used for personnel tracking in Iraq despite a lack of pre-deployment training on the system. Other communications systems, such as the Tactical Operations Center Inter-Communication System (TOCNET), the Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), the Wireless Point-to-Point Link (WPPL) and the Storage Wide Area Network (SWAN) was introduced in theater without the requisite amount of operator training.

Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) Process. MARADMIN 045-06 provides guidance and policy regarding the UUNS process. Marine forces participating in combat and contingency operations often require acceleration of the

Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS), and rely on Combat Development and Integration (CD&I) to authorize the use of UUNS equipment to support the warfighter. The nature of the UUNS process is to provide rapid acquisition of a capability in order to meet an urgent requirement. Figure 4 shows the flow of the UUNS process.



4 Ver 5.0

Figure 4.

While the UUNS process has been successful in fielding critical items, the urgency with which the requests are processed can lead to unintended omissions. Insufficient training plans, inadequate spare parts procurement and poorly developed programmed repair capabilities can result from hastily fielding gear.

In accordance with MARADMIN 045-06 and the Marine Corps Systems Command's (MCSC) Fielding Process Handbook, CD&I is required to provide a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materials, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) assessment and solution identification to the Capabilities Development Integration Board (CDIB) for preparation of the Marine Requirement and Oversight Council (MROC) and final UUNS approval. DOTMLPF assessments are to be completed following an item's fielding and are used to determine if there are any shortfalls in the product provided to the customer.

Too often, DOTMLPF assessments are cursory and fail to provide adequate information and guidance to MCSC to support the item with spare parts, maintenance, and training. Examples include the Marine Corps Robot (MARCBOT) that lacks FSR support across the AO, and Biometric Automated Tool Sets (BATS) that are sustained by a 1 year warranty that fails to provide immediate repairs. MRAP vehicles also lack appropriate FSR support for maintenance and training, and the Ground Based Operational Surveillance System (GBOSS) lacks sufficient FSR support and parts for repairs. These deficiencies leave warfighters with sustainment, maintenance, and training capability shortfalls that should have been anticipated on the DOTMLPF assessment or through feedback from using units.

MCSC requires feedback from the warfighters on SEI equipment. This is not being completed. As indicated in the Naval Audit Service Audit Report of 28 September 2007, *Marine Corps Urgent Universal Need Statement Process*,

Fielded solutions are not tracked and data is not collected or analyzed to determine whether capabilities requested through UUNS process are effectively satisfying the warfighter's needs.

The feedback should be transmitted via the "Gaining Command Fielding Evaluation Report", which includes data utilized by the Project Manager at MCSC to help determine follow-on POR recommendations to the CD&I Integration Team and the Assistant Commander, Life Cycle Logistics (AC LCL) at MCSC. The MCSC AC LCL is responsible for establishing a cohesive and sustained program of life-cycle logistics to support both strategic policy implementation and individual program requirements.

Some SEIs are being fielded without TAMCN's. In accordance with MARADMIN 045-06 and MCSC Fielding Process Handbook, CD&I is required to enter a TAMCN into the TFSMS upon approval of an UUNS by the MROC. However, in some cases the SEI provided to theater as a result of the UUNS process doesn't have a TAMCN assigned. When that happens, each unit with that kind of gear requests a local TAMCN from the local SMU. This leads to multiple local TAMCNs for the same item of equipment throughout the Marine Corps enterprise. Therefore, the MCSC project manager loses

visibility of the items. This shortcoming is further exacerbated as MEF's perform RIP/TOA and assume custody of the gear with locally generated TAMCN's with which they are not familiar.

Because of the lack of assigned TAMCNs, poor supply accountability, unclear management policies and vague or missing disposition instructions, many SEI are locked away and forgotten or improperly sent to DRMO. Efforts are currently under way to fully inventory SEI which is a critical first step in improving management processes.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP). Because MRAPs are being used so extensively, they are now more likely to encounter IEDs than other types of vehicles, often resulting in catastrophic damage to springs, axles, wheels and tires. At the time of this IGMC Readiness Assessment, MNF-W units had fourteen M02 priority Equipment Repair Orders (ERO) open for axle-related parts with an average of 20.7 Days Deadlined (DDL), causing a degradation of readiness for operational units. Maintenance units and FSRs have identified the National Stock Numbers (NSN) in Figure 5 as being difficult to obtain because the NSNs are rejected as either invalid or requiring extremely long lead times from CONUS manufacturers.

Part Number	NSN	Nomenclature
2002487	5306-01-553-1506	BOLT, MACHINE
S1976	2510-01-540-1401	HANGER, SPRING
2003484	2530-01-557-6738	FRONT AXLE
N/A	2530-01-537-3979	WHEEL, TIRE ASSEMBLY
	2530-01-557-6738	AXLE

Figure 5.

In addition, fuel injectors are deadlining the MRAPs due to a possible engineering defect in the part itself. At the time of the IGMC Readiness Assessment there were 16 EROs with an average of 11 days deadlined, indicating that the SMU has no stockage of the necessary parts. The SMU recently open-purchased 60 fuel injectors for the MRAP from vendors (other than Caterpillar and Force Protection) in order to reduce the number of vehicles that are deadlined.



First and second generation MRAPs were fielded with spare tires, however third and fourth generation MRAPs are not. The lack of these spare tires for convoy operations has led units to conduct selective interchange by removing the front tires from one MRAP to provide spare tires for another vehicle, rendering some MRAPs inoperable. Wheel and tire assemblies for spares are among the difficult-to-obtain items listed above.

The external lighting system on current MRAPs is not adequate to identify suspected Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) during convoy operations. This shortcoming has led units to modify their vehicles by adding additional external lights. Without modification instructions, the additional lighting could cause system failure(s) as Marines are wiring the lights into the existing harness without proper instruction. The Joint Program Office (JPO) has procured a COTS lighting system but has only applied a few kits to the 1193 MRAPs used by MNF-W units. Moreover, personnel at the JPO in Al Taquaddum are reluctant to provide light kits to unit FSRs for installation.

Tactical vehicle licensing procedures and the availability of NET for the MRAP is inadequate for units deploying to Iraq. The units currently deployed did so with a disproportionately small number of MRAP operators compared to the actual numbers of MRAP vehicles they received in theater. During pre-deployment training at 29 Palms and Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, units were not provided the opportunity to train on the MRAP platform due to a limited availability of vehicles.

MRAPs are being fielded with an obsolete gunner restraint. The gunner sling currently installed was replaced in the M1043 heavy gun HMMWV and the M1114 up armored HMMWV during the 2005/2006 rotation. This obsolete sling provides no restraint to prevent the gunner from being ejected from the

turret during a roll over. MLG AC/S G-4 has submitted a subsequent UUNS to correct this issue.

Recovery of destroyed or inoperable MRAPs is being conducted without approved recovery procedures for Marine Corps specific recovery assets (e.g., MK-36 MTVR wrecker, M88 Tank Retriever and MK-48/15 LVS wrecker) which could result in additional damage to the MRAP, damage to the recovery vehicle, or serious injury to the recovery crew.

MRAP accountability is not being correctly reported in Marine Corps Equipment Readiness Information Tool (MERIT) as SASSY On-Hand. MNF-W has received 1193 vehicles via the SMU Initial Issue Point (IIP) however SASSY On-Hand figures at the time of the IGMC Readiness Assessment were 1182.

Two MRAPs are deadlined at the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) however the Recovery Item Report (WIR) instructions cannot be located. Both vehicles have been deadlined for an undetermined period of time and were on deck when the IMA unit arrived. Both vehicles are destroyed and all identification numbers are missing so it could not be determined at the time of the IGMC Readiness Assessment if these vehicles are still on the unit records.

Due to the nature of the problems with the MRAP, LOGCOM has initiated weekly video conferences with MARCENT and MCSC. Additionally, LOGCOM is beginning to build a stock of the NSNs that have been difficult for units to find or purchase. The NSNs identified in Figure 5 are included in that stockage.

Summary. The UUNS process has improved. However, the DOTMLPF assessment is not being followed through to ensure that MCSC and CD&I can support requirements of the units on the ground. There is very little useful feedback being provided by the receiving units to ensure a satisfactory product is purchased and fielded. Contracted operation and maintenance training for equipment being fielded is not sufficient to ensure the Marines are prepared to conduct operations when they deploy, requiring on-the-job training during deployment.

Chapter 3 - Equipment Rotation

Background. In 2005, HQMC (I&L and PP&O) directed the development of a PEI rotation plan to ensure the long-term readiness of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) equipment. The goal was to preserve the service life of equipment held by MNF-W, improve equipment operational availability, and enhance equipment capability.

Under the proposed plan, 53 TAMCN PEI were to be rotated based on depot-level repair availability, MCSC production rates, new acquisition programs, equipment operational test codes, and projected environmental survivability rates for equipment in theater.

Previous IGMC Readiness Assessments also addressed whether PEI rotation, programmed by LOGCOM/MCSC, would be adequate to support the long term requirements of units operating in Iraq. This chapter addresses the effect PEI rotation has had on equipment readiness rates of deployed forces within MNF-W.

Rotation Schedules. Figure 6 illustrates the overall PEI rotation process, however there are variations based on individual commodities (e.g. communications, motor transport, engineer, ordnance).

PEI Rotation Process




Figure 6.

Although the proposed PEI Rotation Plan was adopted, a portion of the equipment due to rotate during 2007 remained in theater. This occurred primarily because PEI rotation was removed from the Commandant's Priority of Sourcing. Other pressing initiatives, such as growing the Corps to 202,000 and establishing a Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC), also took precedence and diverted resources.

Despite this setback, LOGCOM was able to successfully rotate 66.5% of the planned equipment in 2007. This rotated equipment may have played a role in MNF-W maintaining over 90% readiness in all commodities of equipment.

Figure 7 shows the previous schedule for proposed and actual equipment rotated in 2006 and 2007. Figure 8 (following) shows the percentage summaries of equipment rotated based on proposed and executed numbers for 2006 and 2007.

2006 and 2007 PEI Rotation.

TAMCN	Nomenclature	2006		2007	
		Proposed	Executed	Proposed	Executed
A0020	DASC Airborne Sysan/TYQ-101	2	2	0	0
A1520	AN/TSQ-179(V)1	1	1	0	0
A1530	Beacon, Transponder Radar Multifunction	3	3	0	0
A1795	Radio Set	6	6	0	0
B0001	Air-Conditioner 60Hz,	15	15	0	0
B0002	Air-Conditioner 60Hz, 18,000 BTU, F18H-38A	51	49	0	0
B0012	Air Conditioner, F18T-MPI, 60/400Hz, 18 BTU	130	6	60	60
B0391	Container Handler 50,000lb	0	0	13	9
B0395	260 CFM Air Compressor	11	11	5	5
B0443	High Speed Mobility Crane	13	13	8	3
B0446	Air Mobile Crane	18	18	5	0
B0589	Excavator, ACE	2	2	5	1
B0730	MEP-Q112A 10KW Mil-Std Gen	205	205	0	0
B0891	MEP-803A 10KW Tactical Quiet Gen	303	300	0	0
B0921	MEP-0112A 10KW Mil-Std Gen	2	2	1	1
B0930	Generator, Magnum	22	22	5	5
B0953	MEP-805 30KW	160	160	80	80
B0971	MEP-114, 30 KW Mil-Std Gen 400Hz	4	4	1	1

B1021	MEP-006, 60KW Mil-Std Gen 60Hz	53	43	15	15
B1045	MEP-007B, 100 KW Mil-Std Gen 60Hz	22	22	15	15
B1082	Grader Rd Motor, 130 G	17	17	3	0
B1135	Helicopter Expedient, Refueling System (HERS)	8	8	0	0
B1922	Scraper-Tractor, Wheeled, 621B	14	14	4	0
B2127	Sweeper Runway	6	6	4	4
B2460	Tractor, Full-TrackeD, W/Angle Blade, T-5	20	20	8	0
B2462	Tractor w/ Bucket MC 155	30	30	5	0
B2464	Tractor, Ft, W/Multipurpose Bucket Case	9	9	3	0
B2561	Truck Forklift Extendable B	60	60	10	3
B2566	LRTF	45	45	10	0
B2567	Tractor Rt Articulated Strg	50	42	28	2
B2604	ROW PU	35	35	5	3
B2685	MCTWS	12	12	6	4
D0209	LVS MK48	61	55	46	2
D0215	M970	10	10	0	0
D0235	M870	24	24	15	15
D0876	Container Hauler 4x4 M	47	47	30	16
D0877	Trlr Wrecker Recovery LVS	2	2	3	0
D0878	Trlr 5th Whl 4x4 MK16	7	7	0	0
D0879	Trlr 20T 4x4 MK17	3	3	0	0
D0880	Trlr Tank WTR M149	23	23	10	10
D0881	Trailer, MK18	8	8	30	4
D1064	P19	6	6	4	0
D1134	Trk Tractor M818/M931	12	12	0	0
D1213	WRECKER	3	3	6	0
E0796	AAVC7A1	2	2	0	0
E0846	AAVP7A1	86	86	0	0
E0856	AAVR7A1	4	3	0	0
E0846	LAV Command/Control LAV-C2	0	0	10	10
E0947	LAV-25	0	0	63	63
E0848	LAV Logistics	0	0	17	17
E0849	LAV Mortar	0	0	8	8
E0850	LAV Recovery	0	0	5	5
E1378	Recovery Veh Full Track M88	4	4	3	2
E1888	M1A1	32	32	17	17
E1906	DSESTS	3	0	5	0
E1976	AN/PAS-13	6	0	0	0

Figure 7.

PEI Rotation			
Year	Planned	Executed	Percentage
2006	1,672	1,509	90.25%
2007	571	380	66.54%

Figure 8.

Readiness of PEI. The rotation of equipment during 2006 and 2007 enabled the Marine Corps to lengthen the life cycle of equipment deployed to Iraq. This was accomplished by preventing premature aging of equipment through rebuilds, and limiting wear and tear by utilizing other Marine Corps assets.

All commodities of equipment improved in readiness once the plan was established, starting with the induction of equipment into the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) of the Army Material Command (AMC) in Kuwait in 2005. In 2006, the Marine Corps began rotating equipment in bulk back to LOGCOM. As a result, readiness has increased from an average of 94.25% to 95.75%, with engineer equipment experiencing the greatest increase. As indicated in Figure 7 above, high density equipment such as generators has seen a significant level of rotation. Figure 9 below shows the resultant increase in readiness.

Date	Communication	Engineer	Motor Transport	Ordnance
2 nd Qtr 05	98%	89%	93%	97%
3 rd Qtr 05	97%	86%	90%	97%
4 th Qtr 05	98%	88%	93%	98%
1 st Qtr 06	98%	88%	93%	98%
2 nd Qtr 06	98%	91%	95%	98%
3 rd Qtr 06	98%	88%	93%	97%
4 th Qtr 06	99%	92%	94%	98%
1 st Qtr 07	98%	92%	93%	99%
2 nd Qtr 07	99%	94%	94%	99%
3 rd Qtr 07	98%	93%	92%	98%
4 th Qtr 07	99%	92%	93%	99%

Figure 9.

Equipment not rotated as planned in 2007 (33%) may become non-mission capable as it quickly reaches the end of its life cycle. This is particularly the case with items such as forklifts and LVSS, which are being operated at record rates and may not have been rotated or inducted into the SLEP.

Future Rotation. The 2008 PEI Rotation Plan is currently underway and was recently placed back on the Commandant's Priority of Sourcing. A total of 1,200 PEI have been proposed for rotation, of which 370 have been shipped and received. An additional 39 are currently in transit.

2009 PEI rotation requirements are currently being analyzed, and LOGCOM is developing a strategy to support a rotation plan through 2011. Any new plan must include the remaining 48 TAMCNS that were not included in the original 2005 analysis, equipment that was not rotated in 2007, and new equipment that has been fielded since 2005.

Low Density High Demand Equipment. Low density equipment, primarily Bravo TAMCNS, is almost impossible to rotate because there are no assets available at LOGCOM to swap. Competing requirements throughout the Marine Corps impact LOGCOM's ability to maintain a pool of equipment available to rotate with units in Iraq. Given the high demand for this equipment and the lack of replacements to establish an effective rotation, it is likely the shortage will have a major impact on future operational readiness.

Summary. There is evidence that the equipment rotation plan is helping to extend the life cycle of PEIs and contributing to high equipment readiness rates in MNF-W. Rates have steadily increased for all commodities of equipment from 2005 through 2007. Unit equipment readiness will be adversely affected by accelerated aging. Future equipment rotation plans need to include all equipment currently deployed to MNF-W, including newly fielded equipment.

Chapter 4 - Status Of Resources and Training System (SORTS) Reporting

Background. SORTS is used by the Marine Corps to assess its ability organize, train, maintain, and equip forces for use by Combatant Commanders. Currently, SORTS is the only readiness tool for capturing resource levels and providing information, per Title 10, on the status of a unit and its ability to undertake assigned missions. The Marine Corps continues to make improvements to the procedures and policies that govern SORTS reporting, however problems remain and were certainly evident in Iraq.

Training. The procedures for updating and reporting information in SORTS are outlined in MCO P3000.13D. Because of the intricacies of the SORTS reporting system, Marines have previously received detailed training to qualify them as SORTS clerks. Training was normally mandated by commanding officers who understood the value in obtaining up to date information that would enhance their reporting capabilities. This training was provided by Mobile Training Teams from Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O) or through distance learning via MarineNet. Unfortunately, both of these training methods were canceled as of September 2007 by PP&O.

As a result of the cancellation, commanders are now deploying with Marines who do not have a full understanding of how to produce effective SORTS reports. Clerks are often young Marines who are new to the unit and have received little to no training in SORTS procedures. In fact, as more senior Marines who have been properly trained eventually depart a unit, their corporate knowledge is lost. In many cases, the S-3 Officer also lacks knowledge of SORTS procedures and is unable to provide the necessary training to the clerk. A review of reports that have been submitted in theater indicates that in most cases, the full capability of the units assessed was not properly captured in the SORTS reports.

Reporting Inconsistencies. The IGMC team determined units were using several methods of reporting readiness. For example, some units currently in Iraq, with half or part of the parent unit remaining in CONUS, were only reporting assets and personnel that were deployed. Some units were reporting only the equipment correctly listed on the EDL, but not the equipment on hand.

Summary. The cancellation of formal SORTS training sponsored by PP&O has led to a decrease in the overall effectiveness of the SORTS program. Clerks are generally unable to maximize reporting accuracy and timeliness because of a lack of basic knowledge of the system. Compounding the problem is a lack of understanding by operations officers.

As a result of this inadequate training, many units use inconsistent reporting methods. This reduces the ability of higher headquarters to accurately assess equipment readiness levels enterprise-wide.

Chapter 5 - Warrior Open Purchase Request Router (WOPRR)

Background. The Warfighter Open Purchase Request Router (WOPRR) is a web-based, theater-specific tool that is used to initiate, track and approve all open purchase requests within MNF-W. Based on interviews with supply officers and users in the AO, the WOPRR is considered a very useful tool. However it does lack many capabilities that could optimize its performance.

Tracking Purchases. The WOPRR is generally unable to identify in-transit tracking information of items that have been shipped (e.g. UPS, DHL and FEDEX tracking numbers). This limits various echelons of commands from receiving real-time information on the status of a given shipment and reduces the overall effectiveness of the router.

WOPRR should be evaluated to determine if it is compatible with PR Builder, which is currently used as the primary Marine Corps enterprise-wide non-deployable accounting system. Linking the two systems would streamline efforts and create a common accounting picture that could be used by contracting personnel to capture global data.

Prioritizing Requests. The WOPRR does not have a function that forces units to prioritize equipment requirements. This is particularly important for deadlined items, which require expedited processing that should supersede routine maintenance shipments. Due to the "first-in, first-out" nature of the current process, a unit could have 20 deadlined items pending approval in the WOPRR that receive a low priority status. Since the SMU and MNF-W Contracting Officers are unable to determine priority shipments they simply process orders as they receive them. Magnify this process hundreds of times daily and it becomes clear that implementing a system to prioritize each request would allow the SMU and the Contracting Officer to better respond to the urgent needs of deployed units.

Data Management. Usage data is not captured when the WOPRR is used to request a repair part for equipment. The SMU is therefore unable to anticipate shortages and re-stock their inventories accordingly.

The WOPRR also has a "history statement" function that is not being used properly. Units in theater indicate the

comments portion of each WOPRR transaction should include more accurate and descriptive history statements. This will better explain the exact status of requests when a user follows-up after completion.

SOP. There is currently no adequate SOP directing the use of the WOPRR. Units utilize a rudimentary one-page list of instructions posted on the WOPRR web page.

Summary. The WOPRR is generally unable to identify in-transit tracking information of items that have been shipped. In addition, WOPRR is currently operated separately from PR builder (the primary non-deployable accounting system for the Marine Corps). Requests are not prioritized at the unit level resulting in delayed deliveries of important items. Data management can be improved to capture usage data and reflect accurate history statements. WOPRR managers need to develop an official, comprehensive SOP to aid users at the unit level.

Chapter 6 - Recommendations

Excess Assets

1. Review the existing EDL validation and updating processes to ensure they meet the needs of units in MNF-W AO.
(MNF-W/MARCENT)
2. Submit Table of Organization and Equipment Change Request (TOECR) to adjust EDL allowances for equipment that has been rotated out of MNF-W as well as new and additional equipment that has been added to MNF-W's EDL.
(MNF-W/MARCENT)
3. Ensure that commanders maintain accurate and timely records of all equipment allowances and on hand quantities. **(MNF-W)**
4. Ensure that each unit deploying into the MNF-W AO has a library of all published procedures governing the appropriate disposition of serviceable and unserviceable assets. **(MNF-W/MARCENT)**
5. Improve oversight to ensure units are complying with established orders, directives, and instructions governing supply accountability. **(MNF-W/MARCENT/I&L)**
6. Conduct an IGMC Readiness Assessment of home-station equipment shortages, supply accountability procedures and readiness. Identify near, mid, and far-term measures to improve data management and equipment readiness reporting. **(IGMC/I&L/PP&O)**
7. Assess the utility of establishing additional Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) facilities at Al Taqaddum and Fallujah.
(MNF-W/MARCENT/I&L)
8. Ensure that DRMS/DRMO understands Marine Corps policies and regulations for disposing of PEI and MARES reportable equipment. Request DRMS/DRMO support in ensuring that units do not turn in PEI without proper disposition instructions. **(I&L/MARCENT/MNF-W)**

9. Assess the utility of a theater ground preposition plan to hold contingency equipment for near-term requirements within the CENTCOM AOR. **(PP&O/I&L/LOGCOM/MARCENT)**
10. Create and implement a comprehensive plan to transfer excess and theater specific equipment to the Iraqi government through FMS or other appropriate donation or transfer programs. **(MCSC/LOGCOM/PP&O)**

Fielding Of New Equipment

11. Review procedures to ensure UUNS items are fully supportable in theater. Ensure the DOTMLPF assessments are conducted and followed through in support of fielding the new equipment. **(MCCDC/MCSC/LOGCOM)**
12. Ensure that directed disposition instructions are provided upon fielding of all SEI. **(MCCDC/MCSC/LOGCOM)**
13. Establish procedures for commands to provide feedback on all UUNS equipment utilizing the "Gaining Command Fielding Evaluation Report." **(MCCDC/MCSC/MARCENT/MNF-W)**
14. Ensure New Equipment Training (NET), Field Service Representative (FSR) and Contracted Logistics Support (CLS) support is sufficient to meet all unit requirements in MNF-W AO and incorporate procedures to evaluate operator and maintenance proficiency. **(MCSC/MCCDC)**

Equipment Rotation

15. Reevaluate the 33 percent of equipment outstanding from the 2007 PEI Rotation Plan to determine its remaining service life and the value of rotating it in 2008. **(MNF-W/MARCENT/LOGCOM/PP&O)**
16. Reevaluate the 2008 and subsequent PEI Rotation Plans include other equipment that was not included in the original rotation plan. This includes equipment newly fielded since 2005. **(MNF-W/MARCENT/LOGCOM/PP&O)**

SORTS REPORTING

17. Provide standardized training for Marines involved in SORTS reporting at all levels of command. Institute pre-deployment SORTS training. **(PP&O/MS)**

18. Establish a clear policy identifying SORTS reporting procedures for units deployed into MNF-W AO. **(PP&O/MNF-W/MARCENT)**
19. Establish an oversight process to ensure commanders use accurate data to report SORTS readiness levels for forward and remain behind elements. **(PP&O)**

WOPRR

20. Determine if PR Builder program can be used directly with the accounting system in MNF-W and if linking these systems is worthwhile and technically feasible. **(P&R/I&L)**
21. Develop a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for using and updating the WOPRR. **(MNF-W)**
22. Improve WOPRR software to include in-transit visibility and prioritization of requests. **(MNF-W)**

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APPENDIX A - ACRONYMS

AO	AREA OF OPERATION
AOR	AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
BCT	BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
BFT	BLUE FORCE TRACKER
C2PC	COMMAND AND CONTROL PERSONAL COMPUTER
CD&I	COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
CEB	COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION
CENTCOM	CENTRAL COMMAND
CLS	CONTRACT LOGISTICS SUPPORT
CMR	CONSOLIDATED MEMORANDUM RECEIPT
CONUS	CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES
COP	COMMON OPERATIONS PICTURE
CPOF	COMMAND POST OF THE FUTURE
DLA	DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
DOTMLP	DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, MATERIAL, LEADERSHIP, PERSONNEL, AND FACILITIES
DRMO	DEFENSE REUTILIZATION AND MARKETING OFFICE
DRMS	DEFENSE REUTILIZATION AND MARKETING SERVICE
DRRS	DEFENSE READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM
EDL	EQUIPMENT DENSITY LIST
EOD	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
ERO	EQUIPMENT REPAIR ORDER
ESUP	ENHANCED SUPERVISED UTILIZATION PROGRAM
FIS	FORWARD IN STORES
FMS	FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
FOB	FORWARD OPERATING BASE
FRAGO	FRAG ORDER
FSR	FIELD SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE
GBOSS	GROUND BASED OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
HMMWV	HIGHLY MOBILE MULTI-WHEELED VEHICLE
IED	IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
I&L	INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS
IMA	INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY
JPO	JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE
LOGCOM	LOGISTICS COMMAND
LVS	LOGISTICS VEHICLE SYSTEM
MAGTF	MARINE CORPS AIR GROUND TASK FORCE
MAK	MARINE ARMOR KIT
MAL	MECHANIZED ALLOWANCE LIST
MAP	MEU (MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT) AUGMENTATION POOL
MARCENT	MARINE CORPS CENTRAL COMMAND
MARES	MARINE CORPS ALLOWANCE READINESS EVALUATION SYSTEM
MCCDC	MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

MCSC	MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND
MERIT	MARINE CORPS EQUIPMENT READINESS INPUT TOOL
MNF-I	MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IRAQ
MNF-W	MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WEST
MOS	MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY
MRAP	MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTIVE VEHICLE
MROC	MARINE REQUIREMENT OVERSIGHT COUNCIL
MSR	MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE
MTVR	MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENT
MWSS	MARINE WING SUPPORT SQUADRON
NET	NEW EQUIPMENT TRAINING
OEF	OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
OIF	OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
OJT	ON THE JOB TRAINING
PEB	PRE-EXPENDED BIN
PEI	PRINCIPLE END ITEM
PP&O	PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS
RBE	REMAIN BEHIND EQUIPMENT
RCT	REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
RIP/TOA	RELIEF IN PLACE/TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
ROE	RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
SEI	SPECIAL EQUIPMENT ITEM
SLEP	SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM
SMU	SUPPLY MANAGEMENT UNIT
SOP	STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
SORTS	STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM
SSA	SERVICES SUPPORT ACTIVITY (US ARMY)
TAMCN	TABLE OF AUTHORIZED MATERIAL CONTROL NUMBER
TFSMS	TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
TOA	TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
TOCNET	TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER INTER COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
TOECR	TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT CHANGE REQUEST
UAH	UP ARMORED HMMWV
UNS	UNIVERSAL NEEDS STATEMENT
UUNS	URGENT UNIVERSAL NEEDS STATEMENT
WOPRR	WARRIOR OPEN PURCHASE REQUEST ROUTER

APPENDIX B - REFERENCES

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